You are here: / / DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT...
,

DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR DEFENDANT’S STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S CAR (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact about whether plaintiff, the front-most driver in this rear-end collision action, was negligent:

Hersh [defendant] raised a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment … . Hersh submitted his own affidavit in which he asserted that, prior to the accident, traffic was moving well and there was no ongoing road construction. Hersh asserted that the plaintiff then “suddenly and unexpectedly jammed on his brakes in front of me,” that Hersh “braked hard” and was able to stop without hitting the plaintiff’s vehicle, but that the vehicle behind Hersh then struck Hersh’s vehicle “twice in the rear,” pushing Hersh’s vehicle into the plaintiff’s vehicle. Hersh stated in his affidavit that, after the accident, he “looked all around on the nearby grass and even under plaintiff’s SUV but did not see any cone” obstructing the lane as the plaintiff claimed. Hersh’s affidavit was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Hersh had a nonnegligent explanation for hitting the plaintiff’s vehicle … . Joseph-Felix v Hersh, 2022 NY Slip Op 04905, Second Dept 8-10-22

Practice Point: Here the defendant in this rear-end collision case raised a question of fact about whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for defendant’s striking plaintiff’s car.

Practice Point: Although plaintiff’s lack of comparative negligence need no longer be asserted in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in a rear-end collision case, the issue may be considered at the summary judgment stage if plaintiff moves to dismiss defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense.

 

You might also like
MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS SUPPORTED NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT).
TRIPPING OVER A GAP BETWEEN THE TOP STEP OF A STAIRCASE AND THE LANDING IS NOT A GRAVITY-RELATED INCIDENT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1); RE: LABOR LAW 241(6), THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING COVERS OVER HAZARDOUS OPENINGS APPLIES ONLY TO OPENINGS A WORKER CAN COMPLETELLY FALL THROUGH (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT MISCHARACTERIZED THE SCOPE OF THE WAIVER OF APPEAL BY NOT CLARIFYING THAT CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES REMAIN APPEALABLE DESPITE THE WAIVER; WAIVER INVALID (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND BISHME’S DAUGHTER TO HAVE BEEN DERIVATIVELY ABUSED AND NEGLECTED BASED UPON BISHME’S ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF ANOTHER CHILD (SECOND DEPT).
THE LETTER OF INTENT WAS NOT A BINDING REAL ESTATE CONTRACT; THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE BREACH OF CONTRACT, BASED ON “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE,” SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).
THE TENANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE RELIEF WAS SOUGHT AFTER THE DEADLINE IN THE NOTICE TO CURE; THAT DEADLINE WAS CONTROLLED BY THE LEASE AND THEREFORE WAS NOT EXTENDED BY THE COVID-RELATED EXECUTIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).
Petitioners’ Properties Not Close Enough to Proposed Development to Confer Standing to Allege Violations of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE... ​ THE CONDITIONAL PRECLUSION ORDER BECAME ABSOLUTE WHEN PLAINTIFF DID NOT...