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NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF THE ABSENCE OR FAILURE OF A SAFETY DEVICE, LABOR LAW 200 AND 240 (1) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and 240 (1) causes of action were properly granted. The plaintiff was injured when attempting to move a 500-600 pound piece of granite. A co-worker lost his grip and the granite fell 18 or 20 inches onto plaintiff’s toe. Because the defendants did not exercise any supervisory control over the manner of plaintiff’s work, the Labor Law 200 cause of action was dismissed. Monitoring safety conditions does not amount to supervisory control. Because the action did not involve the failure or absence of a safety device, the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was dismissed:

“Where . . . a claim arises out of the means and methods of the work, a [defendant] may be held liable for . . . a violation of Labor Law § 200 only if [it] had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” … . General supervisory authority for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work is insufficient to impose liability under the statute … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s injuries arose solely out of the manner of his employer’s work and the defendants exercised no supervisory control over that work … . The defendants’ authority to monitor safety conditions at the work site is merely indicative of their “general supervision and coordination of the work site and is insufficient to trigger liability” … ,

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action insofar as asserted against them. In cases involving falling objects, section 240(1) applies only when “the object fell, while being hoisted or secured, because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the granite stone did not fall because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device … . Portalatin v Tully Constr. Co.- E.E. Cruz & Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 07762, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF THE ABSENCE OR FAILURE OF A SAFETY DEVICE, LABOR LAW 200 AND 240 (1) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

INSURED SETTLED THE MATTER WITHOUT INSURER’S CONSENT, INSURER NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND OR INDEMNIFY INSURED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the insurer (Southwest) was entitled to summary judgment declaring it was not obligated to defend or indemnify the insured (Ralex). Ralex had settled the matter without Southwest’s consent:

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Here, the subject insurance policy Southwest issued to Ralex provided that “[n]o insured will, except at that insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without [Southwest’s] consent.” Contrary to Ralex’s contention, this provision is not ambiguous. “Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties have used, and if they are clear and unambiguous the terms are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and proper sense” … .

Moreover, “New York law views an insurer’s right to consent to any settlement as a condition precedent to coverage” … . Here, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Southwest’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), since the documentary evidence it submitted showed that Ralex undertook its own defense in the underlying action, agreed to settle the underlying action, and incurred defense costs without first obtaining Southwest’s consent. By doing so, Ralex breached the insurance contract and is not entitled to coverage … . Ralex Servs., Inc. v Southwest Mar. & Gen. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 07763, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (INSURED SETTLED THE MATTER WITHOUT INSURER’S CONSENT, INSURER NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND OR INDEMNIFY INSURED (SECOND DEPT))

ALTHOUGH CHILD RESIDED WITH NON-PARENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TEMPORARY TO ALLOW FATHER TO ATTEND LAW SCHOOL, NON-PARENT’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed without a hearing a non-parent’s petition seeking custody of a child. Although the child resided with the petitioner for a significant period of time, there was evidence the arrangement was temporary to allow father, who was working full-time, to attend law school at night:

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The Court of Appeals has created a “two-prong inquiry for determining whether a nonparent may obtain custody as against a parent” … . “First, the nonparent must prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances such as surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody over an extended period of time” … . “If extraordinary circumstances are established such that the nonparent has standing to seek custody, the court must make an award of custody based on the best interest of the child” … .

“A hearing to determine the issue of standing is not necessary where there are no triable issues of fact raised in the papers submitted”… .

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… [T]he period of time when the child resided primarily with the petitioner and not the father largely coincided with the period of time when the father was working full time and attending law school at night. During that period of time, the father contributed financially to the child’s support. The petitioner and the father completed certain forms designating the petitioner as the child’s caregiver for stated purposes, yet these forms were for a limited duration, and some of the forms contained notations to the effect that the father was not giving up his custodial rights. Matter of Schmitt v Troche, 2017 NY Slip Op 07732, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (ALTHOUGH CHILD RESIDED WITH NON-PARENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TEMPORARY TO ALLOW FATHER TO ATTEND LAW SCHOOL, NON-PARENT’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, NON-PARENT, ALTHOUGH CHILD RESIDED WITH NON-PARENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TEMPORARY TO ALLOW FATHER TO ATTEND LAW SCHOOL, NON-PARENT’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/STANDING (FAMILY LAW, NON-PARENT, ALTHOUGH CHILD RESIDED WITH NON-PARENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TEMPORARY TO ALLOW FATHER TO ATTEND LAW SCHOOL, NON-PARENT’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/NON-PARENT (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, STANDING,  ALTHOUGH CHILD RESIDED WITH NON-PARENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TEMPORARY TO ALLOW FATHER TO ATTEND LAW SCHOOL, NON-PARENT’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 action. Plaintiff alleged he was directed to work without a scaffold. He rigged up a ladder with planks on it placed horizontally over a fire escape as a makeshift scaffold. The ladder tipped when a heavy object was placed on it and plaintiff fell:

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Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites … . “In order to prevail on a claim under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that this violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries” … . No recovery is available under Labor Law § 240(1) when the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … .

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Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment failed to establish, prima facie, that no [Labor Law 240(1)] violation occurred, or that the alleged violation was not a proximate cause of the accident … . …

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Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work … . * * *

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Here, the cause of action arose out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work. The defendants failed, prima facie, to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether [defendant] had the authority to supervise or control the injured plaintiff’s work, and as to causation … .

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor … .  Here, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, a violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.16, which requires, in relevant part, that safety belts and harnesses be properly attached to a tail line or lifeline so that “if the user should fall such fall shall not exceed five feet” … . King v Villette, 2017 NY Slip Op 07596, Second Dept 11-1-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff teacher’s age discrimination suit was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action:

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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter the ADEA) provides, in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age” … . “To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a claimant must demonstrate that: 1) [she] was within the protected age group; 2) [she] was qualified for the position; 3) [she] was subject to an adverse employment action; and 4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination'” … .

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… [T]he general allegation in the amended complaint that the plaintiff and two other “older” teachers had been “continuously harassed” by the principal and the assistant principal are vague and conclusory … . Furthermore, the specific instances of discrimination described in the amended complaint, which allegedly occurred over a period of more than three years, were isolated and episodic. For instance, the amended complaint alleged that the plaintiff “was required to teach a class that she was not qualified to teach,” that the principal left her name off an art fair newsletter, that the assistant principal gave the plaintiff “a useless laptop to complete a survey,” and that on two separate occasions the principal slammed her hand on the table and screamed at her. These occurrences were “not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment” … . Murphy v Department of Educ. of the City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 07609, Second Dept 11-1-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/AGE DISCRIMINATION (AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT  (AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION IN THE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT AND WITNESSES BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS BEING INCARCERATED DURING THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction in this murder case because the trial judge took over the questioning of one of the complaining witness and intervened in the questioning of the defendant. The court noted the prosecutor should not have questioned the defendant about his being incarcerated during the trial:

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During the course of the trial, the Supreme Court repeatedly and prejudicially questioned the defendant, who testified in his own behalf, and also extensively intervened in the questioning of prosecution witnesses. Although defense counsel did not specifically object to the court’s questioning of the witnesses … .

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While trial judges play a vital role in “clarifying confusing testimony and facilitating the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial,” their power to examine witnesses “is one that should be exercised sparingly” … . Indeed, such power “carries with it so many risks of unfairness that it should be a rare instance when the court rather than counsel examines a witness” … .

Here, the Supreme Court effectively took over the direct examination of one of the complaining witnesses at key moments in her testimony where she was describing how the defendant shot the victim … . Moreover, in its extensive questioning of the defendant, the court repeatedly highlighted apparent inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony. Viewing the record as a whole, the court assumed the appearance, if not the function, of an advocate at the trial by its extensive examination of certain witnesses … . Accordingly, we must remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial.

As a new trial must be ordered, we note that it was improper for the prosecutor to elicit from the defendant the fact that he was incarcerated pending trial … , as no legitimate State interest was served by disclosing that information under the circumstances of this case … . People v Estevez, 2017 NY Slip Op 07615, Second Dept 11-1-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION IN THE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT AND WITNESSES BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS BEING INCARCERATED DURING THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION IN THE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT AND WITNESSES BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS BEING INCARCERATED DURING THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION IN THE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT AND WITNESSES BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS BEING INCARCERATED DURING THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))

HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress his statements based upon his warrantless arrest in the garage of his home was properly denied. Defendant had failed to stop, led the arresting officer on a high speed chase, and hid in the rafters of his garage:

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… [T]he People established that the detective’s entry was justified by the doctrine of hot pursuit. “[S]ubject only to carefully drawn and narrow exceptions, a warrantless search of an individual’s home is per se unreasonable and hence unconstitutional” … . However, “exigent circumstances or a true hot pursuit’ may justify a warrantless entry”… . “[A] criminal suspect may not thwart an otherwise proper arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by retreating into his residence”… . Here, the exigent circumstances justifying the hot pursuit of the defendant into his garage included the defendant’s observed erratic and dangerous driving, the crashing and abandoning of his vehicle, and the police officers’ peaceful entry through the open door of the garage … . People v Caputo, 2017 NY Slip Op 07614, Second Dept 11-1-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT))/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (CRIMINAL LAW, HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT))/WARRANTLESS ARREST (HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT))/PAYTON RULE (WARRANTLESS ARREST, HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT))/HOT PURSUIT (WARRENTLESS ARREST, HOT PURSUIT JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS ARREST IN DEFENDANT’S HOME (SECOND DEPT)

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had not met the proof requirements for specific performance of a real estate contract:

“To prevail on a cause of action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, a plaintiff purchaser must establish that it substantially performed its contractual obligations and was ready, willing, and able to perform its remaining obligations, that the vendor was able to convey the property, and that there was no adequate remedy at law” … . In moving for summary judgment on a complaint seeking specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff purchaser must submit evidence demonstrating financial ability to purchase the property in order to demonstrate that it was ready, willing, and able to purchase such property… . In the absence of such evidence, a plaintiff purchaser’s motion for summary judgment in its favor on a cause of action for specific performance should be denied due to the plaintiff purchaser’s failure to meet its initial burden … . “When a purchaser submits no documentation or other proof to substantiate that it had the funds necessary to purchase the property, it cannot prove, as a matter of law, that it was ready, willing, and able to close” … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that he was ready, willing, and able to purchase the subject property, since he did not submit any evidence demonstrating his financial ability to close the transaction … . Grunbaum v Nicole Brittany, Ltd., 2017 NY Slip Op 06638, Second Dept 9-27-17

REAL ESTATE (PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (REAL ESTATE, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (REAL ESTATE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff (Kelly) should not have been allowed to file a late notice of claim in this sidewalk slip and fall case. No reasonable explanation was offered and defendant housing authority did not have timely notice of the substance of the claim:

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… Kelly failed to provide a reasonable excuse for his failure to serve a timely notice of claim upon NYCHA [New York City Housing Authority]. Kelly’s excuse, that he first discovered the identity of the owner of the subject walkway at the General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, arose from a lack of due diligence in investigating the matter, which is an unacceptable excuse … . Even if Kelly made an excusable error in identifying the public corporation upon which he was required to serve a notice of claim, he failed to proffer any explanation for the additional seven-month delay between the time that he discovered the error and the filing of his application for leave to serve a late notice of claim … .

Furthermore, NYCHA did not acquire timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting Kelly’s claim. Although the City was served with a notice of claim within 90 days after the accident and conducted a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing about 5½ months after the accident, notice to the City cannot be imputed to NYCHA … . Moreover, the notice of claim, served together with the application upon NYCHA almost 10 months after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed, was served too late to provide NYCHA with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period … .

Finally, Kelly presented no “evidence or plausible argument” that his delay in serving a notice of claim upon NYCHA did not substantially prejudice NYCHA in defending on the merits … . Kelly v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 06640, Second Dept 9-27-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM,  PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (MUNICIPAL LAW, PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition seeking leave to file a late notice of claim should have been denied. Although the school was aware of the student’s injury, it was not timely made aware of the negligent supervision claim. The fact that the school did not demonstrate prejudice from the delay was not determinative:

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… [T]he petitioner failed to establish that the School District acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the child’s accident or a reasonable time thereafter. Although the school nurse prepared a “Notification of Injury” form, which the petitioner signed nearly two months after the accident, this form merely indicated that the child received a laceration and contusion on the outer corner of his left eye when he fell on the steps of the large slide. Thus, the form did not provide the School District with timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claims that it was negligent in supervising its students, and in the hiring and training of school personnel … . Therefore, the School District had no reason to conduct a prompt investigation into the purported negligence … .

… [P]etitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The child’s infancy alone, without any showing of a nexus between the infancy and the delay, was insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse … . Moreover, to the extent that the petitioner attributed her delay to the need to determine that the proper entity to sue was the School District, a readily ascertainable fact, such a claim does not constitute a reasonable excuse… .

While the petitioner did satisfy her initial burden of showing a lack of substantial prejudice to the School District as a result of her late notice, and the School District failed to make a “particularized evidentiary showing” of substantial prejudice in response … , the presence or absence of any one factor is not necessarily determinative in deciding whether permission to serve a late notice of claim should be granted… . A balancing of the relevant factors … demonstrates that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petition … . McClancy v Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 06651, Second Dept 9-27-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENT (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, (LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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