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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE.

In an action for partition and sale of a four-family brownstone, the Second Department determined Supreme Court properly determined there was a question of fact whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy:

“A person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or tenant in common, in which he [or she] has an estate of inheritance, or for life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners” (RPAPL 901[1]). “The right to partition is not absolute, however, and while a tenant in common has the right to maintain an action for partition pursuant to RPAPL 901, the remedy is always subject to the equities between the parties” … . “The actual physical partition of property is the preferred method and is presumed appropriate unless one party demonstrates that actual physical partition would cause great prejudice, in which case the property must be sold at public auction” … .

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is a question of fact as to whether physical partition or sale of the subject property is appropriate … . Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which sought a sale of the property, and properly appointed a referee to determine whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy. Perretta v Perretta, 2016 NY Slip Op 06814, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

REAL PROPERTY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PHYSICAL PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE.

The Second Department determined the People were entitled to a writ of prohibition re: a County Court Judge’s order that they produce the names of all lab personnel whose initials appeared on lab report concerning DNA test results. The People had notified defense counsel persons at the lab had cheated on an exam for certification for use of a DNA software program. The software program was not used in defendant’s case. The People provided defense counsel with the names of the two persons implicated in the cheating whose initials appeared on the lab report. Defense counsel requested the names of all the persons whose initials were on the report. County Court granted that request:

…[T]he only relevant inquiry is whether or not [the judge’s] actions exceeded his authorized powers … . We conclude that Judge De Rosa exceeded his authority by directing the People to make available to the defendant the full names corresponding to the initials that appear on the subject laboratory reports … . Nothing contained in CPL 240.20 imposes an obligation on the People to respond to the defendant’s questions concerning notations that appear in discoverable materials, or to affirmatively create or compile material, or obtain it from sources beyond their control … . Matter of Hoovler v De Rosa, 2016 NY Slip Op 06830, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

JUDGES (WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/PROHIBITION, WRIT OF (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE

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ERROR TO ALLOW PROSECUTOR TO IMPEACH HER OWN WITNESS WITH THE WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The Second Department determined the allowing the prosecutor to impeach her own witness with the witness’s grand jury testimony, allowing inadmissible hearsay, together with the prosecutor’s improper remarks in summation, required reversal in the interest of justIce:

… [A] new trial is warranted as a result of two evidentiary errors, both of which were compounded by improper remarks made during the People’s summation. Specifically, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecutor to impeach one of her own witnesses, who testified at trial that it was dark at the time of the shooting and she “couldn’t really see” the shooter. The prosecutor was permitted to read that witness’s prior grand jury testimony, in which she stated that she recognized the shooter as a person going by the nickname of E-Villain. This was error … . Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief … , telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct contradiction to the witness’s trial testimony, that “[she] saw who it was.”

The Supreme Court also erred in allowing another witness to testify that a “little girl said that [the defendant] shot [the victim]” … . Moreover, on summation, the prosecutor not only repeated the improper hearsay testimony but also mispresented the defendant as having told one of the witnesses, “You know what, that little girl that told you that was a hundred percent right.” People v Thomas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06851, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/GRAND JURY (PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/IMPEACHMENT (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)

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POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined evidence of defendant’s intoxication should not have been suppressed. The arresting officer approached defendant’s car because she was stopped for some time behind a police cruiser which was blocking the turning lane. The Second Department ruled that the officer did not need a suspicion of criminal activity to approach the defendant and ask for her license, insurance card and registration. In the course of interacting with the defendant, the officer noticed signs of intoxication:

Based on the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, the officer had an objective, credible reason for approaching the defendant’s vehicle and asking for her license, registration, and insurance card. The defendant’s vehicle was oddly stopped in the left turning lane behind the officer’s vehicle, when it was obvious that she could not make a left turn. The defendant could have easily proceeded north on Oceanside Road, but instead stopped her vehicle for several minutes behind the officer’s vehicle. Under these circumstances, the officer had an objective, credible reason to approach the defendant’s vehicle and request information … . People v Karagoz, 2016 NY Slip Op 06842, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 CRIMINAL LAW (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/STREET STOPS (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (STREET STOP, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court committed reversible error when it, in the absence of defendant, received the verdict sheet from the jury indicating an impasse on two counts and sent the verdict sheet back to the jury with a message, conveyed by a court officer, to indicate what the jury’s issues were:

This message communicated to the jury that the court was rejecting the verdict and was, in effect, instructing the jury to continue deliberations. Indeed, approximately 10 minutes later, the jury sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict on one of the two counts upon which the jury had earlier been unable to reach a verdict. An instruction to continue deliberations when the jury has indicated an inability to reach a verdict is not a mere “ministerial” matter … . Thus, the defendant was absent during a material stage of the trial, and the trial court improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial staff member … . People v Gray, 2016 NY Slip Op 06839, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/JURIES (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/COURT OFFICERS (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)

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DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL.

The Second Department, affirming the Court of Claims, determined the state was protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs were injured when a van in which they were riding struck a highway guardrail and concrete pillar. The complaint alleged the guardrail was not long enough:

To establish its entitlement to qualified immunity, the governmental body must demonstrate “that the relevant discretionary determination by the governmental body was the result of a deliberate decision-making process” … . “A municipality is entitled to qualified immunity where a governmental planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury'” … . Accordingly, where the decision made by the municipality or governmental body was not the product of a governmental plan or study, the doctrine of qualified immunity is inapplicable … .

Here, the Court of Claims correctly applied the doctrine of qualified immunity based on the evidence the defendants submitted at trial that the guardrail was designed pursuant to the design standards set forth by the New York State Department of Transportation, which were the result of a deliberate decision-making process of the type afforded immunity from judicial interference … . Ramirez v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06815, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

COURT OF CLAIMS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/HIGHWAYS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GUARDRAILS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)

PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court abused its discretion when it ruled two lawsuits joined for trial could be held in the county where the second of the two actions, as opposed to the first, was commenced:

“[W]here actions commenced in different counties have been consolidated [or joined for trial] pursuant to CPLR 602, the venue should be placed in the county where the first action was commenced, unless special circumstances are present, which decision is also addressed to the sound discretion of the court” … . Here, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in placing the venue of the joint trial in Queens County, since EMB [the defendants in the second suit] failed to establish the existence of special circumstances that would warrant a departure from the general rule … . Tieshmaker v EMB Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06819, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)/VENUE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)

COTENANT ACQUIRED THE OTHER COTENANT’S INTEREST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.

The Second Department determined, under the law applicable at the time, a cotenant in possession (Midgley, Jr.) acquired full title to the property (i.e., acquired the cotenant’s interest) by adverse possession:

Midgley, Sr., left his estate, in equal parts, to Midgley, Jr., and a man named Robert E. Sayre, Sr. (hereinafter Sayre, Sr.). Midgley, Jr., claimed that, in 1971, Sayre, Sr., refused to participate in the operation or maintenance of the property and that Midgley, Jr., exclusively possessed and operated the property from that point forward. Midgley, Jr., paid the real estate taxes on the property and leased the property to various farmers and a nursery. All rents from these tenants were paid to Midgley, Jr. Midgley, Jr., farmed the property, growing rye, during the years that he could not find a suitable tenant. Sayre, Sr., died in 2005. In 2009, Midgley, Jr., commenced this action, alleging that he had become the sole lawful owner of the property by adverse possession and, therefore, was entitled to a judgment barring any claim to the property by, among others, the heirs of Sayre, Sr.

Under the law existing at the time title allegedly vested here, in the absence of an overt acknowledgment during the statutory period that ownership rested with another party, actual knowledge of the true owner, or co-owner as is the case here, did not destroy the element of claim of right … . “Where . . . the party claiming adverse possession is a tenant-in-common in exclusive possession, the statutory period required by RPAPL 541 is 20 years of continuous exclusive possession before a cotenant may acquire full title by adverse possession” … . Midgley v Phillips, 2016 NY Slip Op 06688, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

REAL PROPERTY (COTENANT ACQUIRED THE OTHER COTENANT’S INTEREST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION)/ADVERSE POSSESSION (COTENANT ACQUIRED THE OTHER COTENANT’S INTEREST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION)/TENANTS IN COMMON (COTENANT ACQUIRED THE OTHER COTENANT’S INTEREST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION)

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ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE.

The Second Department determined the common law negligence cause of action brought by a police officer against the owner of property abutting the sidewalk where the officer allegedly slipped and fell, was properly dismissed. The applicable village and town codes did not make an abutting landowner liable in tort to someone injured on the sidewalk. However, the police officer’s action under General Municipal Law 205-e properly survived summary judgment. A property owner’s violation of a code provision requiring maintenance of the sidewalk was a proper basis for an action under General Municipal Law 205-e:

… [ t]he Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which seeks to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. “A police officer seeking to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e must identify a statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply and must, in addition, set forth facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused harm to him or her” … . As a prerequisite to recovery pursuant to a General Municipal Law § 205-e cause of action, a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear legal duties … .

* * * Section 302.3 of the 2007 Property Maintenance Code of New York State (see 19 NYCRR 1226.1) has been found by this Court to be a proper predicate for recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-e … .

Further, § 181-11 of the Town Code and § 250-27 of the Village Code are well-developed bodies of law that impose clear duties upon every property owner to keep his or her sidewalk in good and safe repair. Lewis v Palazzolo, 2016 NY Slip Op 06686, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/SLIP AND FALL (POLICE OFFICERS, (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/SIDEWALKS (POLICE OFFICERS, (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/POLICE OFFICERS (SLIP AND FALL, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)

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ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH NURSING HOME MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT TO THIRD PARTY INJURED BY ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION.

The Second Department determined the company (Mainco) under contract with the Bronx Center (a nursing home) to maintain an elevator could be liable to plaintiff, who was injured when the elevator fell. The court explained the analytical criteria for liability in tort to third parties stemming from a contract:

Mainco failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that it did not have a duty to the plaintiff. ” An elevator company which agrees to maintain an elevator in safe operating condition may be liable to a passenger for failure to correct conditions of which it has knowledge or failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct a condition which it ought to have found'” … . Further, “a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care—and thus be potentially liable in tort—to third persons . . . where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty” of safe maintenance … .

Here, the maintenance agreement between Mainco and Bronx Center required Mainco to periodically “inspect” the elevator and to “perform the New York City Local Law #10 mandated annual inspection.” The evidence demonstrated that, if there were any problems with the elevator, Bronx Center called Mainco, and Mainco inspected the elevator to determine and report on the cause of the problem. The evidence further indicated that if the cause of the problem was not a repair covered by the maintenance contract, Mainco issued a repair proposal, and would perform the repair upon acceptance of its proposal. Under these circumstances, Mainco failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that it did not assume a duty to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff’s claims did not fall within the scope of that duty. Fajardo v Mainco El. & Elec. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06678, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH NURSING HOME MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT TO THIRD PARTY INJURED BY ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION)/CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM CONTRACT, ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH NURSING HOME MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT TO THIRD PARTY INJURED BY ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION)/TORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM CONTRACT ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH NURSING HOME MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT TO THIRD PARTY INJURED BY ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION)

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