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THE STANDARD FOR “IMPAIRMENT BY ALCOHOL AND DRUGS” IS THE SAME AS FOR “IMPAIRMENT BY ALCOHOL” IN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW’S DWI SCHEME; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S APPLICATION OF THE HIGHER “INTOXICATION” STANDARD TO “IMPAIRMENT BY ALCOHOL AND DRUGS” WAS REJECTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the standard for “impairment” in the context of “aggravated driving while ability impaired by a combination of drugs and alcohol” is the same as for “impairment by alcohol.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the Fourth Department’s rejection of the Third Department’s application of the higher “intoxication” in the context of impairment by drugs:

After the car he was driving with his fifteen-year-old daughter as a passenger was stopped by police, defendant admitted to drinking “a couple of strong beers” and smoking marijuana. He failed several standard field sobriety tests, and an officer certified as a drug recognition expert determined, based on a 12-step evaluation, that defendant was impaired by the combination of alcohol and cannabis and was unable to safely operate a vehicle. The People presented an indictment to the grand jury charging defendant with aggravated driving while ability impaired by a combination of drugs and alcohol with a child in the vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2-a] [b], [4-a]). For purposes of that charge, the prosecutor defined impaired as follows:

“A person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is impaired by the combined influence of alcohol and drugs when that combination of alcohol and drugs has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which such person is expected to possess in order to operate a motor vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver.” * * *

… [I]n People v Caden N. [189 AD3d 84, 90-91], the Third Department held that Cruz’s [48 NY2d at 427-428] definition of impairment applied only “in the limited context” of driving while ability impaired by alcohol (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]) and instead defined impairment for drug consumption in accordance with the Cruz standard for alcohol intoxication … . Relying on Caden N., defendant argues that for offenses involving drug use, or drug and alcohol use combined, courts should define impairment using Cruz’s intoxication standard. We disagree with that approach and hold that “impaired” should be interpreted consistently across Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 in accordance with the definition that this Court gave that term in People v Cruz and therefore affirm. People v Dondorfer, 2026 NY Slip Op 00823, CtApp 2-17-26

​Practice Point: The standard  for “impairment” in the context of a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation for “impairment by alcohol and drugs” is the same as for “impairment by alcohol.” The higher “intoxication” standard applied by the Third Department for impairment by drugs was rejected.

 

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