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INJURY WHILE LIFTING A HEAVY OBJECT FROM A HORIZONTAL TO A VERTICAL POSITION NOT ENCOMPASSED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1) action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured when a heavy objected being lifted from a horizontal to a vertical position shifted momentarily. The Fourth Department found that the activity during which plaintiff was injured did not involve a risk covered by Labor Law 240 (1):

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“Liability may . . . be imposed under [Labor Law § 240 (1)] only where the plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential’ ” … . “Consequently, the protections of [the statute] do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity’ ” … . Rather, the statute “was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” … .

Here, the harm to plaintiff was not “the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” … ; rather, the submissions establish that plaintiff was injured while lifting the heavy switchgear segment when the weight thereof momentarily shifted to his side as a result of instability or a slight downward movement of half an inch on the coworker’s side … . Although plaintiff’s back injury “was tangentially related to the effects of gravity upon the [switchgear segment that] he was lifting, it was not caused by the limited type of elevation-related hazards encompassed by Labor Law § 240 (1)” … . We thus conclude that defendants established as a matter of law that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a “routine workplace risk[]” of a construction site and not a “pronounced risk[] arising from construction work site elevation differentials” … . Horton v Board of Educ. of Campbell-Savona Cent. Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 07806, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INJURY WHILE LIFTING A HEAVY OBJECT FROM A HORIZONTAL TO A VERTICAL POSITION NOT ENCOMPASSED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FOURTH DEPT)

PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor law 241 (6), 200 and common law negligence action should have been granted. Plaintiff was struck by a car while working in the median of a highway. Defendant, Oakgrove, was a prime contractor with whom the injured plaintiff’s employer did not contract. And Oakgrove had no supervisory control over the plaintiff or the worksite:

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“The owner or general contractor is not synonymous with the prime contractor . . . Generally speaking, the prime contractor for general construction (especially in State construction projects) has no authority over the other prime contractors . . . unless the prime contractor is delegated work in such a manner that it stands in the shoes of the owner or general contractor with the authority to supervise and control the work” … .

Here, Oakgrove and Foit-Albert were both prime contractors, and plaintiff’s employer contracted only with Foit-Albert. Oakgrove did not supervise or instruct plaintiff. Rather, plaintiff reported to a supervisor at Foit-Albert. Oakgrove established as a matter of law that it had no control over plaintiff or the work he was performing, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . …

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… Oakgrove … established that it did not have control over the work site at the time of plaintiff’s accident …. Thus, the court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim and common-law negligence cause of action … . Knab v Robertson, 2017 NY Slip Op 07822, Fourth Department 11-9-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/PRIME CONTRACTOR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying Supreme Court) determined plaintiff was not entitled to disclosure of the pre-disclaimer opinion of outside counsel for the insurer, and was not entitled to the insurer’s manual without an in camera review of the manual for relevance. Supreme Court properly ordered disclosure of the pre-disclaimer claim notes which included statements made by the insured (father of the injured infant):

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… [T]he court properly ordered disclosure of pre-disclaimer claim notes containing statements made by the father. It is well settled that “there must be full disclosure of accident reports prepared in the ordinary course of business that were motivated at least in part by a business concern other than preparation for litigation” … . Here, the father made his statements to defendant’s investigators before defendant made the decision to disclaim, and there is no dispute that defendant’s employees relied on those statements in making that decision.

… [T]he court abused its discretion in granting that part of plaintiff’s motion seeking disclosure of the legal opinion of outside counsel and pre-disclaimer claim notes related thereto and denying that part of defendant’s cross motion seeking a protective order with respect to those items, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Although reports prepared in the regular course of business are discoverable … , documents prepared by an attorney that are “primarily and predominantly of a legal character,” and made to furnish legal services, are absolutely privileged and not discoverable, regardless of whether there was pending litigation at the time they were prepared … .

[T]he court abused its discretion in granting that part of plaintiff’s motion seeking disclosure of defendant’s reserve information and denying that part of defendant’s cross motion with respect thereto inasmuch as that information is not “material and necessary” to the action (CPLR 3101 [a]…).

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… [T]he court abused its discretion in granting that part of plaintiff’s motion seeking disclosure of defendant’s claim investigation manual and denying that part of defendant’s cross motion with respect thereto without first conducting an in camera review. As the moving party, plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating that “the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims” … . …[T]he court should have reviewed the manual in camera to determine whether it contained information material and relevant to the issues to be decided in the action … . Celani v Allstate Indem. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 07799, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (INSURANCE LAW, (SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY-CLIENT, INSURANCE LAW, DISCLOSURE, (SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))/DISCLOSURE (INSURANCE LAW, SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 3101 (a) (INSURANCE LAW, SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT))

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TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board of appeals’ (ZBA’s) restrictions on the hours of operation of petitioner’s restaurant, as well as the requirement for valey parking, were appropriate. The hours coincided with the availability of off-street parking:

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“A zoning board may, where appropriate, impose reasonable conditions and restrictions as are directly related to and incidental to the proposed use of the property, and aimed at minimizing the adverse impact to an area that might result from the grant of a variance or special permit”… . “However, if a zoning board imposes unreasonable or improper conditions, those conditions may be annulled although the variance is upheld'” … .

Here, the ZBA’s conditions requiring valet parking and limiting the petitioner’s hours of operation to coincide with the hours of access to the 40 off-street parking spaces granted in the license agreement were proper because the conditions related directly to the use of the land and were intended to protect the neighboring commercial properties from the potential adverse effects of the petitioner’s operation, such as the anticipated increase in traffic congestion and parking problems… ” The need to alleviate traffic congestion by requiring adequate parking facilities’ is a legitimate consideration for a zoning board of appeals” … .

… The ZBA was entitled to rely on the testimony of the local store owners, since “a zoning board’s reliance upon specific, detailed testimony of neighbors based on personal knowledge does not render a variance determination the product of generalized and conclusory community opposition”… . Their testimony was supported by the observation of the petitioner’s own expert that there is a great demand for parking in the area of the subject restaurant. Members of the ZBA were also entitled to rely on their own personal knowledge of the area in reaching their decision … . Matter of Bonefish Grill, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 2017 NY Slip Op 06643, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

 

ZONING (TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT))/VARIANCES (CONDITIONS, TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT))/PARKING (ZONING, TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC (ZONING, TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT))

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DOCTRINE OF TAX ESTOPPEL PREVENTED DEFENDANTS FROM ASSERTING FACTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER REPORT, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO ENFORCE A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the doctrine of tax estoppel prevented defendants from asserting facts contrary to the information provided in the Real Property Transfer Report (RPT report). Plaintiff had a right of first refusal on the sale of defendants’ commercial property. Defendants sold the property without giving plaintiff the right of first refusal, claiming it was not a bona fide sale because the same person controlled the seller and the buyer, an allegation negated by the RPT report:

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Under the doctrine of tax estoppel, ” [a] party to litigation may not take a position contrary to a position taken in [a] tax return’ ” … . Here, 428 Co. and SS jointly submitted a Real Property Transfer Report (RPT report) … to the Department of Taxation and Finance in which they certified that the transfer of the subject property was not a “sale between related companies or partners in business.”  …

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The sworn statements made in the RPT report further estop defendants from asserting that various mortgage assumptions worth over $2 million constituted part of the purchase price, and that plaintiff was therefore unwilling to purchase the property “at the same price and under the same terms” … . The instructions for the tax form require that any mortgage assumptions be listed as part of the “Full Sale Price” on the RPT report, and [defendants] did not do so here. … [Defendants] listed only a cash sale price of $238,493 as the “Full Sale Price” on the RPT report, and it is undisputed that plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to purchase the property for that amount. Amalfi, Inc. v 428 Co., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06770, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

 

