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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS REINSTATED AGAINST SEVERAL DEFENDANTS; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE ACTIONS WERE REINSTATED BASED UPON A NEW THEORY WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, reinstated the medical malpractice action against several defendants. The dissent argued that evidence submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment presented a new theory and should have been rejected on that ground. The dissent argued that the new theory was raised for the first time in a “supplemental” bill of particulars which, the majority concluded, had been properly struck by Supreme Court:

… [W]e conclude that the court properly granted the motions to strike plaintiff’s “supplemental” bills of particulars inasmuch as they were actually amended bills of particulars. We further conclude that the amended bills of particulars are “a nullity” inasmuch as the note of issue had been filed and plaintiff failed to seek leave to serve amended bills of particulars before serving them upon defendants … .

From the dissent:

… [P]laintiff’s expert’s opinions on malpractice and causation cannot create a question of fact because they are based on a new condition and new injury. Plaintiff’s expert opined that: plaintiff’s son developed Henoch-Schonlein Purpura (HSP) in the days before presenting to the emergency room and was suffering from HSP when he presented to the emergency room; plaintiff’s son was misdiagnosed and the correct diagnosis was HSP; as a result of the mistriage, plaintiff’s son went into hypovolemic shock; and, if properly triaged, plaintiff’s son’s condition, i.e., HSP, never would have progressed to hypovolemic shock.

Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion regarding failure to triage and diagnose relates to a new condition, HSP, and his opinion on proximate cause relates to a new injury, hypovolemic shock, neither of which were included in plaintiff’s original bill of particulars and both of which were included in the “supplemental” bills of particulars, which this Court unanimously agrees were properly struck. Inasmuch as plaintiff’s expert’s opinions regarding the defendants’ negligence and proximate cause involve a new condition and new injury not included in plaintiff’s original bill of particulars, they constituted a new theory of recovery and thus could not be used to defeat the defendants’ motions … . Jeannette S. v Williot, 2020 NY Slip Op 00743, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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