You are here: / Municipal Law
,

19 YEAR OLD NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS NOT SUFFICIENT WRITTEN NOTICE OF SIDEWALK DEFECT.

The Second Department determined a 19-year-old notice of claim did not meet the written notice requirement for a sidewalk defect in this slip and fall case:

“Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) limits the City’s duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” … . Accordingly, “prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which plaintiff is required to plead and prove to maintain an action against the City” … .

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof that a search of its records revealed that it had not received any prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition … . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. “To satisfy a prior written notice statute, the notice relied upon by a plaintiff must not be too remote in time” … . Here, the plaintiffs’ submission of a notice of claim, filed almost 19 years prior to the accident complained of, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact since it was too remote in time to constitute prior written notice within the meaning of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) … . Gellman v Cooke, 2017 NY Slip Op 02404, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

SECOND DEPARTMENT JOINS THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES NEED NOT BE NAMED AS DEFENDANTS IN A NOTICE OF CLAIM.

The Second Department decided to follow the Third and Fourth Departments and did not require the naming of individual municipal employees as defendants in a notice of claim. The decision in this false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil rights violation case is substantive and deals with several issues not summarized here, including the District Attorney’s immunity from suit. With respect to the notice of claim, the court wrote:

The Appellate Division, First Department, has held that “General Municipal Law § 50-e makes unauthorized an action against individuals who have not been named in a notice of claim” … . * * * The plurality opinion in that case stated that the names of individual employees, if unknown, should still be named as John or Jane Does to enable the municipality to properly investigate the claims and to put individual defendants on notice that they will be sued. …

In contrast, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has held that naming individual municipal employees in a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to joining those individuals as defendants in the action … . In Goodwin, the Fourth Department noted that General Municipal Law § 50-e(2), which sets forth the requirements for a notice of claim, does not include a requirement that specific individual employees be named, and concluded that “[t]he underlying purpose of the statute may be served without requiring a plaintiff to name the individual agents, officers or employees in the notice of claim” (id. at 216). In Pierce v Hickey (129 AD3d 1287, 1289), the Appellate Division, Third Department, followed Goodwin, stating that there was no requirement that “an individual municipal employee be named in the notice of claim.”

We agree with the Third and Fourth Departments. * * * Listing the names of the individuals who allegedly committed the wrongdoing is not required … . Blake v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02399, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

, ,

THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FALSE ARREST CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 USC 1983 BEGAN TO RUN UPON ARRAIGNMENT.

The First Department noted that the three year statute of limitations for a false arrest cause of action under 42 USC 1983 began to run upon arraignment:

The three-year limitations period on a section 1983 claim based on false arrest begins to run “when the alleged false imprisonment ends” — that is, when the arrestee becomes subject to the legal process such as being “bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges” … . Here, because plaintiff was arraigned on July 16, 2011, the limitations period on his section 1983 claim based on false arrest ended on July 16, 2014, approximately three months before plaintiff filed this action. Accordingly, the claim is time-barred. Cruz v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02386, 1st Dept 3-28-17

 

,

LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS.

The Fourth Department determined the application for leave to file a late notice of claim was properly granted, despite the absence of an adequate excuse and the lack of timely notice of the underlying facts:

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that claimants failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their delay, we conclude that the remaining factors support the court’s exercise of discretion in granting their application. Although respondents did not obtain knowledge of the facts underlying the claim until approximately nine months after the expiration of the 90-day period, we conclude under the circumstances of this case that “this was a reasonable time, particularly in light of the fact that respondent[s] do[ ] not contend that there has been any subsequent change in the condition of the [premises] which might hinder the investigation or defense of this action’ ” … . Moreover, claimants made a sufficient showing that the late notice will not substantially prejudice respondents, and respondents failed to “respond with a particularized evidentiary showing that [they] will be substantially prejudiced if the late notice is allowed” … . We therefore conclude that the court “properly exercised its broad discretion in granting [claimants’] application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” … . Matter of Diegelman v City of Buffalo, 2017 NY Slip Op 02316, 4th Dept 3-24-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)

CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Curran, in a matter of first impression, determined the Citizen Review Board of Syracuse (CRB) had the capacity to sue and had standing to bring Article 78/declaratory judgment proceedings against the Syracuse Police Department seeking compliance with the citizen review procedures:

Here, the CRB’s enabling legislation provides that it was formed to “establish an open citizen-controlled process for reviewing grievances involving members of the Syracuse Police Department” and that “citizen complaints regarding members of the Syracuse Police Department shall be heard and reviewed fairly and impartially by the review board.” Further, the CRB is required by the ordinance to report and publish the number of cases in which sanctions were imposed. Inasmuch as the CRB cannot perform its legislative mandate without the Chief of Police’s compliance with the corresponding legislative mandate that he “advise the [CRB] in writing as to what type of actions or sanctions were imposed, and the reasons if none were imposed,” we conclude that the CRB has sustained a sufficiently particularized injury that falls squarely within the zone of interests set forth in the ordinance … . Matter of Citizen Review Bd. of The City of Syracuse v Syracuse Police Dept., 2017 NY Slip Op 02181, 4th Dept 3-24-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)/POLICE (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)/CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)

, ,

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR.

In the context of a suit against the county, the Fourth Department determined the deliberative process privilege (also called the inter-agency or intra-agency materials exception) which applies to documents requested under the Freedom of Information Law does not apply to discovery request under the CPLR:

Both the CPLR and FOIL provide for disclosure of documents. The former controls discovery between litigants in court proceedings, and the latter permits disclosure of governmental records to the public even in the absence of litigation. “When a public agency is one of the litigants, this means that it has the distinct disadvantage of having to offer its adversary two routes into its records” … . The deliberative process privilege or exemption under FOIL seeks “to protect the deliberative process of the government by ensuring that persons in an advisory role [will] be able to express their opinions freely to agency decision makers” … . While some courts have applied that privilege outside the FOIL context … , we decline to do so inasmuch as the Court of Appeals “has never created nor recognized a generalized deliberative process privilege’ ” … .

We “recognize[] the existence of some cases which all too casually mention the deliberate process privilege’ and purport to apply it outside the context of a FOIL proceeding” … . Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize that “privileges simply do not exist in the absence of either constitutional or statutory authority, or, when created as a matter of jurisprudence” … . Although the County seeks to assert “the so-called deliberative process privilege[,]’ ” in the context of a civil litigation, “neither the Court of Appeals’ case law nor that of the [Fourth] Department can be construed [as] having created a distinct deliberate process privilege’ outside the context of a FOIL proceeding” … . Mosey v County of Erie, 2017 NY Slip Op 02201, 4th Dept 3-24-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/MUNICIPAL LAW (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (FOIL, DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/INTER OR INTRA AGENCY EXCEPTION (FOIL, DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)

,

PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s slip and fall complaint was properly dismissed because plaintiff could not identify the cause of his fall:

During his 50-h hearing, the injured plaintiff testified that he was walking on the sidewalk and was about to cross the street when his right foot caught on “some sort of stone,” causing him to fall. He did not see the stone before the accident, but after he fell, he looked and saw stones embedded in the earth around a tree, which caught his foot. At his deposition, however, the injured plaintiff testified that as he was about to cross the street, he was paying attention to traffic and his foot “hit something” causing him to lose his balance and fall. This time, he identified a raised portion of the sidewalk, approximately three feet away from the tree, as the cause of his fall. He distinguished this area from the cobblestones around the tree and testified that he did not make contact with the cobblestones, as he was “further down, to the side of the tree.” Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the injured plaintiff’s own contradictory testimony does not create a question of fact … . Rather, it demonstrates that he is unable to identify the cause of his fall and any determination by the trier of fact as to causation would be based upon sheer speculation … . Vojvodic v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02085, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED)/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED)

,

PLAINTIFF INJURED IN COLLSION WITH A POLICE CAR, POLICE REPORT PROVIDED CITY WITH NOTICE OF THE CLAIM, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF EXCUSE.

