You are here: / Judges
, , , , ,

FAMILY COURT LOST SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AFTER THE NEGLECT PETITION WAS DISMISSED; THEREFORE THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTINUED THE CHILD’S PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined Family Court lost subject matter jurisdiction after the neglect petition against mother was dismissed. Therefore the child’s placement in foster should not have been continued by the court. The First Department also noted that mother’s mental-health records from the period after the filing and after the dismissal of the neglect petition were improperly admitted:

We … find that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue R.C.’s foster care placement for the reasons articulated in Matter of Jamie J. (Michelle E.C.) (30 NY3d 275 [2017]), in which the Court of Appeals held that “Family Court’s jurisdiction terminates upon dismissal of the original neglect or abuse petition” … .

The “court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable, but may be raised at any stage of the action, and the court may . . . on its own motion . . . at any time, when its attention is called to the facts, refuse to proceed further and dismiss the action” … .

Here, once the neglect petition against the mother was dismissed, Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue the child’s temporary removal from the mother’s care and placement in foster care … . Accordingly, it should have immediately returned the child to the mother’s care and terminated the child’s foster care placement. It erred when it determined that it could hold permanency hearings based on the pending neglect petition against the putative father, since the child was not removed from his care, but from the mother’s. … Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that the child ever resided with the putative father and no indication that he ever sought custody of the child.

Furthermore, we find that the failure of Family Court to immediately return the child to the care of the mother after the dismissal of the neglect petition against her—as well as the subsequent protracted proceedings, including the dispositional hearing, which lasted nearly a year and a half—violated her due process rights … . Matter of R.C. (D.C.–R.R.), 2025 NY Slip Op 01859, First Dept 3-27-25

Practice Point: Here Family Court lost subject matter jurisdiction after the neglect petition against mother was dismissed and did not have the authority to continue the child’s placement in foster care.

Practice Point: The protracted proceedings after the dismissal of the neglect petition, during which the child remained in foster care, violated mother’s right to due process.

 

, , , ,

MOTHER, WHO WAS REPRESENTING HERSELF IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE JUDGE’S (1) COMMENCING THE HEARING WITHOUT HER, (2) SUBSEQUENTLY EXCLUDING HER FROM THE COURTROOM, (3) DENYING HER REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE IN EVIDENCE, (4) AND DENYING HER REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT TO CONSULT WITH HER LEGAL ADVISOR (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother, who was representing herself, was deprived of her right to due process in this termination of parental rights proceeding by “a confluence of factors:”

“A parent has a due process right to be present during proceedings to terminate parental rights”. Nonetheless, “[a] parent’s right to be present for fact-finding and dispositional hearings in proceedings to terminate parental rights is not absolute” … . “The child whose guardianship and custody is at stake also has a fundamental right to a prompt and permanent adjudication” … . “Thus, when faced with the unavoidable absence of a parent, a court must balance the respective rights and interests of both the parent and the child in determining whether to proceed” … .

Here … the mother was deprived of her due process right to be present in the proceedings seeking to terminate her parental rights. First, the Family Court determined to commence the hearing in the mother’s absence, even though she was proceeding pro se and had made representations to the court through her legal advisor that she had been directed to quarantine by her medical provider and was requesting an adjournment … . Notably, the record does not indicate that the mother had a history of failing to appear, nor did the court apparently rely on that factor in deciding to commence the hearing in the mother’s absence … .

Furthermore, when the hearing continued one week later, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the mother’s requests, among other things, for a copy of her own court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, which, at that point, was in evidence, and for additional time to obtain a court transcript and to consult with her legal advisor. Perhaps most significantly, the court abused its discretion in excluding the mother from the courtroom for the remainder of the hearing, without the issuance of a warning and with knowledge of the mother’s diagnoses contained in the psychiatric evaluation … . Thus, on both dates of the hearing, the mother was left without an advocate … . Matter of Justina C. M. J. (Chantilly J.), 2025 NY Slip Op 01805, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: Here mother was denied the right to be present in the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, was denied access to evidence and her request for an adjournment to consult with her legal advisor was denied. Cumulatively mother was denied her right to due process.

