You are here: / Fourth Department

Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

, , , ,

AN AFFIDAVIT WITH A PARTY STATEMENT AND A NON-PARTY AFFIDAVIT WHICH WERE NOT DISCLOSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE (FOURTH DEPT)

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and reinstating the complaint in this dog-bite case, determined an affidavit which should have been disclosed because it contained the statement of a party was admissible in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment (the Davis affidavit). In addition, the affidavit of a non-party witness should have been considered by the court (the Cheetham affidavit). Even if the discovery demands are read to include the non-party affidavit, the affidavit was privileged as material prepared for litigation and therefore not discoverable. Supreme Court had precluded both affidavits on the ground they had not been disclosed:

… [W]e agree with the court that the affidavit of Davis, insofar as it contained a party statement of defendant, should have been disclosed. CPLR 3101 (e) “enables a party to unconditionally obtain a copy of his or her own statement[,] creating an exception to the rule that material prepared for litigation is ordinarily not discoverable” … . We nevertheless agree with plaintiff that the court abused its discretion in precluding Davis’s affidavit from consideration in opposition to the motion … . Defendant knew of Davis as a person of interest, which is why counsel sought to depose her approximately four months prior to making the motion, and defendant did not seek the assistance of the court to compel Davis’s production … . Inasmuch as plaintiff is not precluded from relying on Davis’s affidavit to oppose summary judgment, Davis is not precluded from testifying at trial … .

We also conclude that the court abused its discretion in precluding the Cheetham affidavit from consideration. Cheetham was listed as a witness in discovery and was deposed. Cheetham is not a party to this action, and his affidavit did not include any statements of a party. Even assuming that Cheetham’s statement was discoverable, we note that defendant’s discovery demands did not include a demand for nonparty witness statements. Assuming further that defendant’s discovery demands could be read to include a request for the statement of a nonparty witness, i.e., Cheetham, we conclude that Cheetham’s statement was conditionally privileged as material prepared in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101 [d] [2 …). Defendant would be unable to show any substantial need for Cheetham’s statement inasmuch as Cheetham was deposed and therefore provided the substantial equivalent of the material contained in the statement … . Vikki-lynn A. v Zewin, 2021 NY Slip Op 05412, Fourth Dept 10-8-21

 

, ,

DEFENDANT IN THIS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASE DEMONSTRATED MITIGATING FACTORS WARRANTING A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TO SORA RISK LEVEL ONE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant in this child pornography case established mitigating circumstances that warranted a downward departure of the risk level to level one:

We agree with defendant … that he established by a preponderance of the evidence that there are other mitigating factors that were “not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines” … . Defendant established that he suffered from a rare, congenital disease that resulted in significant disfigurement and medical issues, requiring numerous surgeries throughout his life. Defendant was bullied as a child, primarily due to his disfigurement and, as a result, was socially isolated, having no significant peer relationships. Defendant has only one prior crime on his record, a misdemeanor for which he was referred to Mental Health Court, and, in the case at hand, the court sentenced him to probation pursuant to the People’s recommendation, thus indicating that defendant does not pose a significant threat to the community. We also note that defendant will be under supervision by the Probation Department for 10 years.

As a result of the depression and related mental health issues that flowed from such a difficult childhood, defendant turned to alcohol and drugs, some of which had been properly prescribed to him following many of his surgeries. Defendant’s use of child pornography generally occurred while he was under the influence of drugs. Inasmuch as defendant was sentenced to a 10-year term of probation, which would ensure that he continued to participate in all of his treatment programs, we conclude that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a downward departure to risk level one is warranted in the exercise of our discretion … . People v Morana, 2021 NY Slip Op 05188, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

,

THE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING PROPERTY TAXES; THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM, WHICH WAS BASED UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s third counterclaim seeking reimbursement for property taxes should not have been dismissed because the terms of the related contract were ambiguous. As part of a purchase agreement which never closed, the defendant was allowed to remain in the property in return for paying the property tax for six months. If the defendant remained in the property after six months defendant was to pay $800/month rent. Defendant remained in the property after six months but no one paid the taxes. Eventually defendant paid the accumulated property tax to avoid a tax auction:

