You are here: / Municipal Law
,

COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL; NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case should have been granted. Plaintiff was a volunteer who walked dogs held at the county animal shelter. She was bitten by one of the dogs. There was no showing the shelter personnel were aware of the dog’s vicious propensities. The fact that the health department was aware the dog had bitten someone else in a prior incident was not imputed to the shelter personnel. The Fourth Department also held Supreme Court should not have denied the county’s motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action. Negligence does not lie in dog bite cases:

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the fact that shelter personnel may have been informed at the time of the dog’s surrender that the dog had previously knocked over a child is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to the dog’s vicious propensities to bite. Although a tendency to knock a person over may reflect “a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm” (Collier, 1 NY3d at 447), plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the dog’s knocking her over, and the dog’s proclivity to do so, even if established, did not “result[] in the injury giving rise to the lawsuit”… .

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, any knowledge of that incident obtained by … [the] Health Department should not be imputed to the County or the shelter … . “A municipality often will have numerous employees assigned to separate and diverse agencies or departments” … , and the record demonstrates that there is no overlap in the respective scopes of authority of the Health Department and the shelter.

We further conclude that the court erred in denying the County’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. “[C]ases involving injuries inflicted by domestic animals may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence” … . Blake v County of Wyo., 2017 NY Slip Op 00826, 4th Dept 2-3-17

 

ANIMAL LAW (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/DOG BITES (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

, , ,

COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM; FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION.

The Second Department determined the county was not entitled to summary judgment on governmental immunity grounds and an independent contractor for the county was not entitled to summary judgment because of the contractual relationship. Plaintiffs alleged the county and the contractor were negligent in dredging a pond resulting in flood damage. The county could be liable in ordinary negligence for maintenance of the drainage system (as opposed to design) and the subcontractor could be liable for launching an instrument of harm:

Although a governmental entity may be entitled to immunity from liability arising out of claims that it negligently designed a sewerage or storm drainage system … , the immunity does not extend to claims that it negligently maintained the system … . Here, even assuming the subject project fell within the ambit of a governmental function, the plaintiffs contend that the County was negligent, inter alia, in its maintenance of the pond and oversight of the dredging operations. * * *

Generally, an independent contractor owes no tort duty of care to third parties … . However, there are “three situations in which a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care—and thus be potentially liable in tort—to third persons … where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launches a force or instrument of harm … . Nachamie v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00657, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/NEGLIGENCE (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/IMMUNITY (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/CONTRACT LAW (INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)

,

LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department determined the county’s written notice required precluded suit in this “slip and fall on ice” action:

Here, the County established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the affidavit of a County employee, which indicated that she had conducted a search of the relevant records covering a five-year period prior to the date of the accident, and found no written notice of any dangerous or defective conditions at the accident site … .

… Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the County could require prior written notice of the icy condition because the landing on the exterior steps of the building where the accident occurred provided the public with a general right of passage, and thus served the same functional purpose as a sidewalk, which is one of the locations specifically enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) … . Walker v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00683, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/NEGLIGENCE (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)

,

ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed a police officer’s article 78 proceeding seeking reimbursement of the cost of defending a civil rights lawsuit. During the civil rights suit, the officer admitted doing nothing when he learned the plaintiff could not have committed the crime for which he was arrested. The officer argued the applicable provision of the General Municipal Law was ambiguous and, read correctly, required the county to indemnify him. Although the Second Department found that the provision was in fact ambiguous and had not been interpreted correctly by the Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification Board, the Board had correctly held the statute did not allow indemnification of the officer:

The statute vests the [Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification] Board with the discretion to determine the issues of proper discharge of duties and scope of employment, limited only by judicial review of whether a denial of defense and indemnification is arbitrary and capricious … . Here, the Board’s determination that the petitioner was not acting within the scope of his employment was arbitrary and capricious … . However, its determination that the petitioner’s failure to notify anyone that an incarcerated arrestee could not possibly have committed the robbery for which he was charged was not “committed while in the proper discharge of his duties” was supported by the facts and was not arbitrary and capricious (General Municipal Law § 50-l…). A court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the determination, but must ascertain only whether there is a rational basis for the decision or whether it is arbitrary and capricious” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 2017 NY Slip Op 00649, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/POLICE OFFICERS (ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/CIVIL RIGHTS (POLICE OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s (petitioner’s) application to serve late notices of claim should have been granted. The court provided a clear explanation of the analytical criteria:

The key factors in determining whether to allow service of a late notice of claim are whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense … . The presence or absence of any one of these factors is not necessarily determinative … , and the absence of a reasonable excuse is not necessarily fatal … . “However, whether the public corporation acquired timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is seen as a factor which should be accorded great weight” … .

Here, the County acquired timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims … . Matter of City of New York v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00465, 2ne Dept 1-25-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

, ,

ACTION BY TOWN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS PURSUANT TO A PROVISION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW WAS PROPERLY AND TIMELY BROUGHT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town’s action pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law seeking reimbursement for litigation costs incurred in defense of discrimination suits was properly and timely brought. Supreme Court had ruled the town should have brought an Article 78 action in Supreme Court:

In 1991, the New York State Legislature adopted article 44 of the Environmental Conservation Law (hereinafter the Greenway legislation), which created the Hudson River Valley Greenway (hereinafter the Greenway). The purpose of this article was to “protect and enhance the special places of scenic, cultural and ecological importance” in the Hudson River Valley (ECL 44-0101). Among other things, the Greenway legislation created a regional planning council and gave communities within its range the opportunity to enter into the “Greenway Compact,” a voluntary regional compact among municipalities to facilitate cooperative planning (see ECL 44-0103[2], [4]; 44-0119). To encourage communities to participate in the compact, the State of New York agreed that participating communities (as defined by ECL 44-0103[10]) would be entitled to indemnification in actions arising from their participation in the compact (see ECL 44-0119[7]). In 1992, this provision was amended to limit the indemnification in actions alleging, among other things, unlawful discrimination. The amendment provided that communities would be entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses only if they prevailed in the underlying action. * * *

… ECL 44-0119(7) speaks of reimbursement and indemnification, and expressly states that, “[i]n any claim against a participating community of unlawful discriminatory practice, the attorney general shall not represent” the Town. Instead, pursuant to ECL 44-0119(7), if the Town prevails in litigating against “any claim” of unlawful discriminatory practice, it “shall” be reimbursed by the State for all reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of the action. … [T]he gravamen of the Town’s claim herein was for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs incurred by it in the defense of the two subject actions. The Town’s claim at bar is one for money damages against the State—a claim that was timely brought in the Court of Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction of such matters … . Town of Rhinebeck v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00502, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

 

COURT OF CLAIMS (ACTION BY TOWN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS PURSUANT TO A PROVISION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW PROPERLY AND TIMELY BROUGHT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS)/MUNICIPAL LAW (ACTION BY TOWN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS PURSUANT TO A PROVISION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW PROPERLY AND TIMELY BROUGHT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW, ACTION BY TOWN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS PURSUANT TO A PROVISION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW PROPERLY AND TIMELY BROUGHT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS)

RESOLUTION IMPOSING A SURCHARGE ON DEVELOPERS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WATER MAINS DECLARED VOID, WATER AUTHORITY FAILED TO PROVIDE PROPER NOTICE BEFORE ENACTING THE RESOLUTION.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county water authority did not provide the property developers (called “beneficial owners”) with sufficient notice of a resolution which imposed a surcharge upon the developers for the cost of construction of water mains to service the project. The resolution was declared void:

Pursuant to Public Authorities Law § 1078(6), the Water Authority is authorized, generally, to impose a surcharge, such as the surcharge at issue in this matter (see Public Authorities Law § 1078[6]; see also id. § 1078[9], [13]). Nonetheless, the record shows that the Water Authority, in enacting the 2009 resolution, failed to provide proper prior notice of the proposed action to the beneficial owners and an opportunity to be heard. Where a municipality seeks to impose a special tax assessment upon a property owner, due process requires that the property owner be granted prior notice and a right to appear … .

Under the circumstances here, the “surcharge” imposed by the 2009 resolution is analogous to a special tax assessment, requiring that the property owner be given prior notice and a right to appear … . A representative of the beneficial owners averred in an affidavit that they received no prior notice of the Board meeting at which the 2009 resolution was adopted. The Water Authority submitted a copy of a meeting notice and agenda, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Water Authority averred that, prior to the meeting, that agenda was published in a newspaper and posted on the Water Authority website; however, the Water Authority failed to provide proof of publication of the agenda or any evidence of service of the agenda upon the beneficial owners, although the addresses of the beneficial owners were known to the Water Authority. Matter of 22-50 Jackson Ave. Assoc., L.P. v Suffolk County Water Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 00299, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

 

MUNCIPAL LAW (RESOLUTION IMPOSING A SURCHARGE ON DEVELOPERS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WATER MAINS DECLARED VOID, WATER AUTHORITY FAILED TO PROVIDE PROPER NOTICE BEFORE ENACTING THE RESOLUTION)/SURCHARGES (MUNICIPAL LAW, RESOLUTION IMPOSING A SURCHARGE ON DEVELOPERS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WATER MAINS DECLARED VOID, WATER AUTHORITY FAILED TO PROVIDE PROPER NOTICE BEFORE ENACTING THE RESOLUTION)/WATER MAINS (MUNICIPAL LAW, RESOLUTION IMPOSING A SURCHARGE ON DEVELOPERS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WATER MAINS DECLARED VOID, WATER AUTHORITY FAILED TO PROVIDE PROPER NOTICE BEFORE ENACTING THE RESOLUTION)

