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MOTOR VEHICLES REGULATION WHICH ALLOWS A LIFETIME DRIVING BAN TO BE IMPOSED UPON DRIVERS WITH MULTIPLE DWI CONVICTIONS IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

The Fourth Department determined the regulation which allows the commissioner of motor vehicles to impose a lifetime driver’s license revocation for persons with multiple driving while intoxicated convictions was not unconstitutionally vague:

… [T]he regulation does not give respondent “unfettered discretion” to deny an application. Section 136.5 formalized the manner in which the Commissioner would exercise her discretion by “ensur[ing] that her discretion is exercised consistently and uniformly, such that similarly-situated applicants are treated equally” … . Additionally, the regulation puts the public on notice of respondent’s general policy with respect to relicensing a person whose driver’s license has been revoked for multiple alcohol- or drug-related transgressions … . In petitioner’s case, he faces a lifetime ban because he has at least five such convictions or incidents, as defined in the regulation … . Nevertheless, the Commissioner reserved the discretion to deviate from her general policy in “unusual, extenuating and compelling circumstances” … . That exception ensures that respondent has the flexibility to grant an application for relicensing where extraordinary circumstances render the application of the general policy inappropriate or unfair … . Thus, reading the language of the challenged exception within the context of the regulation as a whole, we conclude that 15 NYCRR 136.5 (d) is not unconstitutionally vague. Matter of Gurnsey v Sampson, 2017 NY Slip Op 05350, 4th Dept 6-30-17

 

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