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SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the six-months within which plaintiff was required to file his state action after dismissal in federal court (CPLR 205(a)) ran from the federal court’s ruling on plaintiff’s reconsideration motion, not from the initial dismissal in federal court:

Plaintiff was not required to commence a defamation action in state court while the reconsideration motion was pending, or to file a notice of appeal in federal court, in order to gain the benefit of the six-month extension … ; were our decision otherwise, the result would waste judicial resources by forcing a party to commence either a federal appeal or a new state court action while his or her case was still ongoing in federal court. Arty v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01626, 1st Dept 3-2-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)/RECONSIDER, MOTION TO (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)/RECOMMENCE ACTION (SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL)

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