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AFTER THE SECOND DEPARTMENT’S VACATION OF DEFENDANT’S “ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A PHYSICALLY DISABLED CHILD” CONVICTION (BY GUILTY PLEA) ON “ACTUAL INNOCENCE” GROUNDS WAS REVERSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT AGAIN VACATED THE CONVICTION ON “INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE” GROUNDS; THE MEDICAL RECORDS INDICATED THE CHILD WAS NOT BURNED BY HOT WATER, BUT RATHER SUFFERED AN ALLERGIC REACTION TO MEDICATION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate her conviction by guilty plea on ineffective-assistance grounds should have been granted. Defendant, a nurse, was accused of endangering the welfare of a physically disabled child by bathing the child in hot water causing thermal burns. This case has a long history, including the vacation of the conviction by the Second Department on the ground of actual innocence. The Second Department was reversed by the Court of Appeals which held the “actual innocence” argument cannot be raised where the defendant has pled guilty. Here the Second Department vacated the conviction again on the ground of ineffective assistance. There was medical evidence which was consistent with the child’s skin condition being caused by a reaction to medication, as opposed to hot water. Defendant’s counsel did not obtain the skin biopsy report, which attributed the skin condition to an allergic reaction to medication, and did not consult a medical expert:

… [D]espite references in the hospital records indicating that a skin biopsy was ordered, the defendant’s former counsel failed to obtain the skin biopsy pathology report, which would have supported the conclusion that the child’s skin condition was caused, not by thermal burns, but by toxic epidermal necrolysis (hereinafter TEN), a condition associated with an allergic reaction to a medication that the child had been taking. In this regard, the pathology report, which was prepared by three pathologists, set forth that the skin biopsies were performed the day after the child was admitted to the hospital, and that the child’s skin condition was “consistent with a diagnosis” of TEN if no oral lesions were present, or Stevens Johnson Syndrome (hereinafter SJS) if associated with oral lesions. An addendum to the report indicated that the clinical data ruled out SJS, and, therefore, implicated TEN as the diagnosis.

The defendant also demonstrated that her former counsel failed to consult a medical expert, or take steps to either seek the services of a court-appointed medical expert, or find a source of funding to secure the services of a medical expert before counseling the defendant to plead guilty. At the hearing, the defendant offered the expert testimony of Bruce Farber, a physician board-certified in the fields of internal medicine and infectious diseases, who reviewed all the medical records, including the subject pathology report. He opined that, based upon his review of medical records, as well as the pathology report, the child’s skin condition was caused by TEN, and not thermal burns. He testified that the medical records, including the hospital chart, showed that the various medical providers, including a pediatrician, emergency room physician, dermatologist, infectious disease expert, and a burn fellow formulated differential diagnoses including SJS, TEN, or staphylococcal scalded skin syndrome, none of which included thermal burns. People v Tiger, 2022 NY Slip Op 04568, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Here defense counsel told defendant to plead guilty to endangering the welfare of a disabled child (by bathing the child in hot water), causing burns. But the medical records included a skin biopsy report which indicated the child suffered an allergic reaction to medication, not thermal burns. The failure to investigate the medical records and the failure to consult a medical expert were deemed to constitute ineffective assistance.

 

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THE EVIDENCE OF “PHYSICAL INJURY” WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; ASSAULT THIRD CONVICTION VACATED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s assault third conviction, determined the evidence of physical injury was legally insufficient:

… [T]he evidence was legally insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of assault in the third degree, charged in count 6 of the indictment. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution … , was not legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant named in count 6 of the indictment sustained a physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9). Physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” … . Here, the evidence at trial established that this complainant was attacked and that he suffered bruises to his face and neck. This complainant testified at trial that he was not in pain during the time of the attack and that his bruises lasted a couple of weeks. He did not testify that he was in pain after the attack or that he took any medication or sought medical attention. People v Medina, 2022 NY Slip Op 04566, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: The complainant testified he was not in pain at the time of the attack and his bruises lasted a couple of weeks. He did not testify that he was in pain after the attack or that he took any medication or sought medical attention. The evidence of “physical injury” was legally insufficient. Defendant’s assault third conviction was vacated.

 

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THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE BASED UPON STRIKING THE VICTIM WITH HER CAR; IN SUMMATION THE PROSECUTOR CHARACTERIZED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS AS INTENTIONAL, DENIGRATED THE DEFENSE THEORIES, REFERRED TO IRRELEVANT CONDUCT, AND ASSUMED FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE; DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT; THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct. Although some of the errors were not preserved, the appeal was considered in the interest of justice:

The charge of criminally negligent homicide arose from an incident in which the defendant, while operating her motor vehicle, struck Evelyn Rodriguez, who had been standing next to the defendant’s vehicle, thereby causing Rodriguez’s death. The remaining charges were related to the defendant’s conduct of removing and damaging certain personal property placed by Rodriguez and her partner, Freddy Cuevas, on the sidewalk outside a residence owned by the defendant’s mother. The items were part of a memorial to Rodriguez’s and Cuevas’s daughter, Kayla, who had been murdered two years earlier and whose body had been discovered on the defendant’s mother’s property. * * *

The prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence relating to the charge of criminally negligent homicide and confused the jury by repeatedly using language to suggest that the defendant’s conduct in striking Rodriguez with the vehicle was intentional or reckless. … [T]he prosecutor used language such as “conscious, blameworthy choices,” “knowingly commit blameworthy acts,” “took a risk that took [Rodriguez’s] life,” “you don’t get to knowingly choose to do something wrong,” “[y]ou don’t get to drive over someone because you feel a mother’s memorial is a nuisance,” and, illogically, “[s]he failed to perceive that risk, and she chose to go ahead anyway” … .

The prosecutor continually denigrated the defense, referring to defense theories, repeatedly, as “excuses,” and also as “garbage,” and he falsely and provocatively claimed that the “defense repeatedly argued that the death of Kayla . . . was an inconvenience and a nuisance” … . The prosecutor continually evoked sympathy for Rodriguez using strong emotional terms, such as referring to her, and to her and Cuevas together, numerous times, as “the grieving mother” and the “grieving parents” and referring to Kayla repeatedly as Rodriguez’s “murdered daughter” or “murdered teenage daughter” … .

… [I]n arguing that the defendant engaged in “blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk” so as to meet the standard of criminally negligent homicide … , the prosecutor, throughout the course of his summation, referred to conduct not relevant to the driving conduct that formed the basis of the criminally negligent homicide charge. Specifically, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to consider the defendant’s actions in removing the memorial, which he recurrently characterized as “blameworthy,” when determining whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to constitute criminally negligent homicide. The prosecutor compounded the prejudicial effect of this error by repeatedly using inflammatory and emotional language, and assuming facts not in evidence, to describe the defendant’s conduct of removing the memorial. People v Drago, 2022 NY Slip Op 04561, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Even if the errors are not preserved, prosecutorial misconduct during summation may require reversal. The defendant was charged with criminal negligence, yet in summation the prosecutor kept characterizing her conduct as intentional. In addition, the prosecutor denigrated the defense theories, referred to defendant’s conduct which was not relevant to the charge and assumed facts not in evidence.

 

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A FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING MAY BE BROUGHT IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE FAMILY MEMBER RESIDES, AS WELL AS IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE OFFENSE OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the family offense proceeding should not have been dismissed based on the allegation venue was improper. A family offense proceeding may be brought based upon the residence of the family member, as well as were the offense took place:

A family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 “may be originated in the county in which the act or acts referred to in the petition allegedly occurred or in which the family or household resides or in which any party resides” … . Here, since the mother resides in Rockland County, the mother commenced this proceeding in a proper venue. Matter of VanDunk v Bonilla, 2022 NY Slip Op 04554, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: A family offense proceeding may be brought in the county where the family member resides, as well as the county where the offense occurred.

