You are here: / First Department

Tag Archive for: First Department

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE.

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this elevator accident case was properly denied. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied:

The motion court properly concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur precludes the award of summary judgment in defendant’s favor in this action where plaintiff was injured when the elevator in which he was riding came to a sudden and abrupt stop. Elevator malfunctions ordinarily do not occur in the absence of negligence … , and defendant has failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that it lacked exclusive control over the subject elevator at the time of the accident. Defendant’s argument that vandalism was the cause of the elevator’s malfunction, lacks support in the record, and there is no evidence that plaintiff’s actions played a role in the cause of the accident. Galante v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 00430, 1st Dept 1-24-17

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATOR ACCIDENT, DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/ELAVATORS (DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/RES ISPA LOQUITUR (ELEVATOR ACCIDENT, DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)

NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE.

The First Department determined the escalator-fall case against defendant Macy’s and (apparently) defendant ThyssenKrupp (responsible for escalator maintenance) was properly dismissed. The defendants demonstrated they had no notice of a problem with the escalator (either before or after the accident). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because plaintiff did not show the alleged skidding and shaking of the escalator could only have resulted from defendants’ negligence:

Macy’s operations manager and ThyssenKrupp’s elevator mechanic both testified that they did not receive any reports of the escalators shaking or stopping and starting before the date of plaintiff’s accident; nor did anyone, including plaintiff, before her July 2009 accident, observe the escalators stop and start several times in succession … . … The fact that Macy’s made service calls to ThyssenKrupp on January 15, 2009 and February 15, 2009, because the escalator from the basement to the main level was not running, does not raise an issue of fact as to notice, since there is no evidence that those calls were occasioned by the type of malfunctioning plaintiff describes … . * * *

Plaintiff claims that the escalator skidded and shook causing her to fall forward. The evidence in this record establishes that the elevator never operated in this manner either before or after the alleged accident. Plaintiff was able, after her fall, to ride the escalator up to the next level without any further escalator malfunction. Without more, this proof is insufficient to establish that the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence … . Torres-Martinez v Macy’s, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00429, 1st Dept 1-24-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/SLIP AND FALL (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/ESCALATORS (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/RES IPSA LOQUITUR (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)

COMPENSATION FOR A GUARDIAN UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IS NOT CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA IN THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, GUARDIAN ENTITLED ONLY TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION.

The First Department determined Supreme Court properly set the compensation for a guardian (Goldstein) who served for about a month at $100,000, rejecting the guardian’s request for about $700,000. The Mental Hygiene Law requires only “reasonable” compensation, and does not require use of the compensation formula set out in the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SPCA):

… [A]lthough the Mental Hygiene Law, as originally enacted, encouraged courts to consider a compensation plan similar to the guidelines set forth in the SCPA after the statute was amended in 2004, all references to the SCPA were eliminated. The Mental Hygiene Law does not provide any formula or guideline for the court to follow in setting compensation for an Article 81 guardian, nor does it refer to such compensation as a “commission.” * * *

… [W]e reject Goldstein’s argument that the court was required to find misfeasance or misconduct on his part in order to deny him a full commission calculated under the SCPA. Under the Mental Hygiene Law, Goldstein is entitled to no more than “reasonable compensation” for his services, and there is no mathematical formula in the mental hygiene law that the motion court failed to apply or disregarded. A court may, and in this case did, with respect to Goldstein’s services as temporary guardian, choose to compensate a guardian in quantum meruit, using an hourly rate … . Whether using the hourly rate approved by the court of $350 per hour or using his usual hourly rate of $495, Goldstein was well compensated for his time … . Matter of Goldstein v Zabel, 2017 NY Slip Op 00426, 1st Dept 1-24-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (COMPENSATION FOR A GUARDIAN UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IS NOT FIGURED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA IN THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, GUARDIAN ENTITLED ONLY TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION)/GUARDIANSHIP (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, COMPENSATION FOR A GUARDIAN UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IS NOT FIGURED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA IN THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, GUARDIAN ENTITLED ONLY TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION)/SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT (GUARDIANSHIP, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, COMPENSATION FOR A GUARDIAN UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IS NOT FIGURED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA IN THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, GUARDIAN ENTITLED ONLY TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION)

EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this pedestrian traffic accident. Plaintiff pedestrian conceded he did not have the right of way when he crossed in a crosswalk. There was a question of fact whether the driver could have seen the pedestrian and avoided the accident:

Plaintiff pedestrian testified that he was struck by defendant’s vehicle while crossing the street within the crosswalk, but conceded that he did not have the right of way when he entered the street (… Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112;…). Nevertheless, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, triable issues of fact exist as to the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant at the time of the accident, and whether defendant could have seen plaintiff before the accident and failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident … . Sylvester v Velez, 2017 NY Slip Op 00390, 1st Dept 1-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/PEDESTRIANS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)

LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined the lease in question was not an attempt to thwart rent control and was therefore valid and enforceable. The lease related to three apartments which were leased at different times to the defendant-tenant, who combined them into a single unit. Two of the apartments were rent-controlled and one was rent-stabilized and it was unclear at the time the lease was drawn what law applied:

… [T]his case is clearly unique because unlike the many cases where we invalidated leases seeking to circumvent the rent laws, here the parties truly did not know the rent-regulated status of the combined apartments. It appears that there were two rent-controlled apartments that were combined with a rent-stabilized apartment sometime in 1977. Fundamentally, in the foregoing cases there was no uncertainty about the rent-regulated status of the apartments and no question that the parties knowingly attempted to circumvent the rent laws. In contrast, the parties in this matter were unsure about the status of the combined apartment. This confusion was well founded and even supported by the fact that the parties received conflicting determinations concerning the legal status of this apartment from Rent Administrators … regarding the apartment’s status. Furthermore, the lease contemplated the possibility that the apartment could not be treated as intended by the parties. Indeed, while the lease provided for the combined apartments to move from rent control to rent stabilization, the parties explicitly recognized that they might be “prohibited or precluded” from enforcing their intended procedure. This is quite different from those leases which purposely sought to skirt the law and had no regard for the rent regulation scheme whatsoever. In other words, this agreement contemplated not that both parties would evade regulatory coverage but that they would seek approval of their agreement … . Thus, this case is distinguishable from those involving leases which knowingly and purposely sought to evade the rent laws. Here, there was no intent by the parties to the lease agreement to circumvent the rent laws. 204 Columbia Hgts., LLC v Manheim, 2017 NY Slip Op 00425, 1st Dept 1-19-17

LANDLORD-TENANT (LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE)/RENT CONTROL (NYC) (LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE)/LEASES (LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1).

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was performing routine maintenance or repair of an air conditioner. Routine maintenance would not support a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, while repair would:

Issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff was performing routine maintenance, which would not implicate the protections of Labor Law § 240(1), or a repair within the meaning of the statute … , when he diagnosed an air conditioning unit’s malfunction, and replaced a component part. Although plaintiff testified that the compressor contactor malfunctioned due to normal wear and tear … , making it a worn-out component in an otherwise operable air conditioning unit … , and that the entire replacement took only 20 minutes, he also stated that this is not a part that would ordinarily require inspection, adjustment or replacement, and that it generally lasts as long as the compressor and can last the life of the unit, indicating that it was not a recurring event, and that the component was not intended to have a limited life … . Roth v Lenox Terrace Assoc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00402, 1st Dept 1-19-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))/REPAIR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))/MAINTENANCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))

A COURT’S LIMIITED REVIEW POWERS RE AN AGENCY’S FINDINGS PURSUANT TO A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW QUALITY ACT ASSESSMENT CLARIFIED, SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF AGENCY FINDINGS REVERSED. 

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Health (DOH) had given the requisite “hard look” at air quality and noise mitigation issues for a school near a construction site. The Department of Health had approved the measures pursuant to a review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The First Department took pains to explain the limited powers of court-review of an agency finding:

It is axiomatic that judicial review of an agency determination under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) is limited to whether the agency procedures were lawful and “whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look’ at them, and made a reasoned elaboration’ of the basis for its determination” … . Moreover, “[i]t is not the province of the courts to second-guess thoughtful agency decisionmaking and, accordingly, an agency decision should be annulled only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by the evidence” … . Since it is the responsibility of the agency to analyze reports and other documents submitted to it, “it is not for a reviewing court to duplicate these efforts. As we have repeatedly stated, [w]hile judicial review must be meaningful, the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency, for it is not their role to “weigh the desirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives”‘” … .

Thus, the court’s province is to “assure that the agency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively” … . In this regard, “[d]issatisfaction with an agency’s proposed mitigation measures is not redressable by the courts so long as those measures have a rational basis in the record” … . Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 2017 NY Slip Op 00383, 1st Dept 1-19-17

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (A COURT’S LIMIITED REVIEW POWERS RE AN AGENCY’S FINDINGS PURSUANT TO A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW QUALITY ACT (SEQRA) REVIEW CLARIFIED, SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF AGENCY FINDINGS REVERSED)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, A COURT’S LIMIITED REVIEW POWERS RE AN AGENCY’S FINDINGS PURSUANT TO A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW QUALITY ACT (SEQRA) REVIEW CLARIFIED, SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF AGENCY FINDINGS REVERSED)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (A COURT’S LIMIITED REVIEW POWERS RE AN AGENCY’S FINDINGS PURSUANT TO A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW QUALITY ACT (SEQRA) REVIEW CLARIFIED, SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF AGENCY FINDINGS REVERSED)

HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM FAULT UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The First Department determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and Labor Law 200 causes of the action were properly granted. The plaintiff alleged defendants provided him with a defective ladder and debris where the ladder was placed created a dangerous condition. Defendants demonstrated the homeowner’s exception to Labor Law 240 (1) applied and, with respect to Labor Law 200, the defendants demonstrated they did not own the ladder and did not create and were not aware of the debris-related condition on the ground:

… [T]he defendants made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to the protection of the homeowner’s exemption [to Labor Law 240 (1) liability] by submitting evidence demonstrating that the work being performed directly related to the residential use of the cottage and that they did not direct or control the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work … . …

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide employees with a safe place to work … . “To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work'” … . Where the plaintiff’s injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 ” if it either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition'” … . Where, as here, an accident allegedly involves defects in both the premises and the equipment used at the work site, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to an alleged violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards … . A defendant is entitled to summary judgment “only when the evidence exonerates it as a matter of law for all potential concurrent causes of the plaintiff’s accident and injury, and when no triable issue of fact is raised in opposition as to either relevant liability standard” … . Dasilva v Nussdorf, 2017 NY Slip Op 00288, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM FAULT UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION (LABOR LAW 240 (1), HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED)

NO DUTY OWED BY CAB COMPANY TO GENERAL PUBLIC, PLAINTIFF INJURED BY THE CAB AFTER THE DRIVER WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS DURING A ROBBERY. 

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined the owner of a taxicab did not owe a duty to plaintiff who was injured by the cab when an occupant of the cab rendered the driver unconscious during a robbery. The administrative rule requiring a partition between the passenger area and the driver was deemed designed to protect the driver of the cab, not the general public outside of the cab.  Similarly a broken CB radio in the cab did not breach a duty owed to the general public:

Plaintiffs focus on the foreseeability of the type of accident that occurred in the absence of safety devices that would have protected the driver from assault. They argue that since those safety devices would protect not only the driver, but other motorists and pedestrians who might be injured by the driver, the owner of the vehicle owed a duty to both the driver and to plaintiffs to install safety equipment that would protect them.

With regard to how foreseeability interconnects with duty, some confusion has arisen from the classic language of Chief Judge Cardozo’s decision in Palsgraf v Long Is. R.R. Co. (248 NY 339, 344 [1928]), that “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.” These words have sometimes been misinterpreted to mean that the foreseeability of harm can “spawn[] a duty” to prevent that harm (see e.g. Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 787 [1976] [dissenting opinion]). However, the majority in Pulka v Edelman clarified the error of this reasoning, to explain that foreseeability may not be relied on to create a duty:

“Foreseeability should not be confused with duty. The principle expressed in Palsgraf v Long Is. R.R. Co. (248 NY 339, supra), quoted by the dissent, is applicable to determine the scope of duty — only after it has been determined that there is a duty. Since there is no duty here, that principle is inapplicable” (Pulka, 40 NY2d at 785). On v BKO Express LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 00281, 1st Dept 1-17-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (NO DUTY OWED BY CAB COMPANY TO GENERAL PUBLIC, PLAINTIFF INJURED BY THE CAB AFTER THE DRIVER WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS DURING A ROBBERY)/DUTY (NEGLIGENCE, NO DUTY OWED BY CAB COMPANY TO GENERAL PUBLIC, PLAINTIFF INJURED BY THE CAB AFTER THE DRIVER WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS DURING A ROBBERY)/FORESEEABILITY (NO DUTY OWED BY CAB COMPANY TO GENERAL PUBLIC, PLAINTIFF INJURED BY THE CAB AFTER THE DRIVER WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS DURING A ROBBERY)

PLANK USED TO CROSS GAP IN ROOF COLLAPSED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. A plank plaintiff was using to cross a gap in the roof collapsed:

The alleged discrepancies between plaintiff’s account of the accident and the accounts of two of plaintiff’s coworkers are irrelevant to plaintiff’s central contention that he fell when the plank collapsed, and that he was not provided with proper protection … . Moreover, defendant raised no issues of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming the presence of additional safety devices at the work site, there was no evidence that plaintiff was aware of their availability or that he was expected to use them … . DeFreitas v Penta Painting & Decorating Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 00277, 1st Dept 1-17-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLANK USED TO CROSS GAP IN ROOF COLLAPSED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy