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CLAIMANT PROPERLY AWARDED 100% SLU FOR FOUR AMPUTATED FINGERS AND AN ADDITIONAL 100% SLU FOR THE REATTACHED NONFUNCTIONAL THUMB.

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined claimant was properly awarded 100% schedule loss of use (SLU) for the amputation of four fingers on his right hand and an additional 100% SLU for the reattached non-functional thumb on his right hand:

… [T]he Board proportioned the loss of four fingers to the total loss of the hand as required by Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (q), and then separately evaluated the distinct and additional injury to the thumb, to which it awarded a 100% SLU. We defer to the Board’s determination to credit the sole proffered medical opinion of Paterson, and the Board’s conclusion based thereon that claimant sustained a separate and distinct injury to his thumb, which therefore warranted separate SLU determinations and awards for the thumb and the fingers … . Such result is supported by the guidelines, which contemplate awards greater than 100% for the loss of a hand (see New York State Guidelines for Determining Permanent Impairment and Loss of Wage Earning Capacity at 17, figure 2.8 [2012]) and provide that the loss of four fingers, excluding the thumb, constitutes a 100% SLU of the hand … . The guidelines, which address impairments to the thumb separately from fingers (see New York State Guidelines for Determining Permanent Impairment and Loss of Wage Earning Capacity at 12-14 [2012]), provide that “[t]he thumb deserves special consideration; it is the highest valued digit and the most important” (New York State Guidelines for Determining Permanent Impairment and Loss of Wage Earning Capacity at 17 [2012]). Under these circumstances, the Board’s determination to assign a separate SLU to the loss of the thumb and to make a distinct award is supported by the case law and the guidelines, and is not contrary to the statutory language. Therefore, we uphold the Board’s determination and affirm the amended decision. Matter of Deck v Dorr, 2017 NY Slip Op 04186, 3rd Dept 5-25-17

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CLAIMANT PROPERLY AWARDED 100% SLU FOR FOUR AMPUTATED FINGERS AND AN ADDITIONAL 100% SLU FOR THE REATTACHED NONFUNCTIONAL THUMB)/SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, CLAIMANT PROPERLY AWARDED 100% SLU FOR FOUR AMPUTATED FINGERS AND AN ADDITIONAL 100% SLU FOR THE REATTACHED NONFUNCTIONAL THUMB)/HAND (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, CLAIMANT PROPERLY AWARDED 100% SLU FOR FOUR AMPUTATED FINGERS AND AN ADDITIONAL 100% SLU FOR THE REATTACHED NONFUNCTIONAL THUMB)

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BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Third Department, in a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud (among other causes of action) stemming from the underfunding of a Workers’ Compensation benefits trust fund, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for legal malpractice. The lawyer, Gosdeck, argued that the complaint failed to allege his actions were the sole proximate cause of the injury. The Third Department reasoned that the “but for” test for legal malpractice was not the same as “sole proximate cause:”

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… [W]e reject Gosdeck’s argument that plaintiff was required to allege that he was the sole proximate cause of alleged damages. Rather, “[i]n an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused [the] plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages”… . “An attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if but for the attorney’s negligence the plaintiff . . . would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages”… . We agree with Supreme Court that, on this motion to dismiss a claim of legal malpractice that is based on negligent legal advice given over a period of time, the “but for” standard is not synonymous with sole proximate cause and that plaintiff’s burden is to prove that Gosdeck’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages … . New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Program Risk Mgt., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 04184, 3rd Dept 5-25-17

ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (LEGAL MALPRACTICE RE MANAGEMENT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE

CLAIMANT PROPERLY FOUND TO HAVE A 35% LOSS OF WAGE EARNING CAPACITY DESPITE HIS HAVING RETURNED TO WORK FULL-TIME.