 

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THE THREE-DAY FACT-FINDING HEARING RELATED TO THE NEGLECT PETITION RE: SERENA, NOT THE NEWLY-FILED DERIVATIVE NEGLECT PETITION RE: VINCENT; FAMILY COURT IMPROPERLY CONSOLIDATED THE TWO PETITIONS FOR THE DISPOSITIONAL HEARING DEPRIVING MOTHER OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court never held a hearing on the newly filed derivative neglect petition (re: Vincent). The three-day fact-finding hearing related only to the neglect petition (re: Serena). At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the court improperly consolidated the two petitions:

The right to due process encompasses a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” at a fact-finding hearing on a neglect petition … , and to “present evidence relevant to the proceedings” … . Accordingly, the proceeding with respect to Vincent must be remitted to the Family Court … for a fact-finding hearing, in order to afford the parties an opportunity to introduce evidence relevant to the petition to adjudicate Vincent a derivatively neglected child, including, among other things, whether at the time the neglect petition was filed with respect to Vincent the mother had resolved the issues that were the basis of the finding of neglect as to Serena … . Matter of Serena G. (Monica M.), 2022 NY Slip Op 04547, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Here the court held a hearing which was confined to the neglect petition re: Serena and did not address the newly-filed derivative neglect petition re: Vincent. By combining the two petitions for the dispositional hearing mother was deprived of an opportunity to be heard (due process) on the derivative neglect petition.

 

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DUE TO A CONTRACTOR’S ERROR, PETITIONER’S SWIMMING POOL WAS INSTALLED SIX FEET FROM THE PROPERTY LINE, VIOLATING THE 14-FOOT SETBACK REQUIREMENT; THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS PROPERLY DENIED THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A VARIANCE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) properly took into the considerations the factors prescribed by the Town Law when it denied petitioner’s application for a setback variance. The setback requirement for a swimming was 14 feet. Due to an error made by the contractor, petitioner’s pool was installed six feet from the property line:

The record indicates that the ZBA considered the five factors set forth in Town Law § 267-b(3) and conducted the relevant balancing test to reach its determination. The ZBA found that the requested variance would produce an undesirable change in the character of the neighborhood because there was no evidence of any similarly located in-ground pools. The ZBA explained that approving a pool with such a small setback where there are no similar structures in the neighborhood would establish an unwarranted precedent for future development of the area, which could result in a detriment to nearby properties. The ZBA properly considered the possibility that granting the requested variance could set a negative precedent in the area … . Based on the property survey, the ZBA determined that the petitioner could have placed the pool in a conforming location. Moreover, the petitioner presented no evidence that the property could not be utilized without violating the zoning code. The ZBA determined that the requested variance was substantial because it asked for a 57% relaxation of the zoning code. Taking into account the rationale for the required setback, which was to protect the privacy and quiet enjoyment of adjacent residential properties, as well as the fact that the location of the pool was inconsistent with the nature and character of the surrounding area, and that the approval of the requested variance would establish an unwarranted precedent for future development of the area, the ZBA determined that granting the requested variance would have an adverse effect on the physical or environmental conditions in the neighborhood. Finally, the ZBA’s finding that the petitioner’s zoning violation, which was the result of the contractor’s error, was self-created is well founded … . Matter of Dutt v Bowers, 2022 NY Slip Op 04546, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Due to a contractor’s error, the petitioner’s swimming pool was installed six feet from the properly line, violating the 14-foor setback requirement. The petitioner applied for a variance. The Zoning Board of Appeal properly considered all the factors prescribed the Town Law and denied the variance. Supreme Court granted the variance. The Second Department reversed.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE “SEPARATE ENVELOPE” REQUIREMENT OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION ENTITLING THE DEFENDANTS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action was not entitled to summary judgment on its motion to confirm the referee’s report and obtain a judgment of foreclosure. The defendants demonstrated the bank did not comply with the “separate envelope” rule in RPAPL 1304, which entitled to defendants to summary judgment dismissing the complaint:

… [T]he defendants established that the notices served by the plaintiff pursuant to RPAPL 1304 contained additional material in the same envelope as the RPAPL 1304 notice. The copies of the 90-day notice previously submitted by the plaintiff included additional notices not contemplated by RPAPL 1304(2), to wit, a notice pertaining to the rights of a debtor in bankruptcy, a notice to those in military service, and a notice advising customers to beware of any organization that attempts to charge a fee for housing counseling or modification of a delinquent loan … . Since the RPAPL 1304 notice was not “‘served in an envelope that was separate from any other mailing or notice'” … , the plaintiff did not strictly comply with RPAPL 1304 … . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Dedvukaj, 2022 NY Slip Op 04541, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: If the defendants demonstrate the bank in a foreclosure action did not comply with the “separate envelope” requirement of RPAPL 1304 (by including other information in the envelope containing the notice of foreclosure), the defendants will be granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

 

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CLAIMANT WAS INJURED WHEN A TRUCK STRUCK THE BASKET OF THE MAN LIFT SHE WAS USING; THE FACT THAT CLAIMANT DIDN’T FALL FROM THE BASKET DID NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 and 240(1) causes of action should not have been dismissed. Claimant was in the basket of a man lift when a car carrier (truck) struck the basket causing it to “ricochet back and forth/” The fact that claimant didn’t fall from the basket did not take the incident outside the scope of Labor Law 240(1):

The Court of Claims erred in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The defendant failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. “The fact that the plaintiff did not actually fall from the [basket] is irrelevant as long as the ‘harm directly flow[ed] from the application of the force of gravity to [her] person'” … . Johnsen v State of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 04540, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Here claimant was in the basket of a man lift when a truck struck the basket causing it to “ricochet back and forth.” The fact that claimant didn’t fall from the basket did not support the dismissal of the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Labor Laq 240(1) requires that the injury directly flow from the “application of gravity” to the person.

 

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IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case did not raise a question of fact by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly:

… [P]laintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by averring that he had activated his right turn signal, had slowed to a speed of approximately five miles per hour, and was attempting to make a right turn when his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle … .

In opposition, the defendants submitted an affidavit of the defendant driver in which he averred that the plaintiff’s vehicle stopped short suddenly, causing the defendants’ vehicle to collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendants’ assertion that it was the sudden stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle which caused the accident was insufficient, in and of itself, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the rear-end collision … . Gil v Manhattan Beer Distribs., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 04537, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: The defendant in a rear-end collision case does not raise a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for the accident by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly.

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304, AS WELL AS THE NOTICE REQUIRMENTS SPELLED OUT IN THE MORTGAGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 and the mortgage:

… [P]laintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that RPAPL 1304 notices were mailed to each defendant by certified and first-class mail. The affidavit submitted in support of the plaintiff’s motion does not contain an attestation that the affiant had personal knowledge of the purported mailings nor does the affiant attest to knowledge of the mailing practices of the Law Offices of McCabe, Weisberg, and Conway, P.C., the entity that allegedly sent the notices to the defendants on behalf of the loan servicer … . …

… [P]laintiff’s submission also failed to demonstrate that the RPAPL 1304 notices allegedly sent to the defendants contained the requisite list of five housing counseling agencies serving the region in which the subject property is located … . …

… [P]laintiff further failed to establish that the RPAPL 1304 notices were sent by the “lender, assignee, or loan servicer” as required by the statute … . … [T]he RPAPL notices were allegedly sent on August 7, 2014, by the Law Offices of McCabe, Weisberg, and Conway, P.C., on behalf of Ocwen Financial, the plaintiff’s loan servicer. However, the limited power of attorney authorizing Ocwen Financial to act on behalf of the plaintiff, which was submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion, states that it was executed on and effective as of September 17, 2014.  …

… [P]laintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with a condition precedent contained in the mortgage agreement, requiring the lender to send a notice of default prior to the commencement of the action. The plaintiff’s submission failed to show that the required notice was sent to the defendants by first-class mail or actually delivered to the notice address if sent by other means, as required by the terms of the mortgage agreement … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Pariser, 2022 NY Slip Op 04534, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Yet again, summary judgment in favor of the bank in a foreclosure proceeding is reversed because the bank did not prove strict compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 and the mortgage. Reversals on these grounds have appeared every week for at least five years, maybe more.

 

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