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SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined a worksite “safety consultant” (PSS) did not exercise sufficient supervisory control to be held liable under the Labor Law. Plaintiff was injured when he fell through a plywood covered hole in a ramp. The decision has detailed recitations of the black letter law requirements for Labor law 240(1), 241 (6) and 200 causes of action:

PSS submitted evidence demonstrating that its role at the work site was only one of general supervision, and that it did not have the authority to control the work performed or the safety precautions taken by the general contractor and the plaintiff’s employer, which is insufficient to impose liability on a safety consultant under the Labor Law … .

“To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work'” … . ” A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed'” … . ” [T]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor’s work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence'” … . Where a plaintiff’s injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a contractor may be liable under Labor Law § 200 ” only if it had control over the work site and either created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it'” … . Moreover, an entity is not deemed to be an agent of an owner or contractor for purposes of Labor Law § 200 if it “lacked sufficient control over the premises and the activity that brought about the injury” … . Marquez v L & M Dev. Partners, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 05631, 2nnd Dept 7-27-16

 

LABOR LAW (SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/SAFETY CONSULTANT (LABOR LAW, (SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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CRITERIA FOR REVEIW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, upholding Family Court’s custody determination, offered a concise description of the analytical criteria:

There is “no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent” … . The essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best interests of the children … , which are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances … . In making a determination as to what custody arrangement is in the children’s best interests, the court should consider the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the children, the ability of each parent to provide for the children’s emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the children, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the children’s relationship with the other parent … . The court should also consider the children’s wishes, weighed in light of their ages and maturity … . “As a custody determination depends to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, the findings of the Family Court will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . Matter of Schultheis v Schultheis, 2016 NY Slip Op 05648, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

FAMILY LAW (CRITERIA FOR REVIEW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)/CUSTODY (CRITERIA FOR RREVEIW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)/APPPEALS (FAMILY LAW, CRITERIA FOR REVIEW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)

RELIANCE ON A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY AT TRIAL WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE JURISDICTION CRITERIA ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF FAIR NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conspiracy conviction, determined the difference between the jurisdictional allegations in the indictment and the jurisdiction theory relied on at trial deprived defendant of fair notice of the charges against him:

Proof at trial that varies from an indictment may compromise the defendant’s right to fair notice of the charges and his or her right to have those charges determined by the grand jury … . Here, the indictment alleged jurisdiction in Kings County on the basis of overt acts committed in Kings County. However, the proof at trial did not support that theory and, as charged to the jury, jurisdiction in Kings County was based on conduct which had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon Kings County pursuant to CPL 20.40(2)(c). As the evidence presented at trial varied from the indictment, and, contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant did not have fair notice of the jurisdictional theory presented to the jury, the judgment convicting the defendant of conspiracy in the second degree must be reversed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial … . People v Wilson, 2016 NY Slip Op 05660, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

CRIMINAL LAW (RELIANCE ON A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY AT TRIAL WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE JURISDICTION CRITERIA ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF FAIR NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/INDICTMENTS (RELIANCE ON A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY AT TRIAL WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE JURISDICTIONAL CRITERIA ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF FAIR NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JURISDICTION (CRIMINAL LAW, CONSPIRACY CHARGE, RELIANCE ON A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY AT TRIAL WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE  JURISDICTIONAL CRITERIA ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF FAIR NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

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WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Balkin, determined, where liability is conceded by stipulation, prejudgment interest runs from the date of the subsequent damages verdict, not the date of the stipulation. Here the damages trial was held 2 1/2 years after the stipulation was entered. Had liability been determined by “verdict, report or decision,” interest would have run from the liability determination:

When the determinations of liability and damages are made together, the computation of prejudgment interest under CPLR 5002 is straightforward … . When, however, the determinations of liability and damages are bifurcated, the general rule is that prejudgment interest under CPLR 5002 runs from the date of the “verdict, report or decision” as to liability, rather than from the date of the “verdict, report or decision” as to damages … . * * *

Stipulations are different. They are not adjudications made by a third party, but voluntary agreements, or contracts, by which the opposing parties themselves chart their own course in a way that makes sense for them… . * * *

Clearly, the Legislature did not expressly include stipulations in CPLR 5002. Had the Legislature wished to include stipulations, it easily could have done so, as it has in other statutes… . Mahoney v Brockbank, 2016 NY Slip Op 05630, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT)/NEGLIGENCE (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT)/PREJUDGMENT INTEREST (WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT)/INTEREST (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT)/DAMAGES (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, WHERE LIABILITY IS CONCEDED BY STIPULATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RUNS FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGES VERDICT)

PROPER VENUE FOR CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS STARTED IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST ACTION WAS STARTED.

The Second Department determined the proper venue for consolidated actions which had been started in different counties was the county in which the first action was started:

… [I]n the absence of special circumstances, where the actions have been commenced in different counties, venue should be placed in the county having jurisdiction over the action commenced first … . Since venue properly lies in Richmond County with respect to this action, the first of the three subject actions to be commenced, venue of the action commenced in the Supreme Court, Kings County, and venue of the action commenced in the Civil Court, Queens County, should have been transferred to Richmond County. Oboku v New York City Tr. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 05635, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROPER VENUE FOR CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS STARTED IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST ACTION WAS STARTED)/VENUE (PROPER VENUE FOR CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS STARTED IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST ACTION WAS STARTED)

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REVIEW CRITERIA FOR A SMALL CLAIMS RULING EXPLAINED; SMALL CLAIMS FINDING THAT A CONTRACT WAS UNENFORCEABLE AS UNCONSCIONABLE UPHELD.