The Third Department determined claimant was properly determined to have a 35% loss of wage earning capacity even though he had returned to work full-time. Because claimant had returned to work, he was not awarded any compensation. However, should his ability to work change, he would be entitled to up to 275 weeks of compensation. The court explained the different meanings of “wage earning capacity” and “loss of wage earning capacity:”

The employer argues that, because claimant returned to work full time at his preaccident wages, claimant’s wage-earning capacity at the time of classification was 100%; therefore, the employer’s argument continues, the Board’s finding that claimant sustained a 35% loss of wage-earning capacity was in error and unlawful. The employer’s argument on this point ignores the fact that the terms “wage-earning capacity” (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [5-a]) and “loss of wage-earning capacity” (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3] [w]) “are to be used for separate and distinct purposes” … . As this Court recently reiterated, “wage-earning capacity is used to determine a claimant’s weekly rate of compensation,” whereas “loss of wage-earning capacity . . . is used at the time of classification to set the maximum number of weeks over which a claimant with a permanent partial disability is entitled to receive benefits” … . “Unlike wage-earning capacity, which can fluctuate based on a claimant’s employment status, loss of wage-earning capacity [is] intended to remain fixed” … . Contrary to the employer’s assertion, “[t]he durational limits imposed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w) do not distinguish between claimants who are employed at the time of classification and those who are not” … . Matter of De Ruggiero v City of N.Y. Dept. of Citywide Admin. Servs., 2017 NY Slip Op 03999, 3rd Dept 5-18-17

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CLAIMANT PROPERLY FOUND TO HAVE A 35% LOSS OF WAGE EARNING CAPACITY DESPITE HIS HAVING RETURNED TO WORK FULL-TIME)

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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS.

The Second Department determined the defendants had demonstrated at a collateral source hearing that plaintiff will receive $205 per week in Workers’ Compensation benefits for the rest of her life. Even though the benefits were awarded after an unrelated 2002 accident, the damages awards for past and future lost income were reduced by $205 per week from the time of the 2010 accident (plaintiff was planning to return to work, and thereby lose the benefits, at the time of the 2010 accident):

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In “[a]ctions for personal injury . . . where the plaintiff seeks to recover for the cost of medical care, dental care, custodial care or rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other economic loss, evidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish that any such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral source, except for life insurance and those payments as to which there is a statutory right of reimbursement” (CPLR 4545[a]). The legislative intent of CPLR 4545(a) is to “eliminat[e] plaintiffs’ duplicative recoveries” … .. “The moving defendant bears the burden of establishing an entitlement to a collateral source reduction of an award for past or future economic loss” … .

“Reasonable certainty is understood as involving a quantum of proof that is greater than a preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of the four judicial departments has interpreted reasonable certainty’ as akin to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that the result urged by the defendant be highly probable'” … . In order to determine whether a party has established with “reasonable certainty” a payment by a collateral source, the defendants first “must establish with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff has received, or will receive, payments from a collateral source” … , and, second, “that collateral source payments which have been or will be received by the plaintiff must be shown to specifically correspond to particular items of economic loss awarded by the trier of fact” … . “Each case involving potential future collateral source reductions to awards for economic loss must be judged on its own unique facts and merits” … . McKnight v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 03740, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES, NEGLIGENCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, COLLATERAL SOURCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/COLLATERAL SOURCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/DAMAGES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)

SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM.

The Third Department determined the Special Fund was responsible for the decedent’s Workers’ Compensation claim. Decedent’s claim had been transferred to the Special Fund in 2002. The fact that decedent died after the 2014 cutoff for newly reopened claims was irrelevant:

The Special Fund argues that it is not liable because the consequential death claim is a new claim and, since it was filed after the January 1, 2014 cutoff for newly reopened claims against the Special Fund, liability against it is precluded (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]). The Special Fund is correct that “a claim for death benefits . . . is a separate and distinct legal proceeding brought by the beneficiary’s dependents and is not equated with the beneficiary’s original disability claim” … . Indeed, there are separate statutory provisions for disability and death benefits (compare Workers’ Compensation Law § 15, with Workers’ Compensation Law § 16). However, where, as here, liability for a claim has already been transferred from the carrier to the Special Fund and the employee thereafter dies for reasons causally related to the original claim, the Special Fund remains liable for the claim for death benefits … . Thus, under these circumstances, claimant need not obtain another transfer of liability to the Special Fund upon decedent’s death, as liability had already been transferred. In that regard, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a (1-a), which closed the Special Fund to newly reopened cases as of January 1, 2014, has no bearing on the Special Fund’s liability for a claim for which liability was transferred to it in 2000 ,,, . This result is consistent with the purpose of Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a, which “is to shift the liability for paying stale claims to the [Special] Fund” … . Matter of Misquitta v Getty Petroleum, 2017 NY Slip Op 03585, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM)/SPECIAL FUND (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM)

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PLAINTIFF PROPERLY OPTED TO SUE EMPLOYER FOR WORKPLACE INJURY, EMPLOYER DID NOT CARRY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s personal injury action against his employer (Montalvo) should not have been dismissed. The employer did not have Workers’ Compensation insurance and plaintiff properly opted to sue:

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Generally, “Workers’ Compensation benefits are [t]he sole and exclusive remedy of an employee against his employer for injuries in the course of employment” … . “This precludes suits against an employer for injuries in the course of employment” … . Here, however, the plaintiff properly elected his remedy of pursuing this action against Montalvo under Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 50, since Montalvo did not carry Workers’ Compensation coverage at the time of the accident … , a fact conceded by Montalvo’s counsel in a statement that constituted a judicial admission … . Accordingly, the trial court should not have granted Montalvo’s trial motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Rosario v Montalvo & Son Auto Repair Ctr., Ltd., 2017 NY Slip Op 02837, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

WORKERS’S COMPENSATION LAW (PLAINTIFF PROPERLY OPTED TO SUE EMPLOYER FOR WORKPLACE INJURY, EMPLOYER DID NOT CARRY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF PROPERLY OPTED TO SUE EMPLOYER FOR WORKPLACE INJURY, EMPLOYER DID NOT CARRY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE)

EXERTIONAL ABILITY OF LESS THAN SEDENTARY WORK DOES NOT EQUATE TO A FINDING OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY, PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILTIY FINDING AFFIRMED.

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Board’s permanent partial disability finding. Claimant argued she was totally disabled and contended the Board’s finding she has an exertional ability of “less than sedentary work” equated to a finding of permanent total disability. On that issue, the Third Department wrote:

Under the Board guidelines, physicians are required to perform an evaluation of a claimant’s functional capabilities, including his or her exertional abilities (see New York State Guidelines for Determining Permanent Impairment and Loss of Wage Earning Capacity at 44-46 [2012]). The finding of a claimant’s exertional ability is a factor to be considered by the Board in determining the claimant’s loss of wage-earning capacity … . The loss of wage-earning capacity is used to establish the duration of benefits for claimants that have sustained a permanent partial disability … . “In contrast, a permanent total disability is established where the medical proof shows a claimant is totally disabled and unable to engage in any gainful employment. The duration of benefits is not an issue in the permanent total disability context for the simple reason that there is no expectation that a claimant found to have such a disability will rejoin the work force” … . Accordingly, a finding that a claimant has an exertional ability of performing less than sedentary work, while a factor to consider in setting the duration of a permanently partially disabled claimant’s benefits, is not dispositive in the context of establishing the claimant’s overall disability. Rather, the exertional ability to work is applicable only to those claimants already found to have sustained a permanent partial disability and, therefore, are expected to rejoin the work force. Matter of Burgos v Citywide Cent. Ins. Program, 2017 NY Slip Op 02489, 3rd Dept 3-30-17

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW.

The Third Department determined plaintiff could sue in negligence, despite the fact that defendant was a co-worker. Defendant struck plaintiff with a golf club inflicting an injury that required the removal of a testicle. There was a question of fact whether defendant’s actions were grossly negligent or reckless and there not within the scope of defendant’s employment. There was also a question of fact whether the employer condoned defendant’s actions:

There is no dispute that plaintiff and defendant were coemployees, that plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment and that he collected workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6), these benefits are the exclusive remedy for an employee injured “by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ.” Having the same employer is not synonymous with being “in the same employ” and, to be shielded from liability, a defendant “must himself [or herself] have been acting within the scope of his [or her] employment and not have been engaged in a willful or intentional tort” … . Here, there is no indication that plaintiff was involved in any horseplay … . The differing versions of the event presented by the parties, as well as the two club employees who supported plaintiff’s version, raise genuine questions of fact as to whether defendant intended to strike plaintiff and did so in an excessive manner given the sensitive area of impact. Although defendant was not directly disciplined by the club and resigned to take a new position a few months after the incident, a question of fact also remains as to whether the club condoned defendant’s actions. As such, we conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that questions of fact existed as to whether defendant acted in a “grossly negligent and/or reckless” manner when he swung the golf club shaft and struck plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint … . Montgomery v Hackenburg, 2017 NY Slip Op 01744, 3rd Dept 3-9-17

NEGIGENCE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (NEGLIGENCE, (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)

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ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD.

The Third Department sent the matter back to the Worker’s Compensation Board for a review of the Board’s award of $3000 in attorney’s fees. The Third Department determined that the attorney’s fee form was not properly filled out and there was not enough information in the form to allow appellate review:

Our review of the OC-400.1 form submitted in this case reveals that it is very similar to the form submitted by counsel in Matter of Tenecela v Vrapo Constr. (146 AD3d 1217, 2017 NY Slip Op 00367 [2017]) — a form that the Board ultimately deemed to be inadequate in that case (id. at *2). Specifically, although the form here sets forth the dates upon which services were rendered to claimant and the number of hours allocated thereto, the description of those services is largely indecipherable. More to the point, the form tendered by counsel in this matter appears to allocate “25+” hours to an unspecified date or range of dates, thereby “making impossible any assessment of the services rendered” (id.). Finally, the Board premised its award (in part) upon “the financial status of . . . claimant” but, other than noting a reduction in the loss of wage-earning capacity suffered by claimant, the Board’s decision makes no reference to — and the record sheds no light upon — claimant’s financial status. For these reasons, the Board’s award of counsel fees is incapable of intelligent appellate review, and we remit this matter to the Board for reconsideration thereof … . Matter of Shiqerukaj v Gotham Broad, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01426, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

WORKERS’S COMPENSATION LAW (ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD)/ATTORNEYS (WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW, ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD)

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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not demonstrate it was the alter ego of plaintiff’s employer (which would trigger the Worker’s Compensation Law as plaintiff’s sole remedy). Defendant’s summary judgment motion on that ground should have been denied. Plaintiff was injured by a defective floor condition where he worked. He sued the owner of the building and the holder of the lease, Clean Rite Cleaners – Flatbush Avenue, LLC:

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed by nonparty CRC-Management Co., LLC (hereinafter CRC-Management), and, after the accident, he sought Workers’ Compensation benefits from CRC-Management. CRC-Flatbush moved, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff’s causes of action were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Among other things, CRC-Flatbush argued that it was “part of a single integrated entity” along with CRC-Management since they were both subsidiaries of nonparty Clean Rite Centers, LLC. …

… “[A] mere showing that the entities are related is insufficient where a defendant cannot demonstrate that one of the entities controls the day-to-day operations of the other” … . Here, CRC-Flatbush failed to make a prima facie showing either that it and the plaintiff’s employer, CRC-Management, operated as a single integrated entity, or that either company controlled the day-to-day operations of the other … . Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust, 2017 NY Slip Op 01350, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

 

WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CORPORATION LAW (WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAE, NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENCE (WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW, CORPORATION LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/ALTER EGO (WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW, CORPORATION LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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