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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION BASED UPON REMARKS MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL DURING SUMMATION, REMARKS TO WHICH NO OBJECTION HAD BEEN MADE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict in this personal injury case should not have been granted. The jury found that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of the no-fault law (Insurance Law § 5102(d)), and awarded plaintiff $50,000 for lost wages, reduced by $25,000 for failure to wear a seatbelt. The trial judge granted the motion in the interest of justice primarily based upon comments made by defense counsel during summation, comments to which no objection was made:

… [T]he Supreme Court identified eight specific statements made by defense counsel in his closing that the court characterized as improper, in addition to the remarks quoted above. However, none of these statements were objected to. We recognize that common courtesy requires that an attorney allow opposing counsel the opportunity to argue his or her case to the jury without undue or repetitive interruptions. Nevertheless, where counsel, in summing up, exceeds the bounds of legal propriety, it is the duty of the opposing counsel to make a specific objection and for the court to rule on the objection, to direct the jury to disregard any improper remarks, and to admonish counsel from repetition of improper remarks … . Where objection is not, or cannot appropriately be, interposed during summation, counsel should, upon the conclusion of the summation, make appropriate objections, seek curative instructions, or request a mistrial … . Where no objection is interposed, a new trial may be directed only where the remarks are so prejudicial as to have caused a gross injustice, and where the comments are so pervasive, prejudicial, or inflammatory as to deprive a party of a fair trial … . This standard was not met in this case. We stress that the plaintiff’s counsel made no complaint regarding the allegedly prejudicial nature of the defendant’s closing statement until after an adverse verdict was rendered. The verdict that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury was supported by the evidence, and the jury had ample reason to reject the plaintiff’s claims and accept the arguments of the defendants.

Accordingly, we reverse the order insofar as appealed from, deny the branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages in the interest of justice and for a new trial on the issue of damages, and reinstate the jury verdict. Kleiber v Fichtel, 2019 NY Slip Op 03778, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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