 

,

THE JUDGE, IN RENDERING THE VERDICT, STATED THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT PROVEN HE WAS FRAMED AND THEREFORE WAS GUILTY; THAT SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the court, in rendering its verdict, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant:

… Supreme Court, in rendering its verdict, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The defendant asserted at trial that he had been framed by the police. In delivering its verdict, the court ruled that “the credible testimony before me does not persuade this Court beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant was in fact framed. And that being so . . . I find [the] defendant guilty.” The court’s finding “reverses the constitutionally required principles that the defense bears no burden and that it is the prosecution that must introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact finder, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt” … . People v Steward, 2025 NY Slip Op 01825, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: Here the judge, in rendering the verdict, stated the defendant was found guilty because the defendant had not proven he was framed. Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant required reversal and a new trial.

 

,

THE JUDGE DID NOT HOLD A COMPETENCY HEARING IN VIOLATION OF THE MANDATED PROCEDURES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW ARTICLE 730; MATTER REMITTED FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, ordering a reconstruction hearing on the defendant’s competence to stand trial, determined that the judge had not followed the procedures mandated by Criminal Procedure Law article 730:

“Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets out the procedures courts of this State must follow in order to prevent the criminal trial of [an incompetent] defendant” … . The CPL expressly provides that “[w]hen the examination reports submitted to the court show that the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous in their opinion as to whether the defendant is or is not an incapacitated person . . . the court must conduct a hearing to determine the issue of capacity” (CPL 730.30[4] …).. “That section is mandatory and not discretionary” … .

Here, once the Supreme Court made a threshold determination that the defendant’s conduct warranted an examination, it should have followed the procedures mandated by CPL article 730. The failure to comply with the statute deprived the defendant of the right to a full and fair determination of his mental capacity to stand trial … . We find, however, that the requirements of CPL article 730 can be satisfied by a reconstruction hearing … .  People v Petty, 2025 NY Slip Op 01824, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: If the court orders a psychiatric examination to determine whether defendant is an incapacitated person and the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous, the court must conduct a hearing on the issue of capacity.​

 

, , ,

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT HOSPITAL WAS NEGLIGENT IN PLACING HIM IN A ROOM WITH A PERSON WITH COVID; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF THAT PERSON’S MEDICAL RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHEN THE HOSPITAL BECAME AWARE OF THE COVID DIAGNOSIS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to discovery of another’s medical records. Plaintiff alleged the hospital was negligent in placing plaintiff in a room with a person with COVID. The sought medical records may reveal when the hospital became aware of the COVID diagnosis:

Although “discovery determinations rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Appellate Division is vested with a corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court, even in the absence of abuse” … . CPLR 3101 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” “What is material and necessary is left to the sound discretion of the lower courts and includes any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason” … .

Pursuant to CPLR 4504 (a), “a person authorized to practice medicine . . . shall not be allowed to disclose any information which [they] acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable [them] to act in that capacity.” The physician-patient privilege may be overcome, however, where the plaintiff establishes that the information in the medical records is material and necessary to their claim … . Here, plaintiffs established that the nonparty patient’s hospital records would show when defendant, its agents, servants and employees became aware that the patient had tested positive for COVID-19 and that such information is material and necessary to establish whether defendant had notice that it was placing plaintiff in the same room as a person who had COVID-19 … . Martin v Kaleida Health, 2025 NY Slip Op 01756, Fourth Dept 3-21-25

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery of another’s medical records because the records were “material and necessary to the prosecution of the action.”