The Second Department determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should have been granted, despite of the lack of an adequate excuse. The plaintiff was involved in an accident with a police car. The police report noted that plaintiff was injured. Therefore the city had timely notice of essential elements of the claim:

Here, the City and the NYPD acquired timely actual notice of the facts underlying the claim. The subject motor vehicle accident involved a police department vehicle and police department employee. The NYPD responded to the scene and conducted an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident. Indeed, the police accident report specifically noted that the petitioner, as well as the driver of the vehicle in which she was a passenger, made statements alleging that [the officer] was liable. The police accident report also noted that the petitioner was injured and that a copy of the report was being provided to the Office of the Comptroller, as well as the Motor Transport Division and Personal Safety Unit of the NYPD. Thus, the overall circumstances of this matter support an inference that the City effectively received actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim … . In light of the City’s actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, there is no substantial prejudice to the City in maintaining a defense … . “[W]here there is actual notice and an absence of prejudice, the lack of reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim” … . Matter of Jaffier v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02039, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF INJURED IN COLLSION WITH A POLICE CAR, POLICE REPORT PROVIDED CITY WITH NOTICE OF THE CLAIM, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF EXCUSE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, PLAINTIFF INJURED IN COLLSION WITH A POLICE CAR, POLICE REPORT PROVIDED CITY WITH NOTICE OF THE CLAIM, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF EXCUSE)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, PLAINTIFF INJURED IN COLLSION WITH A POLICE CAR, POLICE REPORT PROVIDED CITY WITH NOTICE OF THE CLAIM, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF EXCUSE)

, ,

NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was required to file a notice of claim in his Labor Law action against the city. The notice of claim requirement was not preempted by the Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff was injured while doing overhaul work in a the Brooklyn Navy Yard:

The LHWCA provides nonseaman maritime workers with the right to bring no-fault workers’ compensation claims against their employer, pursuant to 33 USC § 904(b), and negligence claims against the vessel, pursuant to 33 USC § 905(b). As to those two categories of defendants, 33 USC § 905(a) and (b) expressly preempt all other claims, but 33 USC § 933(a) expressly preserves all claims against third parties … . “Importantly, § 933 recognizes that a covered employee may have tort remedies against third parties under federal or state law. Section 933 preserves and codifies a maritime worker’s common law right to pursue a negligence claim against a third party that is not the employer or a coworker; it does not create a cause of action nor establish a third party’s liability for negligence” … . Fernandez v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02022, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNCIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)

, ,

NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The First Department determined the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint poisoning case was properly denied. The NYCHA argued that the building was constructed in 1974 and lead paint was banned in 1960:

Although NYCHA relies on its own testing that was negative for lead paint, DOH’s [Department of Health’s] lead testing came back positive. NYCHA’s arguments that these were false positives due to the manner in which, and location from where, the samples were taken is insufficient to disregard them as a matter of law. * * *

Nor did NYCHA prove as a matter of law, that it had no actual or constructive notice of the existence of lead paint in the building. Pursuant to the City’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (Local Law 1 of 2004), lead-based paint is presumed to exist in a multiple dwelling unit if the building was built before 1960. Where, as here, the building is built between 1960 and 1978, the presumption will apply only if the owner knows that there is lead-based paint, and a child under the age of six lives in the apartment. Although in a pre-1960 building, paint is presumed to contain lead, the opposite is not true; there is no presumption that paint in a building constructed after 1960 is not lead-based. Given plaintiff’s claim, that NYCHA maintains the premises and assumed the duty to have the apartments painted, the absence of any evidence concerning the history of painting in the subject apartments is insufficient for the court to rule out, as a matter of law, notice. Dakota Jade T. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01987, 1st Dept 3-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LEAD PAINT, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW  (LEAD PAINT, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/LEAD PAINT (NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy