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NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF THE ABSENCE OR FAILURE OF A SAFETY DEVICE, LABOR LAW 200 AND 240 (1) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and 240 (1) causes of action were properly granted. The plaintiff was injured when attempting to move a 500-600 pound piece of granite. A co-worker lost his grip and the granite fell 18 or 20 inches onto plaintiff’s toe. Because the defendants did not exercise any supervisory control over the manner of plaintiff’s work, the Labor Law 200 cause of action was dismissed. Monitoring safety conditions does not amount to supervisory control. Because the action did not involve the failure or absence of a safety device, the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was dismissed:

“Where . . . a claim arises out of the means and methods of the work, a [defendant] may be held liable for . . . a violation of Labor Law § 200 only if [it] had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” … . General supervisory authority for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work is insufficient to impose liability under the statute … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s injuries arose solely out of the manner of his employer’s work and the defendants exercised no supervisory control over that work … . The defendants’ authority to monitor safety conditions at the work site is merely indicative of their “general supervision and coordination of the work site and is insufficient to trigger liability” … ,

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action insofar as asserted against them. In cases involving falling objects, section 240(1) applies only when “the object fell, while being hoisted or secured, because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the granite stone did not fall because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device … . Portalatin v Tully Constr. Co.- E.E. Cruz & Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 07762, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF THE ABSENCE OR FAILURE OF A SAFETY DEVICE, LABOR LAW 200 AND 240 (1) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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INSURED SETTLED THE MATTER WITHOUT INSURER’S CONSENT, INSURER NOT OBLIGATED... BECAUSE THERE WAS EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF FELL OFF A BEAM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1)...