 

,

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE PLACED CONDITIONS ON MOTHER’S VISITATION; MATTER REMITTED FOR A SPECIFIC VISITATION SCHEDULE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the judge should not have placed conditions on mother’s visitation and remitted the matter for a visitation schedule:

We agree with the mother … that the court erred in conditioning her visitation upon either her participation in domestic violence counseling or that she no longer reside with her husband … . We therefore modify the order accordingly, and we remit the matter to Family Court to fashion a specific and definitive schedule for visitation, if any, between the mother and the children. Matter of Seeley-Sick v Allison, 2025 NY Slip Op 01747, Fourth Dept 3-21-25

Practice Point: Conditioning mother’s visitation on domestic violence counseling or on no longer resided wither her husband was deemed improper. Mother was entitled to a specific visitation schedule.​

 

, ,

THIS CASE PRESENTS THE RARE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, DESPITE THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR MOTION WHICH WAS BASED ON THE SAME GROUND, I.E., DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MISINFORMATION ABOUT WHEN DEFENDANT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined the defendant’s second motion to vacate his murder conviction (by guilty plea) based on his attorney’s erroneously informing him he would be eligible for parole haff-way through the 15-year sentence required a hearing. Defendant had made a prior motion on the same ground which was denied by another judge. The Third Department noted that ordinarily the prior motion would preclude the instant motion, but irregularities in the prior order denying the motion and the facts asserted in support of the instant motion justified giving the defendant a second chance:

… [T]he Legislature anticipated there would be times when it would be appropriate to reconsider issues previously decided on the merits (see CPL 440.10 [3] …). Doubtless those times should be rare; but, in our view, this is one of them.

Critically, the instant motion includes witness affidavits affirming that counsel assured defendant that he would be eligible for parole review as early as halfway through his minimum 15-year term of imprisonment (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]; compare CPL 440.30 [4] [d]). Also attached is correspondence between defendant and counsel from December 2020. In one letter, defendant asks why counsel advised him that he would be eligible for early parole; counsel’s response does not address defendant’s question. Given defendant’s submissions, plus his relatively young age and inexperience with the criminal justice system at the time of his guilty plea, along with the irregularities in the June 2020 order, summary denial of defendant’s motion was an improvident exercise of discretion. Accordingly, in the exercise of our broad authority to substitute our discretion for that of County Court … , we set aside the procedural bars to relief on the issue of counsel’s alleged erroneous parole advice and remit the matter for a hearing … . People v Phelps, 2025 NY Slip Op 01680, Third Dept 3-20-25

Practice Point: Here irregularities in the order denying defendant’s first motion to vacate his conviction and the facts presented in support of defendant’s second motion on the same ground justified consideration of the second motion.​

 

,

THE MOTIONS TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND JOIN AN ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motions to amend the complaint and to join another action should have been granted. The proposed amendment was not time-barred because the original complaint gave notice of the transactions and occurrences upon which the amendment is based. The motion to join another action should have been granted because there were common questions of law or fact and defendants would not be prejudiced:

While a proposed amendment generally is considered patently devoid of merit if it is time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations” … , here, the proposed amendment relates back to the original complaint and is deemed to have been timely interposed because the original complaint gave “notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences” on which the claims in the proposed amended complaint were based (CPLR 203[f] …). [Defendants] failed to establish that they were prejudiced or surprised by the plaintiff’s delay in seeking leave to amend the complaint, as discovery was still ongoing at the time the plaintiff’s motion was made … , the proposed amended complaint was “premised upon the same facts, transactions, or occurrences” alleged in the original complaint … , and the proposed amendment merely elaborated on the same theory of liability alleged in the original complaint … . …

The Supreme Court also improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 602(a) to join Action No. 2 with Action No. 1 for purposes of trial. “Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion to consolidate or for a joint trial pursuant to CPLR 602(a) should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion” … . Here, Action No. 1 and Action No. 2 both arise from the project, concern the same parties, and involve common questions of law and fact … , and a failure to try the two actions jointly would result in a “duplication of trials, unnecessary costs and expense, and a danger of an injustice resulting from divergent decisions” … . Contrary to the contentions of KGD and OLA, the possibility of prejudice resulting from a joint trial can be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions … , and any potential prejudice is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts if separate trials ensue … .  Great Neck Lib. v Kaeyer, Garment & Davidson Architects, P.C., 2025 NY Slip Op 01613, Second Dept 3-19-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the criteria for amending a complaint, including a determination whether the amendment is time-barred (it is not if the original complaint gave notice of the transactions or occurrences referenced in the amendment).

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the criteria for consolidating two actions which involve common questions of law or fact.

 

, ,

A JUROR, AN ATTORNEY, ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE OTHER JURORS THAT THE “BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT” STANDARD COULD BE DISREGARDED; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A “JUROR MISCONDUCT” HEARING IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT (FIIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, holding the matter in abeyance, determined the allegations that a juror, A.H., an attorney, told the other jurors the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard did not apply to everything in the case necessitated an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict:​​

Some of the alleged conduct of juror A.H., an attorney, described in the supporting affidavits of two jurors, was an emphatic expression of the juror’s thoughts, his strong belief in defendant’s guilt, his understanding of the court’s instructions, his personal antipathy to the defendant, and, to the extent it was incorrect, his understanding of the law, none of which constitutes juror misconduct under CPL 330.30(2) … . However, the affidavit of one juror (E.A.) affirmed that A.H. “told us that we did not have to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for everything in the case.” The other juror (S.D.) affirmed that A.H. averred, without any stated exception, “that the proof did not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Considering these attestations regarding A.H.’s alleged direction to the jury members to disregard the court’s instruction concerning the burden of proof, defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to set aside the verdict. We hold the appeal in abeyance for that purpose. People v Hernandez, 2025 NY Slip Op 01589, Ct App 3-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for some insight into what is, and what is not, juror-misconduct, here in the context of a juror, an attorney, telling the other jurors the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard may be disregarded.

 

, , ,

WHERE THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE A LEGAL ISSUE, THE FACTUAL DISPUTE MUST BE RESOLVED IN A HEARING BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE THE LEGAL ISSUE; WHETHER THE RECORD GIVES RISE TO A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE IS A QUESTION OF LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a factual dispute about whether an attorney (Santamarina) validly waived personal jurisdiction on behalf of defendant Koukis required a hearing:

Supreme Court decided Mr. Koukis’s motion without a factual hearing, holding that Mr. Santamarina lacked authority to act on Mr. Koukis’s behalf and vacating his waiver of personal jurisdiction and service defenses. But Supreme Court concluded that personal jurisdiction existed over Mr. Koukis pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2). It therefore set the matter down for a traverse hearing to determine if service on Mr. Koukis of the summons and complaint was proper.

Before the traverse hearing occurred, the Appellate Division modified the order of Supreme Court by vacating the default judgment and granting Mr. Koukis’s motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Division held that “there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf” … . Additionally, the majority departed from Supreme Court in its analysis of CPLR 302 (a) (2), concluding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction and dismissing the complaint in its entirety … . Two Justices partially dissented on the ground that Supreme Court should have held a hearing to determine whether Mr. Santamarina had the authority to represent Mr. Koukis … . We now reverse on the basis that there is a material factual dispute as to whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction

[Plaintiff] was entitled to a factual hearing to determine whether Mr. Santamarina validly appeared on Mr. Koukis’s behalf and waived personal jurisdiction. Where the record shows a “factual dispute on a material point which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue,” the court may not grant the motion without first holding a hearing (… see … CPLR 2218). Whether the record gives rise to such a factual dispute is a question of law … .Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v Koukis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01565, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: Here there was a factual dispute on a material issue which had to be decided before the related legal question could be answered. Therefore a hearing was required to resolve the factual issue before the court addressed the legal issue. Whether a factual dispute on a material issue exists raises a question of law.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy