You are here: / Fourth Department

Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

,

THE SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ELEMENT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DOES NOT REQUIRE OBJECTIVE MEDICAL EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined it was not necessary to present objective medical evidence to establish the severe emotional distress element of intentional infliction of emotional distress:

On appeal from an order and judgment that awarded plaintiff money damages following a nonjury trial, we reject defendants’ contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Although severe emotional distress is an element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress … , Supreme Court properly concluded that plaintiff was not required to present objective medical evidence in order to establish that element of her cause of action … . Fellows v Rosati, 2019 NY Slip Op 03508, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

, , ,

JUDGE’S SUA SPONTE ASSESSMENT OF POINTS ON A GROUND OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court’s SORA risk assessment, determined that the judge’s assessing points on a ground of which defendant was not given prior notice was a violation of due process. The issue was considered on appeal in the interest of justice (there was no objection at the SORA hearing):

“The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment” . As a result, “[a] defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to notice of points sought to be assigned” … , and “a court’s sua sponte departure from the Board’s recommendation at the hearing, without prior notice, deprives the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to respond” … . Here, neither the Board nor the People requested the assessment of points for a continuing course of sexual misconduct on the ground that defendant engaged in three or more acts of sexual contact with the victim over a period of at least two weeks … . At the conclusion of the SORA hearing, however, the court proceeded to assign additional points under that category on the ground that the grand jury testimony of the victim’s mother established that there was a third uncharged incident of sexual contact. Defendant was never provided any notice that points would be assessed as a result of a third uncharged incident and thus was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the court’s risk level assessment. People v Chrisley, 2019 NY Slip Op 03505, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

,

ALTHOUGH THE ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, DEFENDANT INDICATED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE CRIME TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY BUT THE JUDGE MADE NO FURTHER INQUIRY, THE PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction in the interest of justice, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered:

We agree with defendant that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered … . Although defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review because “his motion to withdraw his plea was made on grounds different from those advanced on appeal” … , and this case does not fall within the “narrow exception” to the preservation rule … , we exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice … .

“A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” … . After Supreme Court accepted defendant’s guilty plea, defendant stated that he was confused by the plea proceeding, and the court asked him if he had any questions about the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant then made a series of remarks from which it became apparent that he did not understand the nature of the crime to which he had entered his guilty plea. Although defendant was “obviously confused,” the court made no further inquiry whether he understood the plea or its consequences … . People v Hector, 2019 NY Slip Op 03504, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

, ,

THERE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT SHARED THE CO-DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO KILL, IN ADDITION, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION UNDER AN ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY THEORY WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined there was legally insufficient evidence that the defendant shared the co-defendant’s intent to kill, and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The co-defendant walked up to the defendant on the street and shot him. The defendant was present at the scene and picked the co-defendant up and drove away after the shooting. The defendant was convicted under an accomplice or accessorial liability theory:

A “defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, alone, is insufficient for a finding of criminal liability” … . Indeed, evidence that a defendant was at the crime scene and even assisted the perpetrator in removing evidence of that crime is insufficient to support a defendant’s conviction where the People fail to offer evidence from which the jury could rationally exclude the possibility that the defendant was without knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent … . “An aider and abettor must share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose”… . We have no difficulty concluding that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could have found that defendant intentionally aided the codefendant after the murder, but we cannot conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the inference that defendant shared the codefendant’s intent to kill the victim … . The People offered no motive for the crime … , and the evidence indicating that defendant was staring at the victim 40 minutes before the shooting and that defendant may have dropped off the codefendant at the bar prior to the shooting was plainly insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of and shared the codefendant’s intent to kill the victim … . * * *

Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence is legally sufficient, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury … , we further conclude that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence … . A review of the weight of the evidence requires us to first determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable … . If so, we must ” weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony’ ” … . We conclude that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable in this case and, based on the weight of the evidence, we further conclude that the jury was not justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Mcdonald, 2019 NY Slip Op 03494, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

, ,

LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF BITTEN BY TENANT’S DOG (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this dog-bite case should have been granted. The landlord was aware the tenant had a dog, and could have required the removal of the dog, but was not aware whether the dog had vicious propensities. The court noted that theories of common-law negligence are not applicable:

It is well established that ” [t]o recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises[,] (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog’ ” … . Here, it is undisputed that defendant was aware that a dog was kept on the premises by his tenants and that he could have required them to remove or confine the dog. Nevertheless, defendant met his initial burden on the motion by establishing as a matter of law that he lacked actual or constructive knowledge that his tenants’ dog had any vicious propensities … .

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint includes a negligence cause of action, we conclude that the court erred in failing to dismiss that cause of action inasmuch as “[c]ases involving injuries inflicted by domestic animals may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence” … . Toher v Duchnycz, 2019 NY Slip Op 03487, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

,

PLAINTIFF, WHO FELL THROUGH A HOLE IN A HOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6), PLAINTIFF WAS MEASURING WINDOWS FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION OF WINDOW TREATMENTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff, who fell through a hole in a house under construction, was not engaged in an activity covered by Labor Law 240 (1) or 241 (6) when he fell. Plaintiff was measuring windows for future installation of window treatments, which is not construction work. There were questions of fact on the negligence and wrongful death causes of action however:

… [T]he work of measuring windows for the future installation of window treatments is not a protected activity under Labor Law § 240 (1). The work did not involve a “significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure” … , was not “performed in the context of the larger construction project” … , and was not “necessary and incidental to the construction of the home” … . …

The work being performed by decedent was not protected work under Labor Law § 241 (6) inasmuch as decedent ” was not involved with [any] construction’ “… , and the window treatment work was separate and “distinct from the construction work” … . Acox v Jeff Petroski & Sons, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 03480, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

ALTHOUGH BEING STRUCK BY A MISHIT BALL IS AN INHERENT RISK IN A GOLF GAME WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE, THERE WAS EVIDENCE DEFENDANT DELIBERATELY HIT THE BALL IN A MANNER THAT UNREASONABLY INCREASED THE RISK OF STRIKING PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant golfer’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. There was evidence defendant teed off when plaintiff was within the range of defendant’s normal drives. Plaintiff was struck in the head by the ball. This was not a case of a mishit ball which would trigger the assumption of the risk doctrine:

… “[A]lthough the object of the game of golf is to drive the ball as cleanly and directly as possible toward its ultimate intended goal (the hole), the possibility that the ball will fly off in another direction is a risk inherent in the game” … . Thus, while a golfer owes a duty to use due care in striking a golf ball … , “the mere fact that a golf ball did not travel in the intended direction does not establish a viable negligence claim” … . “To provide an actionable theory of liability, a person injured by a mishit golf ball must affirmatively show that the golfer failed to exercise due care by adducing proof, for example, that the golfer aimed so inaccurately as to unreasonably increase the risk of harm’ ” … . …

 … [D]efendant’s submissions raise an issue of fact whether he unreasonably increased the risk of striking plaintiff with his golf ball by teeing off when plaintiff, who was visible in the fairway on the same hole, was still positioned well within the typical range of defendant’s drive … . Krych v Bredenberg, 2019 NY Slip Op 03479, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

,

POLICE EFFECTIVELY SEIZED DEFENDANT BY BLOCKING DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WITH TWO POLICE CARS, BECAUSE THE SEIZURE TOOK PLACE IN THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION A PARTICULAR PERSON WAS INVOLVED IN A CRIME THE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and suppressing the tangible evidence, determined the police effectively seized defendant by blocking in defendant’s vehicle with two police cars without sufficient cause:

The conviction arises from a police encounter during which an officer approached the parked vehicle in which defendant was a passenger and observed that defendant was in possession of a handgun. We agree with defendant that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure of the vehicle, and thus Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress both the tangible property seized, i.e., the weapon, and statements defendant made to the police at the time of his arrest. Here, police officers effectively seized the vehicle in which defendant was riding when their two patrol cars entered the parking lot in such a manner as to prevent the vehicle from being driven away … . The police had, at most, a “founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot,” which permitted them to approach the vehicle and make a common-law inquiry of its occupants. They did not, however, have “reasonable suspicion that [a] particular individual was involved in a felony or misdemeanor” to justify the seizure that occurred here …, and thus the weapon and defendant’s statements should have been suppressed. People v Suttles, 2019 NY Slip Op 03158, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE BECAUSE NO REQUEST WAS MADE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE POLICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s weapons possession and sale convictions because the state Attorney General did not have the authority to prosecute the case. The Attorney General’s authority to prosecute a criminal case is triggered when a request is made by the head of an appropriate agency, here the Superintendent of the State Police. No such request was in the stipulated record on appeal:

It is well settled that the Attorney General lacks general prosecutorial authority and has the power to prosecute only where specifically permitted by statute … . As relevant here, Executive Law § 63 (3) grants the Attorney General prosecutorial authority “[u]pon request of . . . the head of any . . . department, authority, division, or agency of the state” (emphasis added). Although the People assert that the Attorney General had authority to prosecute this matter under section 63 (3) based on a request made by the State Police, such a request would confer that authority only if made by the head of the division, i.e., the Superintendent of State Police … . Moreover, “the State bears the burden of showing that the [division or] agency head has asked for the prosecutorial participation of the Attorney General’s office” … . People v Wassell, 2019 NY Slip Op 03187, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

COUNTY COURT COULD NOT LEGALLY FULFILL THE SENTENCING PROMISE THAT INDUCED DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA, PLEA VACATED AND THE MATTER REMITTED FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE WHICH COMPORTS WITH DEFENDANT’S EXPECTATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s guilty plea was induced by a sentencing promise County Court could not fulfill. The plea was vacated and the matter was remitted for imposition of a sentence that comports with defendant’s expectations:

Penal Law § 70.30 (3) provides that “the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” Penal Law § 70.30 (3) further provides that “[i]n the case of an indeterminate sentence, if the minimum period of imprisonment has been fixed by the court . . . , the credit shall also be applied against the minimum period.” That credit, however, “shall not include any time that is credited against the term . . . of any previously imposed sentence . . . to which the person is subject” … . Thus, “a person is prohibited from receiving jail time credit against a subsequent sentence when such credit has already been applied to time served on a previous sentence’ ” … . Inasmuch as defendant was serving a sentence on a prior conviction throughout the instant proceedings, the court could not legally fulfill its promise to credit defendant’s jail time against his sentence in this matter.

It is well established that “[a] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … . “Where, as here, the originally promised sentence cannot be imposed in strict compliance with the plea agreement, the sentencing court may impose another lawful sentence that comports with the defendant’s legitimate expectations” … . People v Mccullen, 2019 NY Slip Op 03180, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy