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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE.

In an action for partition and sale of a four-family brownstone, the Second Department determined Supreme Court properly determined there was a question of fact whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy:

“A person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or tenant in common, in which he [or she] has an estate of inheritance, or for life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners” (RPAPL 901[1]). “The right to partition is not absolute, however, and while a tenant in common has the right to maintain an action for partition pursuant to RPAPL 901, the remedy is always subject to the equities between the parties” … . “The actual physical partition of property is the preferred method and is presumed appropriate unless one party demonstrates that actual physical partition would cause great prejudice, in which case the property must be sold at public auction” … .

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is a question of fact as to whether physical partition or sale of the subject property is appropriate … . Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which sought a sale of the property, and properly appointed a referee to determine whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy. Perretta v Perretta, 2016 NY Slip Op 06814, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

REAL PROPERTY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PHYSICAL PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)

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