Inasmuch as “a contract generally incorporates the state of the law in existence at the time of its formation” ,,, , defendant, as the titled owner, would have been responsible for the property taxes, absent a contractual provision to the contrary. Here, however, the contract was not truly silent on the issue of property taxes. It specifically provided that defendant would pay property taxes in one situation but then failed to address who would pay the property taxes in another situation … . Based on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which applies to contracts as well as statutes … , “[w]here a [document] describes the particular situations in which it is to apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and excluded” … . Inasmuch as the determination of the intent of the parties depends on a choice among reasonable inferences, we conclude that resolution of the third counterclaim should be left to a trier of fact. Dunn Auto Parts, Inc. v Wells, 2021 NY Slip Op 05185, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

, ,

SUPREME COURT MUST RULE ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT CAN CONSIDER THE ISSUE, MATTER REMITTED FOR A RULING; THE SENTENCE IN THIS DWI CASE WAS ILLEGAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the case to Supreme Court, determined the trial court must rule on the motion for a trial order of dismissal before the appeal of that issue can be considered. The Fourth Department noted that the sentence imposed in this DWI case was illegal:

… [W]e may not address defendant’s contention because, “in accordance with People v Concepcion (17 NY3d 192, 197-198 [2011]) and People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998] … ), we cannot deem the court’s failure to rule on the . . . motion as a denial thereof” … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a ruling on defendant’s motion … . …

… [W]e note … that the sentence is illegal insofar as the court directed that defendant serve a term of five years of probation, with an ignition interlock device for a period thereof, consecutive to the indeterminate term of imprisonment of 1 to 3 years on his conviction for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a) … . People v Capitano, 2021 NY Slip Op 05225, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

,

THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE NEGOTIATED A PLEA DEAL WITH A CO-DEFENDANT REQUIRING TESTIMONY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN EXCHANGE FOR A MORE FAVORABLE SENTENCE; NEW TRIAL BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE ORDERED (F0URTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge assumed the function of an interested party when he negotiated and entered into a plea agreement with a co-defendant requiring the co-defendant to testify against the defendant in exchange for a more favorable sentence:

… [T]he court committed reversible error when it “negotiated and entered into a [plea] agreement with a codefendant[,] requiring that individual to testify against defendant in exchange for a more favorable sentence” … . We conclude that, “by assuming the function of an interested party and deviating from its own role as a neutral arbiter, the trial court denied defendant his due process right to ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal’ ” … . We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial before a different justice … . People v Johnson, 2021 NY Slip Op 05217, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER A THEORY OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER WHICH WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE BILL OF PARTICULARS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the jury instructions allowed the jury to consider a theory of prosecution that was not alleged in the bill of particulars. The defendant was charged with hitting and shaking the child victim, but the jury was allowed to consider defendant’s alleged inaction after the alleged assault:

“A defendant has a right to be tried only for the crimes charged in the indictment” … . ” ‘Where the prosecution is limited by the indictment or bill of particulars to a certain theory or theories, the court must hold the prosecution to such narrower theory or theories’ ” … . We agree with defendant that the People’s theory of depraved indifference, as outlined in the bill of particulars, was limited to defendant’s assaultive conduct, i.e., his infliction of head injuries by shaking or hitting the child, and that the court’s instruction allowed the jury to consider, in addition to the specifically delineated assaultive conduct, defendant’s “inaction” after the assault ended. … [D]efendant objected during the charge conference to a modification of the depraved indifference charge. The charge, as modified, allowed the jury to … consider “the defendant’s later inaction as a factor when considering the brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct,” and defendant objected on the ground that such proof was outside the scope of the bill of particulars. People v Faison, 2021 NY Slip Op 05184, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

,

A TOWN IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER IN A “FIRE DISTRICT,” BUT IS LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER IN A “FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the application for leave to file a late notice of claim against the town in this traffic accident case should not have been denied on the ground the town was not liable for an accident caused by a member of the fire company. Plaintiff alleged the defendant driver was acting within the scope of his duties as a firefighter at the time of the accident. The Fourth Department noted that a town is not liable for the negligence of a volunteer fireman in the employ of a “fire district,” but is liable for the negligence of a member of a “fire protection district:”

A fire district is a “wholly independent political subdivision whose members, including its volunteer firemen, are employees of the district and not of the town” … . The “fire district rather than the town appoints its own members, furnishes fire and ambulance service and is liable for negligence on the part of its members, including their negligent operation of vehicles” … . Accordingly, a “town is not liable on the theory of respondent superior for the negligence of a volunteer fireman in the employ of a fire district” … .

In contrast, “a fire protection district is simply a geographic area, with no independent corporate status, for which the town board is responsible for providing for the furnishing of fire protection” …  and, “[t]o that end, [a town board] may ‘contract with any city, village, fire district or incorporated fire company . . . for the furnishing of fire protection’ ” … . “Members of the fire departments or companies established within a fire protection district ‘are deemed officers, employees, or appointees of the town[,] and the town is liable for any negligence on the part of such members’ ” … . Matter of Froelich v South Wilson Volunteer Fire Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 05207, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

, ,

A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING WARRANTED SANCTIONS AGAINST APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, determined sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal were in order in this divorce proceeding:

… [W]e consider defendant’s request for costs, attorney’s fees, and sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. We grant defendant’s request in part and award costs in the form of reimbursement by plaintiff’s attorney, Angelo T. Calleri, for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from the frivolous conduct of Calleri in prosecuting this appeal … and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine such amount … . “[C]onduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” … . We conclude that Calleri’s appellate brief is replete with arguments that qualify as frivolous under the first paragraph of subdivision (c). Indeed, plaintiff’s frivolous request that we impose sanctions against defendant by itself qualifies as frivolous conduct … .  Marshall v Marshall, 2021 NY Slip Op 05194, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

,

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the claim for punitive damages in this medical malpractice action should have been dismissed because there was no evidence defendant doctor acted with malice or evil intent. Apparently, plaintiff alleged defendant’s fallure to adequately treat a skin condition warranted punitive damages:

Defendant explained that he initiated conservative treatment because, given plaintiff’s other conditions, it was appropriate to address plaintiff’s abdominal skin condition by attempting to alleviate her inflammatory process before considering surgical intervention. Defendant’s submissions established that, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, he had indeed treated plaintiff’s abdominal skin condition, albeit conservatively as he deemed appropriate under the circumstances, and that he had not abandoned plaintiff’s treatment in that regard … . We conclude that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendant established that his conduct “did not manifest spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive . . . , or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton” … . Gaines v Brydges, 2021 NY Slip Op 05193, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

,

DEFENDANT TENANT CLOSED ITS BUSINESS AND ABANDONED THE LEASED PROPERTY DUE TO THE COVID PANDEMIC; PLAINTIFF LANDLORD TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND CHANGED THE LOCKS; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE WHETHER PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES AND THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to discovery in this action on a commercial lease. Defendant closed its furniture business due to the COVID pandemic and abandoned the leased property. Plaintiff took possession of the property and changed the locks. Therefore questions remained concerning whether plaintiff accepted surrender of the property and whether the accelerated rent amounted to a penalty:

Generally, a tenant is relieved of its obligation to pay full rent due under a lease where it surrenders the premises before expiration of the term and the landlord accepts its surrender … . A surrender by operation of law may be inferred from the conduct of the parties where “the parties to a lease both do some act so inconsistent with the landlord-tenant relationship that it indicates their intent to deem their lease terminated” … . “Such a surrender and acceptance severs the relationship between the parties upon the creation of an estate inconsistent with the prior tenant’s rights under the lease” … . Further, “conduct by the landlord which [falls] short of an actual reletting but which indicate[s] the landlord’s intent to terminate the lease and use the premises for his [or her] own benefit” may evince an intent to accept a tenant’s surrender of the premises … .

… [W]hile plaintiff had no duty to mitigate damages …, any actions it may have taken to offset the rent owed by defendants are relevant to determining the amount of damages … . Thus … the discovery sought by defendants is relevant to the issues presented in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment … . … [B]ecause plaintiff seeks accelerated rent constituting liquidated damages … , defendants should have been afforded an opportunity to obtain information regarding whether the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to plaintiff’s actual losses and thus an enforceable penalty … . University Sq. San Antonio, Tx. LLC v Mega Furniture Dezavala, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 05192, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy