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EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION IN THE ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASE WAS SUFFICIENT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the evidence of causation in this asbestos exposure case was sufficient to support the plaintiffs’ verdict and the motion to set aside was properly denied:

Although, to prove specific causation, plaintiff and decedent were required to establish that decedent “was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause” his alleged injuries, “it is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship” … . There simply “must be evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of [the] agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered” … . Such evidence may include an expert’s use of estimates generated by mathematical models taking a plaintiff’s work history into account, or the use of “more qualitative means” to determine the level of a plaintiff’s exposure, such as comparing the plaintiff’s exposure level “to the exposure levels of subjects of other studies” … . Matter of Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 2020 NY Slip Op 05621, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE TRIGGERING EVENT FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ASBESTOS-INJURY IS THE FIRST EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AS OPPOSED TO EXPOSURE TO A CERTAIN LEVEL OF ASBESTOS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this asbestos exposure case, held it should not have been determined as a matter of law that insurance coverage is triggered by the first exposure to asbestos, as opposed after exposure to a certain level of asbestos:

The parties do not dispute that the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, “which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began” … . Rather, the parties dispute when an asbestos-related injury actually begins: plaintiffs assert that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos, while defendant denies that assertion and instead maintains that injury-in-fact occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos. … [T]he court erred in that regard, and we therefore modify the judgment by denying the subject motion for partial summary judgment and vacating the declaration with respect to that motion. Carrier Corp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 05620, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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COMPLAINT SUING A RETAILER WHICH SOLD AMMUNITION TO A 20-YEAR-OLD WHO SHOT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION TO DISMISS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the complaint alleging defendant retailer negligently sold ammunition to a 20-year old (Klocek) who shot plaintiff’s decedent properly survived a motion to dismiss. The action was not precluded by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA, 15 USC 7901):

… [A] qualified civil liability action [prohibited by the PLCAA] does not include … “an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se” … or “an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought” … . …

… [P]laintiffs allege that defendant violated 18 USC § 922 (b) (1) and Penal Law § 270.00 (5) when defendant allegedly sold “handgun ammunition” to Klocek, who was 20 years old at the time. The federal statute prohibits the sale or delivery of ammunition “other than . . . ammunition for a shotgun or rifle” to anyone the seller or deliverer “knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age” (18 USC § 922 [b] [1]). The state statute prohibits the sale of ammunition “designed exclusively for use in a pistol or revolver” to anyone not authorized to possess a pistol or revolver (Penal Law § 270.00 [5]). Plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, establish that defendant committed a predicate offense under 15 USC § 7903 (5) (A) (ii) and, as a result, establish that this action is not a qualified civil liability action and not subject to immediate dismissal. King v Klocek, 2020 NY Slip Op 05619, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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FAMILY COURT CAN EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER A NONRESIDENT PUTATIVE FATHER IN A PATERNITY ACTION AS LONG AS THE FACTS HAVE A CONNECTION WITH NEW YORK STATE; THE PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the paternity petition should not have been dismissed with prejudice because there are circumstances where the New York Family Court can obtain jurisdiction over an out-of-state respondent in the paternity action:

In a paternity proceeding, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident putative father may be established pursuant to Family Court Act § 580-201. Petitioner, however, admittedly failed to allege in her petition that respondent engaged in sexual intercourse with the mother in New York State at the time of conception, or that he had any other relevant ties to New York State, and no other grounds for jurisdiction apply (see Family Ct Act § 580-201 [6], [8]). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court should have granted the motion on the ground that petitioner failed to state a cause of action predicated upon respondent’s sexual intercourse with petitioner in New York State … . Inasmuch as such a dismissal is not on the merits, however, we further conclude that the petition should be dismissed without prejudice … . Matter of Joyce M.M. v Robert J.G., 2020 NY Slip Op 05616, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT OWE A SPECIAL DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WHO CALLED 911 DURING A SNOW STORM AFTER HIS CAR HAD BECOME STUCK AND WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR THREE DAYS LATER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the municipality was entitled to summary judgment in this wrongful death action. Plaintiff’s decedent’s car was stuck in snow during a snow storm. He called 911 three times over the course of seven hours and was found dead in his car three days later:

Preliminarily, we conclude that, during the events that led to decedent’s unfortunate death, defendants were acting in a governmental capacity … . “Under the public duty rule, although a municipality owes a general duty to the public at large to furnish police protection, this does not create a duty of care running to a specific individual sufficient to support a negligence claim, unless the facts demonstrate that a special duty was created” … . … According to plaintiff, a special relationship was formed in this case by … the voluntary assumption of a duty of care by defendants. That method requires plaintiff to establish “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … . Here, only the first and fourth elements are at issue. We conclude that defendants met their burden on the motion by establishing as a matter of law that there was no voluntary assumption of a duty of care, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendants assumed, through promise or action, any duty to act on decedent’s behalf … . … [D]efendants also met their initial burden by establishing that any alleged reliance upon representations made by defendants or their agents was not justifiable, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in that regard … . Bauer v County of Erie, 2020 NY Slip Op 05623, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COUNTY WAS AFFIRMATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE; THEREFORE THE COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The county demonstrated it did not have written notice of the condition and was not affirmatively negligent:

The complaint alleged that a dangerous or defective condition existed as a result of defendant’s negligent snow and ice removal operations and procedures, and its failure to provide “a means of ingress/egress with a handrail.” …

Defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that it did not receive prior written notice of the allegedly dangerous or defective condition as required by Chautauqua County Local Law No. 4-09 … . In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether such prior written notice was given … . Further, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding the applicability of an exception to the prior written notice requirement, i.e., as relevant here, that defendant “affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence” … . A municipality” ‘may not be held liable for the mere passive failure to remove all snow and ice’ ” or to install a handrail because “[s]uch acts are acts of omission rather than affirmative acts of negligence” … . Here, plaintiff’s submissions establish only defendant’s alleged “nonfeasance, as opposed to affirmative negligence,” and the exception to the prior written notice requirement for affirmative acts of negligence therefore does not apply … . Brockway v County of Chautauqua, 2020 NY Slip Op 05659, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT AT A SIDEBAR CONCERNING THE BIAS OF A PROSPECTIVE JUROR, CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant was deprived of his right to be present at a side bar concerning the bias of a prospective juror:

A … prospective juror was peremptorily excused by defendant’s counsel, however, and, during a sidebar conference at which defendant was not present, that juror was questioned “to search out [her] bias, hostility or predisposition to believe or discredit the testimony of potential witnesses” (Antommarchi, 80 NY2d at 250). Consequently, we conclude that, “absent a knowing and voluntary waiver by defendant of his right to be present at that sidebar conference, his conviction cannot stand” … . The only evidence in the record concerning a waiver consists of a conversation between the court, defendant’s counsel and codefendant’s counsel that occurred after the prospective juror was excused, in which codefendant’s counsel indicated that he had just discussed with codefendant the right to approach the bench during such conferences, and defendant’s counsel merely assented. Inasmuch as the discussion was vague and prospective, and there is no indication that defendant or defendant’s counsel were waiving defendant’s Antommarchi rights retrospectively, that conversation is insufficient to establish that defendant waived those rights concerning the questioning of the prospective juror at issue here. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial. People v Mckenzie-Smith, 2020 NY Slip Op 05653, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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DEFENDANT’S HOME WAS CONSTRUCTED ABOUT EIGHT FEET FROM THE PROPERTY LINE VIOLATING THE COVENANT OR RESTRICTION REQUIRING TEN FEET; PLAINTIFF, AFTER A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, WAS NOT, HOWEVER, ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the defendant had violated a covenant or restriction imposed on property owners in a subdivision, but that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief. Defendant had constructed the home about eight feet from the property line and the covenant or restriction required ten feet:

… [D]efendant knew, or should have known, of the side setback violation on the right side, yet he chose to construct his house in disregard of the fourth paragraph of the covenants and restrictions, defendant did not act in good faith with respect to that violation, and the hardship was self imposed … . … [E]nforcement of the restriction would have little benefit to plaintiff inasmuch as the violation had no impact on the value of plaintiff’s home, the violation did not detract from any neighbor’s view of the lake, and the violation occurred on the side of defendant’s property that was not adjacent to another residential lot. A balancing of the equities under all the circumstances of the case established that plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief for the right side lot line violation … . Kleist v Stern, 2020 NY Slip Op 05652, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

FALL WHILE UNLOADING A FLATBED TRUCK CAN BE A COVERED ACTIVITY AND INVOLVED AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK; INDUSTRIAL CODE VIOLATION FIRST ASSERTED IN OPPOSITION PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was unloading a man lift from a flatbed truck and was on the man lift when it rolled off the truck. The Fourth Department determined: (1) unloading a truck at an active construction site is a covered activity; (2) the fall involved an elevation-related risk; and (3), although an industrial code violation was first asserted in opposition paper, it should not have been rejected:

Delivery of equipment is a covered activity if the equipment is being delivered to an active construction site … or is being “readied for immediate use” … . Delivery of equipment is not a covered activity if it is being delivered to an inactive construction site and is merely being “stockpil[ed] for future use” … . …

Although a fall from a flatbed truck generally does not present the sort of elevation-related risk that Labor Law § 240 (1) is intended to cover … , we have distinguished those cases in which a falling object causes the injured worker to fall … . …

Although plaintiff alleged a violation of section 23-1.5 (c) (3) for the first time in opposition to the motion, a plaintiff may be entitled to leave to amend his or her bill of particulars where, as here, he or she makes a showing of merit, raises no new factual allegations or legal theories, and causes the defendant no prejudice … . Shaw v Scepter, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05651, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A RECURRING ICY CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant had constructive knowledge of a recurring icy condition where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell. Plaintiff slipped after leaving a tenant’s apartment. The tenant testified at a deposition:

… [P]laintiff submitted, inter alia, the deposition testimony of the tenant that she had treated on the day of the incident. The tenant testified that, “basically[,] what happens is there’s a lot of runoff from the ground over here. When the snow melts the whole area gets flooded and then it freezes, and then you have a solid sheet of ice pretty much over these last few blocks of the sidewalk and then down in the end, right at the end where the parking lot meets the sidewalk. I’ve actually contacted management many times in regards to that issue.” The tenant further testified that, when he contacted the property manager on such occasions prior to the incident, he was told that there was nothing that could be done because “the snow melts, thaws and freezes, and there’s nothing [*2]they can do about water.” He also noted that he had been living at the property for 11 years, and no steps had been taken during that time to eliminate water from pooling on the sidewalk. Monnin v Clover Group, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05325, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

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