Reversing the Appellate Term, the Second Department explained the review criteria for a Small Claims Court (District Court) ruling. The Second Department upheld the Small Claims determination a contract was unenforceable as unconscionable:

An appeal from a small claims judgment is permitted “on the sole ground that substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (Uniform Dist Ct Act § 1807). ” Accordingly, a small claims judgment may not be overturned simply because the determination appealed from involves an arguable point on which an appellate court may differ; the deviation from substantive law must be readily apparent and the court’s determination clearly erroneous'” … .

Here, the District Court’s determination that the subject contract was unenforceable according to its literal terms because it was unconscionable was not clearly erroneous … . Tranquility Salon & Day Spa, Inc. v Caira, 2016 NY Slip Op 05637, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

 

CONTRACT LAW (REVIEW CRITERIA FOR A SMALL CLAIMS RULING EXPLAINED; SMALL CLAIMS FINDING THAT A CONTRACT WAS UNENFORCEABLE AS UNCONSCIONABLE UPHELD)/APPEALS (SMALL CLAIMS, CRITERIA FOR A SMALL CLAIMS RULING EXPLAINED; SMALL CLAIMS FINDING THAT A CONTRACT WAS UNENFORCEABLE AS UNCONSCIONABLE UPHELD)/SMALL CLAIMS (APPEAL, (REVIEW CRITERIA FOR A SMALL CLAIMS RULING EXPLAINED; SMALL CLAIMS FINDING THAT A CONTRACT WAS UNENFORCEABLE AS UNCONSCIONABLE UPHELD)

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DETAILS OF ARRESTS JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF PISTOL PERMIT.

The Second Department determined the petitioner’s failure to disclose the details of his prior arrests justified denial of a pistol permit:

Penal Law § 400.00(1), which sets forth the eligibility requirements for obtaining a pistol license, requires, inter alia, that the applicant be at least 21 years of age, of good moral character with no prior convictions of a felony or serious offense, a person who has not had a license revoked or who is not under a suspension or ineligibility order, and a person “concerning whom no good cause exists for the denial of the license” … . “A pistol licensing officer has broad discretion in ruling on permit applications and may deny an application for any good cause” … .

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the licensing officer’s determination that good cause existed to deny his application for a pistol license was not arbitrary and capricious. The petitioner failed to disclose all of the required details of his three prior arrests, thus hindering the licensing officer’s ability to determine his moral fitness to possess a pistol. Matter of Praino v Forman, 2016 NY Slip Op 05572, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

PISTOL PERMITS (FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DETAILS OF ARRESTS JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF PISTOL PERMIT)

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DISCLOSURE OF TOWN EMAIL LIST PROPERLY ORDERED.

The Second Department determined the town board did not articulate any valid reason for refusing to disclose an email list (gblist) consisting of the addresses of town residents who wished to be kept informed of news on matters of public concern:

 

Here, the Town parties did not articulate the applicability of any enumerated exemptions under Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b), nor did they show that the privacy interests at stake outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the information … . The petitioner seeks “to further the public discourse on matters of public importance and concern in the Town” by obtaining the names and email addresses of those persons who subscribe to the gblist—persons who have willingly divulged that information to the Town so that they may receive news and information, in electronic form, on matters of public concern in the Town. The Town parties did not articulate any privacy interest that would be at stake in the disclosure of the records. The Town parties’ contention that disclosure of the requested email addresses would render the gblist subscribers more susceptible to phishing, spamming, and other email scams is speculative; the Town parties failed to show that disclosure of the information would make the gblist subscribers more susceptible to such acts than they ordinarily would be. Matter of Livson v Town of Greenburgh, 2016 NY Slip Op 05570, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (DISCLOSURE OF TOWN EMAIL LIST PROPERLY ORDERED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW, DISCLOSURE OF TOWN EMAIL LIST PROPERLY ORDERED)

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WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the finding that appellant, had he been an adult, would have committed criminal possession of a weapon (and related offenses) was against the weight of the evidence. The Second Department clearly explained its role in a weight of the evidence review and essentially rejected the testimony of the arresting officers:

 

In conducting our weight of the evidence review, we have a responsibility to affirmatively review the record; independently assess all of the proof; substitute our own credibility determinations for those made by the Family Court in an appropriate case; determine whether the Family Court’s determination was factually correct; and acquit the appellant if we are not convinced that the Family Court’s adjudication of the appellant as a juvenile delinquent was proven beyond a reasonable doubt … . * * *

The reasonable inferences to be made from the officers’ collective testimony were that at least two other individuals were with the appellant at the time of his arrest and, contrary to the initial testimony that the appellant was the only person observed in the area of the firearm, multiple individuals were in the vicinity of the firearm at the relevant time.

In addition, when the appellant was brought to the precinct, he denied possessing the firearm and asked Officer Thomas to check to see if there were cameras in the area of the incident. Officer Thomas testified that at the end of his shift on the date in question, he returned to the scene and viewed surveillance video from a store in the area. However, he did not take notes or ask for a copy of the video, and he “completely forgot to notify anybody” of his investigation or record it in his memo book. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, he could not recall whether the video he viewed depicted the street at the relevant time. Matter of Trevor S., 2016 NY Slip Op 05574, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/EVIDENCE (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/CRIMINAL LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/APPEALS (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)

FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the guardianship petition should not have been denied solely because the petitioner did not comply with the order requiring the fingerprinting of petitioner as part of a criminal background check. Family Court did not have the authority to require fingerprinting:

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, there is no express statutory fingerprinting requirement in a proceeding such as this pursuant to Family Court Act § 661(a) for “[g]uardianship of the person of a minor or infant” … . Consequently, it was improper for the Family Court to dismiss the petition based solely on the petitioner’s failure to comply with a directive to obtain fingerprinting… . Matter of Silvia N. P. L. v Jorge M. N. P., 2016 NY Slip Op 05567, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/GUARDIANSHIP (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/FINGERPRINTING (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)

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