,

ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the city, based upon a traffic accident involving a city police car, was properly denied. Although there was a police report of the accident, there was no indication in the report that petitioner was injured:

“A report which describes the circumstances of the accident without making a connection between the petitioner’s injuries and negligent conduct on the part of the public corporation will not be sufficient to constitute actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim” … . Here, since the police accident report does not connect any injuries sustained by the petitioners to any negligent conduct on the part of the operator of the respondents’ vehicle, it was not sufficient to provide the respondents with actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim. Moreover, the direct involvement of the respondents’ employee in the accident itself, without more, is also not sufficient to establish that the respondents acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Matter of D’Agostino v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00302, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)

, , ,

TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD.

The Third Department, in a decision too detailed to be fairly summarized here, determined a town board of assessment review (BAR) is a quasi-judicial body and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Third Department further determined that causes of actions for civil rights violations (42 USC 1983) against two town assessors individually (stemming from allegedly discriminatory property tax assessments) can go forward:

Consistent with the provisions of RPTL 523, the Town was required to have a board of assessment review (see RPTL 523 [1] [a]), and its individual members, in turn, were required to attend mandated training (see RPTL 523 [1] [d]; [2]). Here, in accordance with its appointed duties, the BAR had a statutory obligation to “fix the place or places for the hearing of complaints in relation to assessments” (RPTL 525 [1]) and, on the date required by law, to “meet to hear complaints in relation to assessments” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]). Upon convening for the required hearing, the BAR could “administer oaths, take testimony and hear proofs in regard to any complaint and the assessment to which it relates” and, further, could “require the person whose real property is assessed, or his or her agent or representative, or any other person, to appear before [it] and be examined concerning such complaint, and to produce any papers relating to such assessment” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]). “Minutes of the examination of every person [so] examined” were required to “be taken and filed in the office of the . . . town clerk” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]), and the BAR thereafter was required to “determine the final assessed valuation or taxable assessed valuation . . . of the real property of each complainant” (RPTL 525 [3] [a]), “prepare and verify a statement showing the changes determined to be made by them in the assessments” and notify each complainant of its determination and the time within which to seek judicial review thereof (RPTL 525 [4]). In light of these statutory mandates, it is apparent that the BAR’s determinations constitute decisions of a quasi-judicial nature and, hence, the BAR (and its individual members) are entitled to absolute immunity … . * * *

… [S]uffice it to say that [defendants town assessors’] proof … fell short of establishing that the assessors valued plaintiff’s property in a nondiscriminatory fashion and, therefore, defendants failed to demonstrate their entitlement to summary judgment [on the violation of civil rights causes of action]. Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 2017 NY Slip Op 00227, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/MUNICIPAL LAW (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/IMMUNITY (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/CIVIL RIGHTS (42 USC 1983) (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/42 USC 1983 (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)

NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW BANNING E-CIGARETTES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE SUBJECT RULE OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW OR THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined a New York City Local Law (Local Law 152), which included electronic or e-cigarettes in the law’s smoking ban, did not violate the “one subject” rule in the New York State Constitution. Although the court found that the constitutional prohibition only applies to state statutes, it noted that the Municipal Home Rule Law and the New York City Charter have a similar prohibition. The idea behind the “one subject” rule is to prevent a statute which ostensibly relates to a particular subject from including “hidden” provisions which address another unrelated subject:

Municipal Home Rule Law § 20(3) states that “[e]very such local law shall embrace only one subject. The title shall briefly refer to the subject matter”; the New York City Charter provides that “[e]very local law shall embrace only one subject. The title shall briefly refer to the subject-matter” (NY City Charter § 32).

Local Law 152 does not violate those requirements. It was titled “A Local Law to amend the administrative code …, in relation to the regulation of electronic cigarettes.” The regulation of electronic cigarettes was the only subject of the bill and that subject was clearly stated in its title. Therefore, the bill met the transparency requirement of the one-subject rule and adequately apprised the City Council and members of the public of its contents and purpose … . NYC C.L.A.S.H. v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00042, 1st Dept 1-3-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (E-CIGARETTE BAN, NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW BANNING E-CIGARETTES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE SUBJECT RULE OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW  OR THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER)/ONE SUBJECT RULE (E-CIGARETTE BAN, NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW BANNING E-CIGARETTES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE SUBJECT RULE OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW OR THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER)/E-CIGARETTES (NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW BANNING E-CIGARETTES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE SUBJECT RULE OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW OR THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy