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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION A CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT (CD) HAS BEEN PAID OUT WITHIN 20 YEARS OF WHEN IT CAME DUE APPLIED TO CD’S IN PLAINTIFF’S DECEASED HUSBAND’S IRA WHICH WERE RENEWED AUTOMATICALLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant bank’s motion for summary judgment in this action seeking the payment of certificates of deposit (CD’s) held in an independent retirement account (IRA) should not have been granted. The presumption that a CD has been paid out within 20 years of when it came due may not apply to these CD’s which were in plaintiff’s deceased husband’s IRA and were renewed automatically:

Defendant [bank] relied upon the common law rebuttable presumption of payment to establish its prima facie case. It presumes that payment on a CD has occurred within 20 years after the time it came due … . In opposition, plaintiff has raised issues of fact with respect to whether the presumption applies because the CD, held by an IRA, renewed automatically each year. Plaintiff has also provided an affidavit stating that she never presented the CD to defendant for payment and explaining the delay. Plaintiff’s affidavit was sufficient to warrant denial of summary judgment … . Friedfeld v Citibank, N.A., 2020 NY Slip Op 05575, First Dept 10-8-20

 

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HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM WERE NOT CORROBORATED, NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the neglect finding, determined the hearsay statements of the alleged victim were not corroborated:

The finding of neglect was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. “Unsworn out-of-court statements of the victim may be received and, if properly corroborated, will support a finding of abuse or neglect” … . Here, the child’s out-of-court statement made during his videotaped interview with an investigator from the the Child Advocacy Center, that respondent bit him on the right shoulder during a January 2017 incident, was not sufficiently corroborated … . Although medical findings confirmed that the child sustained injuries that were consistent with a bite mark, those findings in no way connected those marks to respondent. Further, there is no dispute that the child told respondent that he was going to make false allegations against her to the Administration for Children’s Services while the fact-finding hearing was pending, rendering his overall credibility quite impaired. Matter of Jaylin S. (Jasmine E.T.), 2020 NY Slip Op 05606, First Dept 10-8-20

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEALED THE ENTIRE COURT RECORD, REDACTION IS APPROPRIATE FOR TRADE SECRETS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the entire court record should not have been sealed. The facts were not discussed, but the court noted redaction is appropriate to protect trade secrets, confidential business information or proprietary information:

We reverse the order of the motion court for two reasons. First, the motion court erred by sealing the entire court file. As we have previously explained, “We recognize that it may be easier for the parties and the motion court to seal an entire court record, rather than make a determination on a document by document basis about sealing, but administrative convenience is not a compelling reason to justify sealing” … . Indeed, “In camera review and appropriate redaction is a valid method of protecting trade secrets” …

Second, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing grounds for protecting from public access any or all of the information in Exhibit A to the complaint, let alone the entire court record. They failed to show that Exhibit A, or any other document likely to become part of the record, contains trade secrets, confidential business information, or proprietary information … . Vergara v Mission Capital Advisors, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05610,First Dept 10-8-20

 

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ALTHOUGH THE INCONSISTENT VERDICT ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE FAILURE TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING, IN THE FACE OF AWARDING DAMAGES FOR PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES, REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL ON THAT ISSUE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, setting aside the verdict for future damages and ordering a new trial on that issue, determined the awards for past pain and suffering and future medical expenses rendered the failure to award damages for future pain and suffering a material deviation from reasonable compensation:

Plaintiff failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the verdict was inconsistent because the claim was raised after the jury had been discharged. However, where the jury verdict awards plaintiff damages for past pain and suffering and future medical expenses, but declines to award damages for future pain and suffering, the verdict on future pain and suffering is contrary to a fair interpretation of the evidence and constitutes a material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation … . Paucay v D.P. Group Gen. Contrs./Devs., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05611, First Dept 10-8-20

 

SALARIES OF UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICERS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW REQUEST (FIRST DEPT).

he First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the salary of undercover police officers should not be disclosed:

FOIL provides that “[n]othing in [the statute] shall be construed to require any entity to prepare any record not possessed or maintained by such entity” (Public Officers Law § 89[3][a]), with exceptions not raised here. Accordingly, respondent is not obligated to compile “aggregate data” “from the documents or records in its possession” … .

In any event, the information sought as to the salaries of undercover police officers, whether aggregated or individualized, is exempt from disclosure under FOIL’s public safety exemption (Public Officers Law § 87[2][f]). Respondent met its burden of making a particularized showing that publicly releasing this information would create “a possibility of endangerment” to the public’s safety … . Respondent submitted an affidavit of the Undercover Coordinator of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) establishing that this information could be used to estimate the total number of undercover officers employed by NYPD. The analysis of petitioner’s request must consider not only the instant FOIL request for information as to fiscal year 2017, but also future requests which could be made for equivalent information as to other years. Such information would allow members of the public to estimate the increases or decreases in the overall number of undercover officers, which could “undermine their deterrent effect, hamper NYPD’s counterterrorism operations, and increase the likelihood of another terrorist attack” … . Respondent’s past disclosure of salary and other information as to certain public employees not employed by NYPD is not dispositive. Matter of Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy v New York City Off. of Payroll Admin., 2020 NY Slip Op 05449, First Dept 10-6-20

 

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ALTHOUGH COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE PROPER PARTY TO SUE WAS ARGUABLY NOT EXCUSABLE, THE DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY; THE APPLICATION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s application to file a late notice of claim in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Although the excuse for not filing on time was not a good one, counsel’s failure to identify the proper party to sue, the defendant had timely knowledge of the nature of the action:

Although counsel’s error in identifying the proper party was arguably not excusable, the error was not due to any fault or delay on the part of petitioner, and “[t]he failure to set forth a reasonable excuse is not, by itself, fatal to the application” … . This is particularly true where, as here, the record shows that respondents received timely and actual notice of the essential facts underlying plaintiff’s claim … .

Here, the incident report gave respondents actual knowledge of the pertinent facts constituting the claim. The report makes clear that petitioner fell on the sidewalk, and the photographs contained in the report show that the sidewalk is cracked and raised, presenting a tripping hazard … . Furthermore, according to petitioner’s 50-h testimony, her fall was notable enough that a security guard immediately called his supervisor to the scene, and there is no indication that respondents are prejudiced by the delay … . English v Board of Trustees of the Fashion Inst. of Tech., 2020 NY Slip Op 05450, First Dept 10-6-20

 

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ACTION TO ENFORCE A FOREIGN JUDGMENT AGAINST A DELAWARE DISSOLVED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATE OF CANCELLATION HAS NOT BEEN NULLIFIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment after defendant corporation had been dissolved could not be maintained:

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant, a Delaware limited liability company, to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment in its favor several months after defendant had been dissolved and a certificate of cancellation filed (see 6 Del C § 18-203[a]). As the certificate of cancellation has not been nullified and plaintiff does not seek nullification, plaintiff cannot maintain this action (6 Del C § 18-803[b]) … . Epie v Herakles Farms, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05283, First Dept 10-1-20

 

LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF BE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK; HERE PLAINTIFF FELL OFF THE TOP OF A TRACTOR-TRAILER; THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed. The court noted that liability under Labor Law 200 does not require that the plaintiff be engaged in construction work:

Plaintiff was injured when he fell to the ground from the top of a tractor-trailer, as he was attempting to manually roll out a tarp to cover trash in the trailer, as required by [defendant] Tully. The trailer with the allegedly defective tarping mechanism was owned by Strength and leased to plaintiff’s employer.

Plaintiff is entitled to the protection afforded by Labor Law § 200 for his work because that section codifies the common-law duty of an owner to provide workers with a safe place to work, which is not limited to construction work … .

The record presents an issue of fact as to Tully’s authority to control the activity that brought about plaintiff’s injury … . Plaintiff testified that Tully directed him in how to proceed at the facility and mandated that he cover the trash with the tarp, and the facility manager testified that Tully had a policy prohibiting drivers from standing on the tops of trailers. There is also a factual issue as to whether Tully permitting the tractor-trailer to be overfilled created the condition that may have cause plaintiff’s injuries … . Landron v Wil-Cor Realty Co. Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05287, First Dept 10-1-20

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION AT THE ORIGINAL PLEA AND SENTENCING, HE WAS SO INFORMED AT RESENTENCING; DEFENDANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY AT RESENTENCING TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND THE SENTENCING JUDGE WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INFORM DEFENDANT, SUA SPONTE, OF THE AVAILABILITY OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS RESENTENCE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant’s motion to set aside his resentence was properly denied. Defendant was not informed of the period of post-release supervision (PRS) at the time of the original plea and the original sentence, but was so informed at the resentence:

In 2002, defendant pleaded guilty without being informed of the mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) component of the promised sentence … , and was sentenced in a proceeding in which the court also did not pronounce that component of the sentence … . Seven years later, he was returned to court with his attorney for further proceedings. Defense counsel advised the court that he had spoken to his client who was prepared to accept the amended sentence. The court explained that five years of PRS would be imposed. Defense counsel responded that that was fine. The court then resentenced defendant to a term that included the mandatory PRS period … .

… Defendant was not denied a meaningful opportunity, at resentencing, to seek to withdraw his plea based on the plea court’s failure to inform him that his sentence was required to include PRS. Generally, a defendant is entitled to an opportunity to withdraw a plea where a sentence exceeds the original promise. However, we find no support for defendant’s argument that this places a sua sponte obligation on the court to inform a counseled defendant of the right to move for plea withdrawal … . People v Perez, 2020 NY Slip Op 05297, First Dept 10-1-20

 

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A NOTICE OF LIEN CAN NOT BE DISCHARGED ABSENT A TRIAL IF IT IS VALID ON ITS FACE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the notice of lien should not have been discharged because it was valid on its face:

… Supreme Court … granted the motion of defendants … to reduce or discharge the mechanic’s lien filed by plaintiff … to the extent of reducing the lien from $33,837,618.34 to $3,566,357.42 … .

A court has no inherent power to vacate, modify or discharge a notice of lien pursuant to Lien Law § 19(6) where there is no defect on the face of the lien, and any dispute concerning the lien’s validity must await a trial … . Pizzarotti, LLC v FPG Maiden Lane LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05305, First Dept 10-1-20

 

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