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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING MEDICAL EXPERT OPINIONS ABOUT A DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF CARE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this medical malpractice action, determined plaintiff’s expert affidavit raised questions of fact about whether defendant’s treatment of plaintiff’s decedent departed from accepted standards of practice. Granting summary judgment to defendants is not appropriate where there are conflicting medical expert opinions:

… [V]ascular surgeon Jon Kirwin from Kings County Hospital surgically created an arteriovenous fistula (hereinafter AVF) in the decedent’s upper left arm as an access site for dialysis treatments. … [D]uring one of the decedent’s scheduled dialysis visits … , a nurse examined the decedent and, believing that the AVF was infected, conferred with … [the] attending nephrologist, who directed that the decedent be transferred to Kings County Hospital’s emergency room for evaluation. The decedent presented to Kings County Hospital where he was evaluated by Kirwin, who cleared him for dialysis. The decedent underwent dialysis at Kings County Hospital without incident that day, and two days later reported to Utica for his scheduled dialysis treatment. The decedent underwent dialysis at Utica on August 27, 2010, and August 30, 2010, without incident. On August 31, 2010, the decedent was found unconscious at home and died on the way to the hospital. The cause of death was a rupture of the AVF. * * *

… [I]n support of their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, the moving defendants submitted expert affirmations that established, prima facie, that none of them departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice in their treatment of the decedent and that no alleged departure was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … . However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact through her expert affirmations as to whether the defendants departed from accepted standards of practice by continuing with dialysis on an AVF that presented with infection and aneurysmal dilatation and whether the continued dialysis caused the AVF to rupture. “Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions. Such credibility issues can only be resolved by a jury” … . Hutchinson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 03775, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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GRANDMOTHER WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER WHEN PIECES OF THE FACADE OF A BUILDING FELL AND KILLED HER TWO-YEAR-OLD GRANDCHILD, BECAUSE GRANDMOTHER IS NOT ‘IMMEDIATE FAMILY’ SHE CANNOT RECOVER UNDER A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THEORY, THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD THAT THEORY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the grandmother of a two-year-old child who witnessed the child’s death was not a member of the child’s “immediate family” and therefore could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, despite the grandmother’s being in the zone of danger when the child was struck by falling pieces of a building-facade. The motion to amend the complaint to add the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action should not have been granted:

… [I]n Trombetta v Conkling (82 NY2d 549, 551), the Court of Appeals held that a niece could not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress for witnessing the death of her aunt, despite the fact that the niece’s mother had died when the niece was 11 years old, and the aunt had allegedly been the maternal figure in the niece’s life. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was 37 years old and her aunt was 59 years old (see id. at 551). In rendering its determination, the Court of Appeals stated: “On firm public policy grounds, we are persuaded that we should not expand the cause of action for emotional injuries to all bystanders who may be able to demonstrate a blood relationship coupled with significant emotional attachment or the equivalent of an intimate, immediate familial bond” (id. at 553).

In Jun Chi Guan v Tuscan Dairy Farms (24 AD3d 725), this Court held that the relationship of grandparent and grandchild does not constitute “immediate family” so as to permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Jun Chi Guan, the plaintiff grandmother was pushing her infant grandson in a stroller, when a truck owned and operated by the defendants struck the stroller, killing the infant (see id. at 725). This Court rejected the grandmother’s argument that she should be considered immediate family because she was the family member who spent the most time with the infant during his waking hours (see id. at 726). Further, this Court held that “it is not appropriate for this Court to expand the class [of persons constituting immediate family] absent further direction from the Court of Appeals or the New York State Legislature” (id.). Greene v Esplanade Venture Partnership, 2019 NY Slip Op 03771, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF AN APARTMENT DEPENDED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, A DARDEN HEARING WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY, MATTER REMITTED FOR THE HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have held a Darden hearing because the detective observed the confidential informant (CI) enter the building but did not observe the CI go to the apartment where the drugs were allegedly purchased. Therefore probable cause for the search of the apartment depended upon the CI’s information. The appeal was held in abeyance and the matter was remitted for the hearing:

The Court of Appeals has held that a Darden hearing is necessary where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause without information provided by a confidential informant … . “[A] Darden rule is necessary in order to fulfill the underlying purpose of Darden: insuring that the confidential informant both exists and gave the police information sufficient to establish probable cause, while protecting the informant’s identity. The surest way to accomplish this task is to produce the informant for an in camera examination” …  . This procedure is “designed to protect against the contingency, of legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer might have been wholly imaginary and the communication from him [or her] entirely fabricated”  … . “[T]he court should conduct an in camera inquiry outside the presence of defendant and his [or her] counsel, and make a summary report regarding the existence of the informer and communications made by the CI to the police, taking precautions to protect the anonymity of the CI to the maximum extent possible” … . People v Nettles, 2019 NY Slip Op 03816, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIS MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN ADOPTIVE ADMISSION, SENTENCE FOR CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONCURRENT WITH THE SENTENCE FOR MURDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a recording of defendant’s phone conversation with his mother, made when defendant was in jail, should not have been admitted as an adoptive admission. The error was deemed harmless however. The Second Department further determined that the sentences for criminal possession of a weapon should be concurrent with the sentence for murder. There was no evidence the weapon was possessed for an unlawful purpose other than the shooting:

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court should not have permitted the People to introduce into evidence, as an adoptive admission of guilt, a recording of a telephone call that he made to his mother while he was incarcerated at Rikers Island Correctional Facility. We agree. “Generally, an adoptive admission is allowed when a party acknowledges and assents to something already uttered by another person, which thus becomes effectively the party’s own admission” . Here, the People failed to establish that the defendant assented to the statements uttered by his mother during the telephone call … . …

The evidence adduced at trial failed to establish that the defendant possessed the gun for an unlawful purpose unrelated to shooting at the intended victim, resulting in the death of the victim (see Penal Law § 265.03[1][b]…), or that his possession of a gun was separate and distinct from his shooting of the victim (see Penal Law § 265.03[3] … ). Accordingly, the terms of imprisonment imposed upon the defendant’s convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree should run concurrently with the sentence imposed upon his conviction of murder in the second degree. People v King, 2019 NY Slip Op 03813, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

DEFENDANT ASSERTED SHE THOUGHT PLAINTIFF’S CAR WOULD GO THROUGH THE YELLOW LIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT RAN INTO THE REAR OF PLAINTIFF’S CAR WHEN IT CAME TO A SUDDEN STOP, DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION DID NOT CONSTITUTE A NON-NEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant, in this traffic accident case, failed to raise a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for the rear-end collision. Defendant asserted that it “appeared” the lead vehicle and plaintiff’s vehicle (behind the lead vehicle) were going to go through the yellow light at the intersection. Defendant further asserted that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, plaintiff’s vehicle struck the lead vehicle, and then defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiff’s. The court held that defendant should have anticipated the sudden stop because of the yellow light:

The defendant driver’s assertion that the plaintiff’s vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the collision between the plaintiff’s vehicle and the defendants’ vehicle … . Even if, as the defendant driver asserted, the plaintiff had come to a sudden stop at the traffic light, the defendant driver should have anticipated that the plaintiff’s vehicle might come to a stop at the intersection, especially where, according to the defendant driver’s own affidavit, the traffic light already turned yellow … . The defendant driver was under a duty to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the plaintiff’s vehicle, notwithstanding that it “appeared” to her that the lead vehicle and the plaintiff’s vehicle were “going to attempt to beat the light'” … . Therefore, in opposition to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Catanzaro v Edery, 2019 NY Slip Op 03762, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO THE CHARGES IN TWO INDICTMENTS, WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE INDICTMENTS, COUNSEL WHO NEGOTIATED THE PLEA OFFER HAD BEEN RELIEVED AS DEFENSE COUNSEL BECAUSE OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed defendant’s convictions by guilty plea because defense counsel had a conflict of interest:

The defendant was charged under Indictment No. 13-00668 with murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The defendant was later charged under Indictment No. 14-00627 with assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree. Following a pretrial hearing on Indictment No. 13-00668, the defendant’s counsel (hereinafter the attorney), who represented the defendant on the charges under both Indictment Nos. 13-00668 and 14-00627, learned that he had a conflict of interest with the defendant, as the attorney’s law office also represented, on unrelated charges, the prosecution’s principal witness in the case under Indictment No. 13-00668. The witness was to testify that he saw the defendant shoot and kill the unarmed victim. The County Court granted the attorney’s motion to be relieved as defense counsel in the case under Indictment No. 13-00668. However, the attorney remained as the defendant’s counsel on the charges under Indictment No. 14-00627.

The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to certain charges on both indictments in exchange for a reduced sentence.

… The defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when the attorney, who had been relieved as the defendant’s counsel on Indictment No. 13-00668 because of a conflict of interest with the prosecution’s principal witness, made a plea offer with respect to that indictment . The defendant failed to receive representation that was conflict-free and singlemindedly devoted to his best interests as required by both the Constitution of the United States and the New York State Constitution … . People v Hill, 2019 NY Slip Op 03810, Second Dept 6-15-19

 

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INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF THE THE AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department dismissed the inclusory concurrent counts of the aggravated vehicular homicide convictions:

As the People correctly concede, the defendant’s convictions of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.13[3], [4]), vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.12[1]), reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212), and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[4]) must be vacated and those counts of the indictment must be dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of the convictions of aggravated vehicular homicide (see CPL 300.40[3][b]; Penal Law § 125.14[3], [4]…). People v Aniano, 2019 NY Slip Op 03797, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS), PARENTAL NEGLECT AND DANGER FROM GANGS IN HONDURAS WAS DEMONSTRATED, APPELLATE COURT CAN MAKE ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS ON A SUFFICIENT RECORD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the child’s motion for findings enabling him to petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) should have been granted:

“This Court’s power to review the evidence is as broad as that of the hearing court, and where, as here, the record is sufficiently complete to make our own factual determinations, we may do so” … . Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not a viable option based upon parental neglect … . The record reflects that the child’s parents did not provide him with adequate supervision or medical care, and that they failed to meet the child’s educational needs. Furthermore, the record also supports a finding that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return to Honduras, his previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence. The child indicated that he was assaulted by gang members in Honduras on multiple occasions, once leaving him with a broken rib and a scar on his head, and that he had witnessed a drive-by shooting at his school which resulted in the death of his schoolmate. In addition, the child stated that the gang members tried to recruit him, but he refused to join, and that the gang members were “killing people if they didn’t want to join.” The child stated that he “felt scared all the time and could no longer live a normal life,” and that he “basically stayed inside [his] house all the time” out of fear that he “was going to be attacked again” … . Matter of Victor R. C. O. v Canales, 2019 NY Slip Op 03789, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR TO QUESTION DEFENDANT ABOUT THE FACTS UNDERLYING PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE SANDOVAL RULING, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions, determined the trial judge implicitly changed the Sandoval ruling by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant about the underlying facts of prior convictions:

Prior to the trial, the Supreme Court conducted a Sandoval hearing (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371), after which the court ruled that, should the defendant testify on his own behalf, the People would be permitted to ask whether he had two prior felony convictions. However, the People were not permitted to elicit the underlying facts of either of those crimes. …

Without seeking an amendment of the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling, the prosecutor then asked whether he was being arrested that day in 2008 “because there was a DNA match of [him] committing a burglary.” Defense counsel objected, the objection was overruled, and the defendant denied that this was true. The prosecutor persisted in that line of inquiry, and asked whether the defendant had been convicted of burglary in the third degree in 2009. The defendant responded that “[y]es [he] was convicted of a case in 2008.” Nonetheless, without asking for a modified Sandoval ruling, the prosecutor brought up, no less than six times, that the 2008 conviction was for burglary and involved DNA, going so far to ask the defendant to “explain” the facts of his 2008 conviction, with the court instructing the defendant to do so. In one instance, after asking the defendant to confirm that he was charged in the instant case with burglary in the second degree, the prosecutor remarked, in effect, that the instant crime was “the same type of DNA hit that happened back in 2008.” …

The defendant here was denied … [the right to make an informed choice whether to testify] when, after making what he believed to be an informed judgment and taking the witness stand, the Supreme Court implicitly changed the ruling upon which he relied by allowing the prosecutor to continue her course of prejudicial questioning despite objections from defense counsel. People v Walters, 2019 NY Slip Op 03632, Second Dept 5-8-19

 

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DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY PROHIBITED FROM CROSS-EXAMINING A POLICE OFFICER ABOUT FALSE ARREST AND POLICE BRUTALITY LAWSUITS FILED AGAINST THE OFFICER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the defendant was properly prohibited from cross-examining a police officer about four federal lawsuits filed against the officer:

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining a police witness with respect to the allegations of false arrest and/or police brutality in four federal lawsuits filed against that witness. “Where a lawsuit has not resulted in an adverse finding against a police officer . . . defendants should not be permitted to ask a witness if he or she has been sued, if the case was settled (unless there was an admission of wrongdoing) or if the criminal charges related to the plaintiffs in those actions were dismissed. However, subject to the trial court’s discretion, defendants should be permitted to ask questions based on the specific allegations of the lawsuit if the allegations are relevant to the credibility of the witness” … . “In cross-examining a law enforcement witness, the same standard for good faith basis and specific allegations relevant to credibility applies, as does the same broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination” . “First, counsel must present a good faith basis for inquiring, namely, the lawsuit relied upon; second, specific allegations that are relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness must be identified; and third, the trial judge exercises discretion in assessing whether inquiry into such allegations would confuse or mislead t… he jury, or create a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the parties”… . Here, the complaints in each of the identified actions contain only allegations of unlawful police conduct by large groups of officers, and did not set forth specific acts of misconduct against the police witness individually. Thus, cross-examination of this witness regarding the federal lawsuits was properly denied … . People v Crupi, 2019 NY Slip Op 03614, Second Dept 5-8-19

 

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