REAL ESTATE (DOCTRINE OF TAX ESTOPPEL PREVENTED DEFENDANTS FROM ASSERTING FACTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER REPORT, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO ENFORCE A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (REAL ESTATE, RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL, DOCTRINE OF TAX ESTOPPEL PREVENTED DEFENDANTS FROM ASSERTING FACTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER REPORT, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO ENFORCE A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/TAX LAW  (DOCTRINE OF TAX ESTOPPEL PREVENTED DEFENDANTS FROM ASSERTING FACTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER REPORT, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO ENFORCE A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/TAX ESTOPPEL (DOCTRINE OF TAX ESTOPPEL PREVENTED DEFENDANTS FROM ASSERTING FACTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION IN THE REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER REPORT, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO ENFORCE A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR NEAR THE SHOWER WAS NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE SHOWER AND WAS NOT AN ACTIONABLE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the complaint in this slip and fall case was properly dismissed. Plaintiff’s daughter slipped and fell on water on the bathroom floor on defendants’ property. The court held that water on the floor near the shower was not actionable:

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Defendants’ submissions established that the daughter slipped on the bathroom floor when she stepped out of the shower to retrieve a brush while the water was running. The daughter stated during her deposition that, although the shower curtain had been closed and no water was falling outside the bathtub prior to the accident, as a result of her opening the curtain while the water was running, there was some water on the floor around the bathtub when she stepped out of the bathtub. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, ” a wet floor—especially in a bathroom where one can expect some water to make its way out of the shower to the floor—is not enough, standing alone, to establish negligence’ ” …  Here, defendants established that the amount of water present on the floor “was a condition that was necessarily incidental’ to the use of the shower[] . . . and thus that it did not by itself constitute a dangerous condition”… . Defendants further established that the accident was not attributable to a defect in the floor or the bath towel that they provided to the daughter, which she placed on the floor beside the bathtub… . Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that a dangerous condition existed, we conclude that defendants met their burden by establishing that they neither created the dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice thereof … . Keller v Keller, 2017 NY Slip Op 06773, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

NEGLIGENCE (WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR NEAR THE SHOWER WAS NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE SHOWER AND WAS NOT AN ACTIONABLE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR NEAR THE SHOWER WAS NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE SHOWER AND WAS NOT AN ACTIONABLE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/BATHROOMS (SLIP AND FALL, WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR NEAR THE SHOWER WAS NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE SHOWER AND WAS NOT AN ACTIONABLE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/NECESSARY AND INCIDENTAL (SLIP AND FALL, WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR NEAR THE SHOWER WAS NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE SHOWER AND WAS NOT AN ACTIONABLE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT)

STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined a stipulation which was not merged into the judgment of divorce should not have been dismissed as unenforceable:

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It is well settled that a party to a stipulation that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce “cannot challenge the [enforceability of the] stipulation by way of motion but, rather, must do so by commencement of a plenary action” … . Conversely, a party seeking to enforce the terms of such a stipulation may do so either by a motion to enforce the judgment … . In this case, the issue whether the stipulation was enforceable was not properly before the court because defendant did not commence a plenary action challenging its enforceability. Rather, plaintiff moved to enforce the judgment incorporating the stipulation, and defendant effectively conceded that the stipulation was enforceable when she asserted that the only questions before the court were the valuation of her master’s degree and the extent of plaintiff’s marital interest therein. Thus, we conclude that the court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion on the ground that the stipulation was unenforceable … . Anderson v Anderson, 2017 NY Slip Op 06786, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

FAMILY LAW (DIVORCE, STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (DIVORCE, STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))/DIVORCE (STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))

EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that respondent was legally responsible for the child, therefore the neglect finding could not stand:

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… [T]he evidence does not support Family Court’s determination that he is a person legally responsible for the child … , and the court therefore erred in determining that he neglected the child … . Even giving deference to the court’s credibility determinations … , we conclude that petitioner’s witnesses established that respondent and the mother of the child had been living together for some unspecified period of time, but there was nothing further to show that respondent acted “as the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial or household setting” … . There was no testimony that respondent, the mother, and the child were “living together as a family” … , or that respondent provided childcare or financial support, or performed any household duties … . Matter of Kameron V. (Eva V.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06782, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

FAMILY LAW (EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLECT (EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT))

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WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the denial of youthful offender status was not appealable as it was encompassed by the waiver of appeal. The Fourth Department further determined the purported waiver of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation was not valid because there was no relationship between the waiver and the sexual-abuse offense to which defendant pled guilty. The invalid conditions allowed searches of his person, home and personal property, breath, blood and urine testing, and prohibited use or possession of alcohol:

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Defendant … contends that various conditions of his probation are not authorized by Penal Law § 65.10. We agree with defendant that his contention is not precluded by the waiver of the right to appeal and does not require preservation inasmuch as his challenges to those conditions implicate the legality of the sentence … . We agree with defendant that the document he signed requiring him to consent to waive his Fourth Amendment right protecting him from unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, home, and personal property, and to submit to chemical tests of his breath, blood, or urine, is not enforceable because it was not related to the probationary goal of rehabilitation … . The waiver and consent to search was ostensibly based on defendant’s acknowledgment that his criminal behavior was related to drug/alcohol abuse, but in fact there was no evidence that defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs when he committed the offense or had a history of drug or alcohol abuse … . For similar reasons, we agree with defendant that special condition nine of the conditions of probation, which required him to abstain from the use or possession of alcoholic beverages and to submit to appropriate alcohol testing, is also not enforceable and must be stricken. People v Saraceni, 2017 NY Slip Op 06732, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

CRIMINAL LAW (WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (PROBATION CONDITIONS, WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID (FOURTH DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (PROBATION CONDITIONS, WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID (FOURTH DEPT))/PROBATION (WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/WAIVER OF APPEAL (WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/SEXUAL ABUSE (PROBATION CONDITIONS, WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PROBATION INVALID, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ENCOMPASSED BY WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))

DEFENDANT SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE FIRST STEP OF A BATSON CHALLENGE TO A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS IN THE BATSON PROCEDURE WERE NOT TAKEN, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AFTER A JURY TRIAL, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO COMPLETE THE BATSON PROCEDURE (FOURTH DEPT). 

The Fourth Department determined defendant had adequately raised a Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s removal of a juror. Because the next steps in the Batson procedure were not taken the case was remitted for that purpose (after a jury trial and conviction):

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We agree with defendant that he met his initial burden on his Batson application by demonstrating that the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a member of a cognizable racial group from the venire, “and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenge[] to exclude [that] potential juror[] because of [her] race”… . We note that “the first-step burden in a Batson challenge is not intended to be onerous” … , and that the initial burden is met when ” the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose’ ” … . Here, defendant is African-American, and the first prospective juror to be peremptorily challenged by the People was the only African-American on the panel. Neither the People nor defendant asked any questions of the prospective juror at issue during voir dire, and County Court’s general questioning of the panel raised no issues that would distinguish her from the other prospective jurors. Inasmuch as there is a basis in the record to infer that the People exercised the peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner, the burden shifted to the People to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for striking the juror, and the court then should have determined whether the proffered reason was pretextual … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for that purpose … . People v Davis, 2017 NY Slip Op 06790, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE FIRST STEP OF A BATSON CHALLENGE TO A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS IN THE BATSON PROCEDURE WERE NOT TAKEN, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AFTER A JURY TRIAL, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO COMPLETE THE BATSON PROCEDURE (FOURTH DEPT))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE FIRST STEP OF A BATSON CHALLENGE TO A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS IN THE BATSON PROCEDURE WERE NOT TAKEN, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AFTER A JURY TRIAL, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO COMPLETE THE BATSON PROCEDURE (FOURTH DEPT))/BATSON PROCEDURE (JURORS, DEFENDANT SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE FIRST STEP OF A BATSON CHALLENGE TO A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS IN THE BATSON PROCEDURE WERE NOT TAKEN, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AFTER A JURY TRIAL, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO COMPLETE THE BATSON PROCEDURE (FOURTH DEPT))

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