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IN THIS TENANT HARASSMENT AND PRIVATE NUISANCE ACTION BY TENANTS AGAINST THE LANDLORD, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENTIRELY PROHIBITING VIDEO CAMERAS IN THE INTERIOR OF THE BUILDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the tenant-plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the landlord from maintaining video cameras in the interior of the building. Supreme Court had only prohibited video cameras outside the bathrooms. The tenants alleged the landlord was taking actions designed to force them to leave and alleged causes of action for tenant harassment and private nuisance:

Generally, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court … . “[A] movant must establish (1) a probability of success on the merits, (2) a danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, and (3) a balance of the equities in the movant’s favor” … . In granting, in part, those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from operating the video cameras in the interior portions of the property and from conducting inspections on the property without reasonable notice, the court properly, in effect, determined that the plaintiffs had established a probability of success on the merits, a danger of irreparable injury, and that the equities favor them. The court, however, improvidently exercised its discretion in limiting that preliminary injunction to enjoining the defendants only from operating video cameras that capture persons entering or exiting any bathrooms in the property. Under the circumstances of this case, the court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety, and preliminarily enjoined the defendants from operating video cameras in the interior portions of the property. Suchdev v Grunbaum, 2022 NY Slip Op 01195, Second Dept 2-23-22

 

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PLAINTIFFS-TENANTS STATED CLAIMS FOR TENANT HARASSMENT, PRIVATE NUISANCE, INTENTIONAL... BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT COULD NOT COMMENCE A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION...