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TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY.

The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, determined the police properly towed defendant’s car (which resulted in an inventory search) after defendant’s arrest for shoplifting. The towing of the car was consistent with the provisions of the police department’s written policy:

… [T]he police officers’ decision to tow defendant’s vehicle, which was parked in the same parking lot in which defendant was arrested, was properly made in accordance with “standard criteria” set forth in the police department’s written policy … . Those criteria, among other things, limit an officer’s discretion to tow a vehicle upon a driver’s arrest to situations in which such action is necessary to ensure the safety of the vehicle and its contents and where releasing the vehicle to an owner or designee is not otherwise appropriate. Upon defendant’s arrest, the vehicle would have been left unattended indefinitely in the complainant’s private parking lot, which had a history of vandalism, and the complainant requested that the police remove the vehicle. In our view, the officers’ decision to tow the vehicle was, therefore, consistent with a community caretaking function … . Moreover, there is no indication that the officers suspected that they would discover evidence of further criminal activity in defendant’s vehicle, or that they towed the vehicle for that purpose … . People v Tardi, 2016 NY Slip Op 07822, CtApp 11-21-16

CRIMINAL LAW (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY)/INVENTORY SEARCH (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY)/TOWING (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY

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STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION.

The Court of Appeals, affirming the denial of a suppression motion, explained the standard of review in the Court of Appeals for mixed questions of law and fact:

… [P]olice were dispatched … after an anonymous caller informed a 911 operator that two black males were walking back and forth … carrying silver colored guns on their waists. One individual was described as wearing a white t-shirt with red letters. The other was wearing a black t-shirt.

Two uniformed police officers, each driving a marked patrol car, responded to a radio dispatch concerning the 911 call. The first officer to arrive observed two black males walking side-by-side … . One male had a black t-shirt and the other male wore a two-toned blue jacket, over what appeared to the officer to be a light-colored t-shirt. The officer parked his vehicle and approached the men on foot. As soon as they saw the officer, one man fled into a backyard and the other man, defendant, continued to walk southbound … . The officer pursued the fleeing man with his gun drawn and observed the man hide what was later discovered to be a handgun underneath a pile of leaves.

When the second officer arrived at the scene, he observed the fleeing man run into the backyard with the first officer running after him and defendant walking … . No one else was in the area. As the second officer parked and exited his vehicle, defendant yelled an expletive and fled. The officer gave chase and observed a handgun fall from defendant’s waist.

The [Appellate Division] explained that defendant’s flight upon seeing the second officer exit his vehicle provided the officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant his pursuit of defendant, and the fact that defendant dropped the gun during the pursuit gave rise to probable cause to arrest … .

The issue of whether the second officer had reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant is a mixed question of law and fact, limiting our review … . Because there is record support for the determination of the lower courts, we affirm … . People v Gayden, 2016 NY Slip Op 07702, CtApp 11-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/STREET STOPS (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/SUPPRESS, MOTIONS TO (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)

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WHERE A PARTY IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE FAMILY COURT ACT TIME-LIMIT FOR OBJECTING TO AN ORDER BEGINS TO RUN WHEN THE ATTORNEY, NOT THE PARTY, IS NOTIFIED OF THE ORDER.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the Family Court Act time-limit for objecting to a support order begins to run when the party’s counsel, not the party, is notified of the order. Here the party was notified of the order by mail, but counsel was not. The objections to the order were filed more than 35 days after the order was mailed to the party and were rejected on that ground. The Court of Appeals held that, even if a statutory time-limit for service is silent about the issue, where a party is represented by counsel, the time-limit does not start to run until counsel is notified:

“[O]nce a party chooses to be represented by counsel in an action or proceeding, whether administrative or judicial, the attorney is deemed to act as his agent in all respects relevant to the proceeding. Thus any documents, particularly those purporting to have legal effect on the proceeding, should be served on the attorney the party has chosen to handle the matter on his behalf” (Bianca, 43 NY2d at 173). Indeed, “[t]his is not simply a matter of courtesy and fairness; it is the traditional and accepted practice which has been all but universally codified” (id.). In particular, as the Court noted, CPLR 2103 (b) provides that “[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law or order of court, papers to be served upon a party in a pending action shall be served upon the party’s attorney.”

Bianca governs here. The reference to the mailing of the order to a “party or parties” in Family Court Act § 439 (e) must be read to require that the order be mailed to the party’s counsel, in order for the statutory time requirement to commence. Matter of Odunbaku v Odunbaku, 2016 NY Slip Op 07705, CtApp 11-17-16

 

FAMILY LAW (WHERE A PARTY IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE FAMILY COURT ACT TIME-LIMIT FOR OBJECTING TO AN ORDER BEGINS TO RUN WHEN THE ATTORNEY, NOT THE PARTY, IS NOTIFIED OF THE ORDER)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY COURT ACT, WHERE A PARTY IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE FAMILY COURT ACT TIME-LIMIT FOR OBJECTING TO AN ORDER BEGINS TO RUN WHEN THE ATTORNEY, NOT THE PARTY, IS NOTIFIED OF THE ORDER)

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EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY. 

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, affirming the Appellate Division, determined evidence of defendant’s sexual acts with consenting adults was properly admitted to corroborate the testimony of children who described sexual abuse by the defendant. The children alleged defendant took them into a closet where he abused them (oral sex) while he smoked crack cocaine with his shirt pulled over his head. The children’s mother alleged the same scenario with her and other adults. The court noted that the consensual sexual acts with adults were not Molineux evidence because they were not prior bad acts or crimes. The only Molineux evidence was the allegation defendant smoked crack cocaine. Because all the evidence served to corroborate the children’s testimony it was not prohibited “propensity” evidence and the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect:

… [W]e … note that evidence of defendant’s prior sexual acts with adult women is not “propensity” evidence in its traditional sense. When we limit Molineux or other propensity evidence, we do so for policy reasons, due to fear of the jury’s “human tendency” to more readily “believe in the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he has previously committed a similar crime” … . But here, that defendant had engaged in oral sex with consenting adult women, while in a closet smoking crack with his shirt pulled over his head, showed no propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial. That this evidence corroborated the girls’ accounts does not render it propensity evidence, because corroboration and propensity are distinct concepts. Because “there [was] a proper nonpropensity purpose, the decision whether to admit evidence of defendant’s prior . . . acts rests upon the trial court’s discretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice” … . People v Brewer, 2016 NY Slip Op 07704, CtApp 11-17-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)

MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEDGED POSSESSION OF BRASS KNUCKLES.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, determined the misdemeanor complaint sufficiently alleged possession of “brass knuckles:”

“[A] reasonable, not overly technical reading” of the accusatory instrument here satisfies our sufficiency standard … , as it supplied “defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy” … . The accusatory instrument clearly informed defendant that he was in criminal possession of “brass metal knuckles,” a per se weapon, in violation of Penal Law § 265.01 (1). The term “brass metal knuckles” gave defendant a clear description of the object recovered from his pocket at a specific time and place. Under the common and natural definition of the term, as well as the dictionary definition, defendant was adequately informed of the charge against him. * * *

[T]he character of metal knuckles is such that one need only look at the object to discern whether it is in fact metal knuckles. Thus, the officer here did not have to “exercise . . . professional skill or experience” to conclude defendant possessed metal knuckles … , and the accusatory instrument did not require any specific description of the officer’s training or experience. People v Aragon, 2016 NY Slip Op 07104, CtApp 11-1-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEDGED POSSESSION OF BRASS KNUCKLES)/MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT (MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEDGED POSSESSION OF BRASS KNUCKLES)/BRASS KNUCKLES (MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEDGED POSSESSION OF BRASS KNUCKLES)

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DEFENSE EXPERT’S CONCLUSORY ASSERTIONS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE ALLEGATIONS THE NEGLIGENT PRESCRIPTION OF TWO DRUGS CAUSED HEART DAMAGE.

