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PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court abused its discretion when it ruled two lawsuits joined for trial could be held in the county where the second of the two actions, as opposed to the first, was commenced:

“[W]here actions commenced in different counties have been consolidated [or joined for trial] pursuant to CPLR 602, the venue should be placed in the county where the first action was commenced, unless special circumstances are present, which decision is also addressed to the sound discretion of the court” … . Here, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in placing the venue of the joint trial in Queens County, since EMB [the defendants in the second suit] failed to establish the existence of special circumstances that would warrant a departure from the general rule … . Tieshmaker v EMB Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06819, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)/VENUE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)

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