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POLICE OFFICER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS PULMONARY HYPERTENSION WAS RELATED TO HIS SERVICE AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON 9-11.

The First Department, in an extensive decision, determined petitioner, a police officer who worked over 100 hours at the World Trade Center (WTC) beginning on September 11, 2001, was not entitled to accident disability retirement benefits (ADR) based upon pulmonary hypertension. There was no showing the pulmonary hypertension was related to the time spent at the WTC:

The record establishes that, long before the events of September 11, 2001, petitioner suffered from a number of medical conditions that are risk factors for the development of pulmonary hypertension. * * *

The record is devoid of any medical study linking exposure to WTC site contaminants to pulmonary hypertension, nor does it contain any evidence that other WTC site responders have been diagnosed with this condition in numbers greater than would be predicted from general epidemiological experience. Matter of Stavropoulos v Bratton, 2017 NY Slip Op 01779, 1st Dept 3-9-17

 

RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (POLICE OFFICER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS PULMONARY HYPERTENSION WAS RELATED TO HIS SERVICE AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON 9-11)/WORLD TRADE CENTER (9-11) (POLICE OFFICER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS PULMONARY HYPERTENSION WAS RELATED TO HIS SERVICE AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON 9-11)/POLICE OFFICERS (9-11, POLICE OFFICER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS PULMONARY HYPERTENSION WAS RELATED TO HIS SERVICE AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON 9-11)/HYPERTENSION (9-11, POLICE OFFICER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS PULMONARY HYPERTENSION WAS RELATED TO HIS SERVICE AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON 9-11)

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REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge should have instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur and Multiple Dwelling Law 78 in this elevator accident case. Plaintiff alleged the elevator door closed on her causing her to fall to the floor. There was evidence the door had malfunctioned the day before and a building representative was made aware of the malfunction. There was evidence the door would not have struck plaintiff absent a malfunction, and there was a log of incidents with the elevator which was erroneously excluded from evidence:

Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine which “permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances of the occurrence” when a plaintiff can establish that (1) the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant; and (3) the event was not caused by the plaintiff’s actions … . “To rely on res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff need not conclusively eliminate the possibility of all other causes of the injury. It is enough that the evidence supporting the three conditions afford a rational basis for concluding that it is more likely than not’ that the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence” … .

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has frequently been applied in cases involving elevator malfunctions, including those involving doors which unexpectedly closed upon and injured plaintiffs while attempting to enter and exit an elevator … . * * *

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the owner’s nondelegable duty under Multiple Dwelling Law § 78. A building owner’s duty under the statute extends to elevator maintenance and repair … . The court’s refusal to charge section 78 erroneously led the jury to believe that the owner’s negligence could only be predicated on its actual or constructive notice of an elevator problem. Barkley v Plaza Realty Invs. Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01664, 1st Dept 3-7-17

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/EVIDENCE (RES IPSA LOQUITUR, MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/ELEVATORS (REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/RES IPSA LOQUITUR (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)

PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICERS AND OFFICER’S STATEMENT TO THE VICTIM DID NOT RENDER THE SHOWUP INDENTIFICATION UNDULY SUGGESTIVE.

The First Department determined the showup identification was not unduly suggestive, despite the presence of police officers and an officer’s statement to the victim they may have someone who matched the perpetrator’s description:

Police, who undisputedly had a sufficient basis for a common-law inquiry of defendant based on their investigation of a robbery, entered defendant’s apartment with the consent of another resident. After the resident who answered the door knocked on a bathroom door, defendant came out of the bathroom and complied with an officer’s request to move to a position between two officers. Meanwhile, an officer told the victim that the police might have someone who matched the description, and then brought him to the apartment. While defendant was flanked on both sides by two officers, and other officers were nearby, the victim identified defendant as one of the robbers. …

The showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, in light of the “close spatial and temporal proximity to the robbery, as the result of a single unbroken chain of events,” and the fact that defendant was not physically restrained … . Notwithstanding the presence of several police officers in or near the apartment, and an officer’s statement to the victim that the police had someone who might match the description provided by the victim, “the overall effect of the allegedly suggestive circumstances was not significantly greater than what is inherent in any showup” … . People v Vizcaino, 2017 NY Slip Op 01811, 1st Dept 3-5-17

CRIMINAL LAW (PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICER’S AND OFFICER’S STATEMENT TO THE VICTIM DID NOT RENDER THE SHOWUP INDENTIFICATION UNDULY SUGGESTIVE)/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICER’S AND OFFICER’S STATEMENT TO THE VICTIM DID NOT RENDER THE SHOWUP INDENTIFICATION UNDULY SUGGESTIVE)/SHOWUP INDENTIFICATION (PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICER’S AND OFFICER’S STATEMENT TO THE VICTIM DID NOT RENDER THE SHOWUP INDENTIFICATION UNDULY SUGGESTIVE)

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PLAINTIFF’S LOSS WAS DUE TO THE MARKET COLLAPSE OF RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, LOSS CAUSATION ELEMENT OF FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION THEREFORE NOT DEMONSTRATED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined defendant TCW’s motion for summary judgment in this residential-backed mortgage securities (RBMS) fraud action should have been granted. TCW represented it could select less risky RBMS’s and plaintiff invested $27,000,000 . The market subsequently collapsed. The First Department found the proof of “loss causation” lacking:

” Loss causation is the causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff'” … . To establish loss causation a plaintiff must prove that the ” subject of the fraudulent statement or omission was the cause of the actual loss suffered'” … . Moreover, ” when the plaintiff’s loss coincides with a marketwide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by the fraud decreases’, and a plaintiff’s claim fails when it has not . . . proven . . . that its loss was caused by the alleged misstatements as opposed to intervening events'” … . Indeed, when an investor suffers an investment loss due to a “market crash [] of such dramatic proportions that [the] losses would have occurred at the same time and to the same extent regardless of the alleged fraud,” loss causation is lacking … . Basis PAC-Rim Opportunity Fund (Master) v TCW Asset Mgt. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 01644, 1st Dept 3-2-17

SECURITIES (PLAINTIFF’S LOSS WAS DUE TO THE MARKET COLLAPSE OF RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, LOSS CAUSATION ELEMENT OF FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION THEREFORE NOT DEMONSTRATED)/RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES (PLAINTIFF’S LOSS WAS DUE TO THE MARKET COLLAPSE OF RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, LOSS CAUSATION ELEMENT OF FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION THEREFORE NOT DEMONSTRATED)/FRAUD (RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, PLAINTIFF’S LOSS WAS DUE TO THE MARKET COLLAPSE OF RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, LOSS CAUSATION ELEMENT OF FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION THEREFORE NOT DEMONSTRATED)/LOSS CAUSATION (FRAUD, RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, PLAINTIFF’S LOSS WAS DUE TO THE MARKET COLLAPSE OF RESIDENTIAL-BACKED MORTGAGE SECURITIES, LOSS CAUSATION ELEMENT OF FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION THEREFORE NOT DEMONSTRATED)

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant should not have been granted summary judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff alleged she slipped on a waxy substance on a marble floor and alleged she saw a “dent” in the substance made by her shoe when she fell. Defendant submitted evidence that the floor was never waxed:

Here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a slippery substance on the bathroom floor that caused plaintiff to fall notwithstanding defendant’s assertion that it never used wax in that particular bathroom. Contrary to the motion court’s findings, plaintiff’s proof was not speculative and was sufficient to defeat the motion, because she set forth a specific reason for the slippery condition on the floor, namely a build-up of wax … . Indeed, as noted above, she “saw a big line, the dent of my shoe in the wax all the way that I fell,” suggesting that her shoe gouged out some of the waxy substance where she fell. This was more than just leaving a streak … , which would happen regardless of the condition of the floor. Villa v Property Resources Corp. (137 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2016]), recently decided by this Court, is also not dispositive. There, plaintiff merely felt a wetness on her pants and hands that smelled like wax or ammonia, while here, plaintiff saw the dent of her shoe in the waxy substance … . De Paris v Women’s Natl. Republican Club, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01625, 1st Dept 3-2-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)

SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the six-months within which plaintiff was required to file his state action after dismissal in federal court (CPLR 205(a)) ran from the federal court’s ruling on plaintiff’s reconsideration motion, not from the initial dismissal in federal court:

Plaintiff was not required to commence a defamation action in state court while the reconsideration motion was pending, or to file a notice of appeal in federal court, in order to gain the benefit of the six-month extension … ; were our decision otherwise, the result would waste judicial resources by forcing a party to commence either a federal appeal or a new state court action while his or her case was still ongoing in federal court. Arty v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01626, 1st Dept 3-2-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)/RECONSIDER, MOTION TO (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)/RECOMMENCE ACTION (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)

LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ITEMS PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER WERE NOT INTEGRAL TO THE WORK BEING DONE BY PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME HE FELL.

The First Department determined Labor Law 241(6) causes action based on the allegation plaintiff tripped on discarded concrete and rebar should survive summary judgment because plaintiff demonstrated the concrete and rebar were not integral to his work:

Plaintiffs established that the excess wet concrete discarded on the plywood on which plaintiff slipped was not integral to the work being performed by plaintiff at the accident site … . Plaintiff did not work with concrete and concrete was not a part of his responsibilities in constructing the tables and forms used to hold the rebar and other ironwork in place. Similarly, the rebar on which plaintiff tripped was not integral to the work he was performing, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2) was correctly denied ,,, . Plaintiff presented evidence that he did not work with rebar and that rebar was not integral to any work being done on the day of the accident. Pereira v New School, 2017 NY Slip Op 01627, 1st Dept 3-2-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ITEMS PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER WERE NOT INTEGRAL TO THE WORK BEING DONE BY PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME HE FELL)

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TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the termination of a teacher for submitting inaccurate time sheets was not warranted. The teacher had an unblemished record and the misconduct was precipitated by Hurricane Sandy, which flooded her home and the home of her disabled student:

Petitioner filled out the time sheets in question in advance of the dates to which those time sheets pertained. Although she did not, in fact, proceed to provide instruction to the disabled student on the days set forth in those time sheets, she submitted the time sheets without correction on a subsequent date. Because petitioner instructed other students on each of the dates in question, she would have received the same salary regardless of how many students she had instructed or how many hours she had spent with them, and thus derived no benefit from her actions. Petitioner’s misconduct is more a matter of lax bookkeeping than implementation of any venal scheme. There was no scheme to defraud or theft of services on petitioner’s part, and the harm to the public and to the DOE was mitigated. * * *

At the hearing, petitioner admitted that she was guilty of submitting reports stating that she had provided instruction to the disabled student on certain dates when she had not done so and that she had reported to various schools and libraries on certain dates when she had not done so. As petitioner acknowledges, her misconduct warrants punishment, since the disabled student was deprived of the services of a teacher for two months. Petitioner does not seek to set aside the findings of misconduct contained in the hearing officer’s opinion, but only to modify the penalty imposed on her. She has acknowledged her error in judgment and has pledged to change her practices and never to repeat the error. There is no evidence that “petitioner could not remedy her behavior” … . Matter of Beatty v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01628, 1st Dept 3-2-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (EDCUATION-SCHOOL LAW, TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (EDCUATION-SCHOOL LAW, TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)

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PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS ASBESTOS CASE PROPERLY SET ASIDE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED TO DANGEROUS LEVELS OF ASBESTOS EMANATING FROM DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS.

 

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined the plaintiff’s verdict in this asbestos/mesothelioma case was properly set aside by the trial court. The First Department held the plaintiff’s experts did not present sufficient proof plaintiff’s decedent was exposed to dangerous levels of asbestos emanating from defendant’s products while working as an auto mechanic:

… [T]he fact that asbestos, or chrysotile, has been linked to mesothelioma, is not enough for a determination of liability against a particular defendant; a causation expert must still establish that the plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin from the defendant’s products to have caused his disease … . Even if it is not possible to quantify a plaintiff’s exposure, causation from exposure to toxins in a defendant’s product must be established through some scientific method, such as mathematical modeling based on a plaintiff’s work history, or comparing the plaintiff’s exposure with that of subjects of reported studies … .

The evidence presented by plaintiff here was insufficient because it failed to establish that the decedent’s mesothelioma was a result of his exposure to a sufficient quantity of asbestos in friction products sold or distributed by defendant Ford Motor Company. Plaintiff’s experts effectively testified only in terms of an increased risk and association between asbestos and mesothelioma … , but failed to either quantify the decedent’s exposure levels or otherwise provide any scientific expression of his exposure level with respect to Ford’s products … . Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2017 NY Slip Op 01523, 1st Dept 2-28-17

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS ASBESTOS CASE PROPERLY SET ASIDE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED TO DANGEROUS LEVELS OF ASBESTOS FROM DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS)/TOXIC TORTS (ASBESTOS, PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS ASBESTOS CASE PROPERLY SET ASIDE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED TO DANGEROUS LEVELS OF ASBESTOS FROM DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS)/ASBESTOS (PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS ASBESTOS CASE PROPERLY SET ASIDE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED TO DANGEROUS LEVELS OF ASBESTOS FROM DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS)/EXPERT OPINION (PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS ASBESTOS CASE PROPERLY SET ASIDE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED TO DANGEROUS LEVELS OF ASBESTOS FROM DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS)

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COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant transit authority’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff slipped on snow on a step as she got off a bus:

Plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell as she was exiting a bus owned and operated by defendants because the step was covered with a slushy condition. She and the bus driver both stated that there was snow all over the ground from a storm that had ended earlier that day, and certified meteorological records submitted by defendants demonstrated that a snow storm that started the previous night and ended earlier in the day of the accident had left about six inches of snow on the ground. The bus driver also testified that passengers tracked snow onto the bus on their shoes and boots as they boarded.

Common carriers are not obligated to provide a “constant remedy” for the tracking of water onto a bus during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter … . Similarly, when the ground is covered with snow left by a recent storm, “it would be unreasonable to expect the [defendants] to constantly clean the front steps of the subject bus” … . Plaintiff’s argument that defendants failed to show lack of notice of the slushy condition is irrelevant, since they did not breach any duty of care under the existing weather conditions. Harbison v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01503, 1st Dept 2-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/BUSES (SLIP AND FALL, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)

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