The Court of Appeals, with a concurrence and a three-judge dissent, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied in this medical malpractice action. The complaint alleged the negligent prescription of two drugs caused heart damage. The majority concluded that conclusory statements in the defense expert’s affidavit did not raise a question of fact about the plaintiff’s allegations of malpractice:

Here, defendant’s expert proffered only conclusory assertions unsupported by any medical research that defendant’s actions in prescribing both drugs concurrently did not proximately cause plaintiff’s AV heart block. These conclusory statements did not adequately address plaintiff’s allegations that the concurrent Lipitor and azithromycin prescriptions caused plaintiff’s injuries. By ignoring the possible effect of the azithromycin prescription, defendant’s expert failed to “tender[] sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” … as to proximate causation and, as a result, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. Because defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … .  Pullman v Silverman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07107, CtApp 11-1-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENSE EXPERT’S CONCLUSORY ASSEERTIONS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE ALLEGATIONS THE NEGLIGENT PRESCRIPTION OF TWO DRUGS CAUSED HEART DAMAGE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DEFENSE EXPERT’S CONCLUSORY ASSEERTIONS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE ALLEGATIONS THE NEGLIGENT PRESCRIPTION OF TWO DRUGS CAUSED HEART DAMAGE)

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DEFENDANT PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE TO THE POLICE AT THE SCENE OF HIS ARREST; SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF AN ATTACK ON DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINANT WHICH DEFENDANT DESCRIBED AT TRIAL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, with a concurring opinion, determined defendant was properly impeached with a spontaneous statement made to police at the time of his arrest for robbing the complainant. At trial, defendant testified the complainant had struck him with a board. However, the alleged attack with a board was not mentioned in defendant’s spontaneous statement at the scene:

Here … defendant’s statement was not the product of interrogation, but was made spontaneously at the scene, prior to the issuance of Miranda warnings. In addition, the substance of defendant’s spontaneous statement was not inculpatory, but a description of the complainant’s conduct and was made to inform the police when the information was timely to their decision as to whether to arrest defendant or complainant. Even more significant, defendant admitted in his direct testimony that he was not silent and that he had given the police his version of complainant’s misconduct at the scene. Consequently, the credibility of his initial spontaneous statement was legitimately called into question by his trial testimony.

Here, defendant elected to provide some explanation of what happened at the scene, and it was unnatural to have omitted the significantly more favorable version of events to which he testified at trial — that complainant had assaulted him. “[D]efendant’s conspicuous omission of these exculpatory facts in his voluntary statement to police tended to show that his trial testimony was a recent fabrication” … . People v Chery, 2016 NY Slip Op 07109, CtApp 11-1-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE TO THE POLICE AT THE SCENE OF HIS ARREST; SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF AN ATTACK ON DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINANT WHICH DEFENDANT DESCRIBED AT TRIAL)/EVIDENCE DEFENDANT PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE TO THE POLICE AT THE SCENE OF HIS ARREST; SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF AN ATTACK ON DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINANT WHICH DEFENDANT DESCRIBED AT TRIAL/IMPEACHMENT (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE TO THE POLICE AT THE SCENE OF HIS ARREST; SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF AN ATTACK ON DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINANT WHICH DEFENDANT DESCRIBED AT TRIAL)/STATEMENTS (CRIMINAL LAW, IMPEACHMENT, DEFENDANT PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE TO THE POLICE AT THE SCENE OF HIS ARREST; SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF AN ATTACK ON DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINANT WHICH DEFENDANT DESCRIBED AT TRIAL)

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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined defendant had been wrongly informed by his attorney that he was subject to consecutive sentences, and therefore defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the People presented evidence that, because of the horrendous nature of the crime, there was no possibility defendant would have been offered a plea bargain. Therefore the erroneous advice could not have affected the proceedings. Defendant’s motion to set aside his conviction was properly denied:

… [D]efendant was required to show more than incorrect advice by defense counsel. Here, the record supports the Appellate Division’s determination that there was no possibility that a reduced plea would have been offered to defendant. Therefore, the incorrect advice could not have affected the outcome of the proceedings. The People entertained no plea possibility or any reduction in the sentence given, among other things, the maximum sentence defendant faced for killing two adults and injuring a third was an aggregate term of just 5 to 15 years. Nor was there any proof that the court would have extended an offer to a reduced sentence. Rather, the sentencing court remarked that it did not think the maximum sentence was enough punishment for defendant under the circumstances of this case. People v Bank, 2016 NY Slip Op 07110, CtApp 11-1-16

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)

THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, with a two-judge concurrence, determined that the tolling provision, which tolls the five-year statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses involving a child until the child turns 18, applied here and the indictment, brought when the victim was 21, was timely. The opinion delves into an extensive statutory-interpretation analysis which is too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Defendant claims his prosecution is time-barred because the applicable five-year limitations period set forth in CPL former 30.10 (3)(e) expired before the filing of the felony complaint, and the statute of limitations is not subject to tolling under CPL 30.10 (3)(f). Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive, misconstrues the statutory provisions, and ignores the relevant legislative history. The crime for which defendant stands convicted is expressly encompassed by CPL 30.10 (3)(f), and involves the type of conduct the legislature sought to address by expansive, albeit delayed, prosecution of multiple acts of sexual abuse against a minor. * * *

Unlike CPL 30.10 (3)(e), which is a self-contained statute of limitations, CPL 30.10 (3)(f) is a tolling provision and as such is dependent on reference to time limits found elsewhere in the statute. Defendant mistakenly equates the two subsections — as if they are both statutes of limitations — when he claims they are in conflict and the specific provision of CPL 30.10 (3)(e) overrides the general provision of CPL 30.10 (3)(f). The more apt comparison is to the two statutes of limitations CPL 30.10 (3)(e) and 30.10 (2)(b), which harmoniously coexist as a specific and general statute of limitations, respectively, and which in no way lead to the conclusion promoted by defendant, that CPL 30.10 (3)(e) is superfluous. Regardless, there is no conflict obvious from the interplay of subsections (3)(e) and (3)(f). One sets forth a five-year prosecution deadline and the other explains when the clock begins to run on that deadline. People v Pabon, 2016 NY Slip Op 07108, CtApp 11-1-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)TOLLING PROVISION (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRIMINAL LAW, (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/CHILDREN, SEX OFFENSES INVOLVING  (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)

PEOPLE VS CATU, WHICH INVALIDATED GUILTY PLEAS WHERE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT DISCUSSED, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, with a concurring opinion and over a dissenting opinion, determined the 2005 case which invalidated guilty pleas accepted without express notice of the period of postrelase supervision (PRS) (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242) should not be applied retroactively. In both cases before the court, the pre-Catu convictions by guilty plea were challenged to prohibit their consideration as predicate crimes for sentencing in post-Catu offenses. The analysis, which encompasses federal and state constitutional law, is too complex to fairly summarize here:

… [N]either [defendant’s] conviction was obtained in violation of the law as it existed at the time of their respective convictions. Both state and federal law required that a defendant demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about a mandatory term of his sentence. It was not until our 2005 decision in Catu that a defendant was entitled to automatic vacatur. * * *

Our Catu “automatic vacatur” rule did not constitute ,,, a “watershed rule”… . Catu was not necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction, and it is doubtful that the failure of the courts to apprise defendants … of the PRS component resulted in them pleading guilty to crimes that they did not commit. Indeed, when presented with their prior convictions, defendants … acknowledged that they were the individuals mentioned in the predicate felony statements filed by the People, and that they did not wish to challenge any of the allegations contained within their respective statements. People v Smith, 2016 NY Slip Op 07106, CtApp 11-1-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE VS CATU, WHICH INVALIDATED GUILTLY PLEAS WHERE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT DISCUSSED, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY)/POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (PEOPLE VS CATU, WHICH INVALIDATED GUILTLY PLEAS WHERE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT DISCUSSED, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY).CATU, PEOPLE V (PEOPLE VS CATU, WHICH INVALIDATED GUILTLY PLEAS WHERE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT DISCUSSED, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY)/GUILTY PLEAS (PEOPLE VS CATU, WHICH INVALIDATED GUILTLY PLEAS WHERE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT DISCUSSED, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY)

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