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THE INSTALLATION OF MOTION-ACTIVATED SECURITY LIGHTS WHICH SHINE INTO A NEIGHBOR’S PROPERTY CAN CONSTITUTE A PRIVATE NUISANCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the nuisance cause of action, based upon defendants’ installation of flood lights, should not have been dismissed:

“To establish a claim of private nuisance, a plaintiff must show: ‘an interference (1) substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with [the plaintiff’s] property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another’s conduct in acting or failure to act’ ” … . The interference “must not be fanciful, slight or theoretical, but certain and substantial, and must interfere with the physical comfort of the ordinarily reasonable person” … .

… [T]he amended complaint alleged that a nuisance arose from, among other things, flood lights in defendants’ backyard that shined light onto plaintiff’s property at night. According to plaintiff, the lights constituted a “substantial, intentional and unreasonable interference” with his property rights. In support of that part of their motion seeking summary judgment, defendants acknowledged that they installed motion-activated security lights in their backyard but contended in a conclusory fashion that the lights do not “amount to nuisance to a reasonable person.” Defendants did not identify where on their property the lights are stationed, nor did they dispute that they shined light onto plaintiff’s property. Thus, defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that the lights did not constitute a nuisance. Marrano v Dusza, 2025 NY Slip Op 05592, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: Lights which shine into a neighbor’s property can constitute a private nuisance.

 

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