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DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE DEEMED TOO HARSH BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY, THE PLEA DEAL DEFENDANT WAS OFFERED BEFORE TRIAL, AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW EVIDENCE REVEALED BY THE TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s sentence was unduly harsh based upon his criminal history and the plea deal defendant was offered before trial:

… [T]he 10-year determinate sentence is unduly harsh and severe considering that defendant has no violent crimes on his record and was offered the opportunity to plead guilty to the charges in the indictment in exchange for a prison sentence of five years. It does not appear that any facts were revealed at trial that were unknown to the People or the court at the time the sentence promise was made. Under the circumstances, we modify the judgment as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice by reducing the sentence on each count to a determinate term of imprisonment of seven years plus three years of postrelease supervision … . People v Green, 2020 NY Slip Op 00765, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WHOLE FOODS STORE IN THE VICINITY OF A RECREATIONAL TRAIL AND A PUBLIC USE EASEMENT VIOLATES THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s violation of the public trust doctrine causes of action should not have been dismissed. The action relates to the construction of a Whole Foods store in the vicinity of a recreational trail and a public use easement:

… [T]he court erred by granting a declaration in favor of respondents on petitioner’s … causes of action … which allege violations of the public trust doctrine, because there are unresolved factual issues concerning the impact of the Whole Foods development on a recreational trail known as the Auburn Trail, including whether the development would require the constructive abandonment of the existing public use easements for that trail ,,, , Matter of Brighton Grassroots, LLC v Town of Brighton, 2020 NY Slip Op 00754, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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APPLICATION TO FILE A LATE CLAIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING A LATE CLAIM UNDER THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT DESCRIBED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimant’s application to file a late claim in this Labor Law 240 (1) action should have been granted. The criteria for allowing a late claim under the Court of Claims Act were described in some detail:

Upon our consideration of the six factors outlined in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying claimant’s application insofar as claimant sought to assert a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1).

Several factors militate against granting claimant’s application. For instance, his excuse for failing to file a timely notice of intent was law office failure, which, as the court determined, is not an acceptable excuse … . Also, as the court noted, claimant has at least “a partial alternate remedy through workers’ compensation” … . With respect to three of the remaining four statutory factors, we agree with the court’s determination that defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, had an opportunity to investigate the claim and was not prejudiced by the delay … .

The most significant factor, however, is “whether the claim appears to be meritorious” (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]) inasmuch as “it would be futile to permit the filing of a legally deficient claim which would be subject to immediate dismissal, even if the other factors tend to favor the granting of the request” … .

.. [D]ocumentation submitted by claimant indicates that, as he struggled to remove the window and lower it to the ground, the window allegedly “fell” on him, causing him to sustain injuries to his back.

Claimant’s submissions raise issues of fact whether he was injured by the application of the force of gravity to the window as he was moving it between “a physically significant elevation differential” … . Phillips v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00753, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS REINSTATED AGAINST SEVERAL DEFENDANTS; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE ACTIONS WERE REINSTATED BASED UPON A NEW THEORY WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, reinstated the medical malpractice action against several defendants. The dissent argued that evidence submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment presented a new theory and should have been rejected on that ground. The dissent argued that the new theory was raised for the first time in a “supplemental” bill of particulars which, the majority concluded, had been properly struck by Supreme Court:

… [W]e conclude that the court properly granted the motions to strike plaintiff’s “supplemental” bills of particulars inasmuch as they were actually amended bills of particulars. We further conclude that the amended bills of particulars are “a nullity” inasmuch as the note of issue had been filed and plaintiff failed to seek leave to serve amended bills of particulars before serving them upon defendants … .

From the dissent:

… [P]laintiff’s expert’s opinions on malpractice and causation cannot create a question of fact because they are based on a new condition and new injury. Plaintiff’s expert opined that: plaintiff’s son developed Henoch-Schonlein Purpura (HSP) in the days before presenting to the emergency room and was suffering from HSP when he presented to the emergency room; plaintiff’s son was misdiagnosed and the correct diagnosis was HSP; as a result of the mistriage, plaintiff’s son went into hypovolemic shock; and, if properly triaged, plaintiff’s son’s condition, i.e., HSP, never would have progressed to hypovolemic shock.

Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion regarding failure to triage and diagnose relates to a new condition, HSP, and his opinion on proximate cause relates to a new injury, hypovolemic shock, neither of which were included in plaintiff’s original bill of particulars and both of which were included in the “supplemental” bills of particulars, which this Court unanimously agrees were properly struck. Inasmuch as plaintiff’s expert’s opinions regarding the defendants’ negligence and proximate cause involve a new condition and new injury not included in plaintiff’s original bill of particulars, they constituted a new theory of recovery and thus could not be used to defeat the defendants’ motions … . Jeannette S. v Williot, 2020 NY Slip Op 00743, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE ARM-WRESTLED WITH PLAINTIFF; THEREFORE THE EMPLOYER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED INJURY TO PLAINTIFF UNDER A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against the owner of a defendant strip club for injuries incurred when plaintiff was arm-wrestling with defendant’s employee should have been dismissed. Defendant’s employee was not acting within the scope of his employment and defendant therefore could not be liable under a respondeat superior theory:

… [W]e conclude that defendants met their initial burden on the motion by establishing that the employee’s act of arm wrestling plaintiff was not within the scope of his employment and that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response … . The uncontroverted evidence submitted by defendants demonstrated that, although the employee had various responsibilities at the club, he was not required to entertain the club’s patrons, and he arm wrestled plaintiff out of personal motives unrelated to any of his job responsibilities … . Gehrke v Mustang Sally’s Spirits & Grill, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 00741, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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THE MAJORITY NOTED THAT A DECISION IS NOT AN APPEALABLE PAPER BUT HELD THE DECISION HERE IN THIS DIVORCE CASE MET THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN ORDER AND WAS THEREFORE APPEALABLE; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined that, although a decision is not an appealable paper, the decision in this divorce action was close enough to an order to support an appeal. The dissent disagreed:

As a preliminary matter, although not raised by the parties and although “[n]o appeal lies from a mere decision” (… see generally CPLR 5501 [c]; 5512 [a]), we conclude that the paper appealed from meets the essential requirements of an order, and we therefore treat it as such … .

From the dissent:

In 1987, this Court held that “[n]o appeal lies from a mere decision” (Kuhn v Kuhn, 129 AD2d 967, 967 [4th Dept 1987]). In reaching that conclusion, we relied on, inter alia, CPLR 5512 (a), titled “appealable paper,” which provides that “[a]n initial appeal shall be taken from the judgment or order of the court of original instance.” Until today, we have routinely followed that settled principle … . * * *

Here, the record includes a decision that is denominated only as a decision and has no ordering paragraphs and, in his notice of appeal, plaintiff explicitly appeals “from the Decision” (emphasis added). My colleagues in the majority believe that the decision is an appealable paper because it meets “the essential requirements of an order.” To support that proposition, the majority relies on Matter of Louka v Shehatou (67 AD3d 1476 [4th Dept 2009]), wherein this Court determined that a letter would be treated as an order inasmuch as “the Referee filed the letter with the Family Court Clerk and . . . the letter resolved the motion and advised the father that he had a right to appeal” (id. at 1476). Although the decision here was filed and resolved the motion, there was no directive in the decision that plaintiff had the right to appeal from it. Furthermore, I submit that almost all written decisions at least attempt to resolve the issues presented by the parties and many of those decisions are also filed. Nicol v Nicol, 2020 NY Slip Op 00740, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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STATUTE CRIMINALIZING THE POSSESSION OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SECOND AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peradotto, determined that the statute prohibiting possession of an unlicensed firearm in the home does not violate the Second Amendment:

… [D]efendant contends that New York may not constitutionally impose any criminal sanction whatsoever on the unlicensed possession of a handgun in the home. * * *

… [I]t is beyond dispute that “New York has substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention” … . Those concerns include the state’s “substantial and legitimate interest and[,] indeed, . . . grave responsibility, in insuring the safety of the general public from individuals who, by their conduct, have shown” that they should not be entrusted with a dangerous instrument … . …

… [T]the criminal prohibition on the unlicensed possession of a handgun, including in the home, bears a substantial relationship to the state’s interests. “In the context of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying [and possessing] firearms and the manner to combat those risks” … . People v Tucker, 2020 NY Slip Op 00739, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; DEFENDANT MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTORCYCLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the defense verdict in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Defendant made a left turn in front of plaintiff’s motorcycle:

A court should be guided by the rule that, “if the verdict is one that reasonable persons could have rendered after receiving conflicting evidence, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury” … . Here, as the court charged the jury, “defendant had a common-law duty to see that which [he] should have seen through the proper use of [his] senses” … . The evidence undisputedly established that the area of the accident did not have any obstructions and that defendant had a clear line of sight of oncoming traffic. Inasmuch as defendant admitted at trial that he never saw plaintiff or his motorcycle prior to the accident, we conclude that the finding that defendant was not negligent could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence … . Cramer v Schruefer, 2020 NY Slip Op 00728, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION PURSUANT TO REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 853 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the landlord’s (Huntress’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the tenant’s (Kingsbury’s) action for wrongful eviction (RPAPL 853) should not have been granted:

The sole contention raised by Huntress in support of his motion with respect to the first cross claim was that he could not be personally liable inasmuch as he was acting as an agent of a disclosed principal. We conclude that Huntress failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that cross claim and, as a result, the burden never shifted to Kingsbury to raise a triable issue of fact … .

“It is well established that [a] corporate officer may be held personally liable for a tort of the corporation if he or she committed or participated in its commission, whether or not his or her acts are also by or for the corporation’ ” … . A cause of action under RPAPL 853 sounds in tort … . Here, Huntress failed to establish that he did not participate in the eviction of Kingsbury, and he therefore failed to establish as a matter of law that he cannot be held personally liable if the eviction violated RPAPL 853 … . Canandaigua Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Acquest S. Park, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 09130, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

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FAMILY COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSPENDED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS; THE PAYMENTS WERE GOVERNED BY THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT, AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined Family Court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending maintenance payments to mother because the maintenance was provided for in the parties’ separation agreement:

… [W]e agree with the mother and the AFC [attorney for the child] that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending maintenance payments to the mother inasmuch as the parties’ separation agreement setting forth that obligation is an independent contract … . Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute … , and “[i]t generally has no subject matter jurisdiction to reform, set aside or modify the terms of a valid separation agreement”… . We therefore modify the order by vacating the tenth provision of the second ordering paragraph insofar as it relates to the suspension of maintenance payments, and we remit the matter to Family Court for a determination of the amount of any maintenance arrears … . Matter of Krier v Krier, 2019 NY Slip Op 09129, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

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