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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASE, CORPORATE OFFICERS PROPERLY SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ motion to dismiss the trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition causes of action was properly denied. The court noted that the complaint properly alleged torts by defendants in their individual capacities without alleging facts supporting piercing the corporate veil. The Second Department held that the judge, sua sponte, should not have granted the preliminary injunction:

” [P]reliminary injunctive relief is a drastic remedy which will not be granted unless a clear right thereto is established under the law and the undisputed facts upon the moving papers, and the burden of showing an undisputed right rests upon the movant'” … . “As a general rule, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” … . “In exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court must determine if the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and (3) a balance of the equities in favor of the injunction” … . ” [A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, a preliminary injunction will not issue where to do so would grant the movant the ultimate relief to which he or she would be entitled in a final judgment'” … .

The plaintiff did not request a preliminary injunction  … [T]he record in this case lacks evidence establishing, among other things, irreparable harm or extraordinary circumstances warranting a preliminary injunction that would, in effect, depart from the status quo and grant the plaintiff its ultimate relief … . The evidence at this stage further fails to demonstrate that the plaintiff possesses a likelihood of success on the merits … . The court therefore improvidently exercised its discretion in sua sponte awarding preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiff. Emanuel Mizrahi, DDS, P.C. v Angela Andretta, DMD, P.C., 2019 NY Slip Op 02315, Second Dept 3-27-19

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DRAWN AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST FATHER BASED UPON FATHER’S FAILURE TO CALL HIS GIRLFRIEND AS A WITNESS WITHOUT FIRST INFORMING FATHER AND GIVING FATHER A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN, ERROR DEEMED HARMLESS HOWEVER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the judge should not have drawn an adverse inference against father for his failure to call his girlfriend as a witness without first informing father and giving father a chance to explain. The error was deemed harmless however:

“A party is entitled to a missing witness charge when the party establishes that an uncalled witness possessing information on a material issue would be expected to provide noncumulative testimony in favor of the opposing party and is under the control of and available to that party” … . “The party seeking a missing witness inference has the initial burden of setting forth the basis for the request as soon as practicable . . . to[, inter alia,] avoid substantial possibilities of surprise” … . Here, in its written decision, “[t]he court sua sponte drew a negative inference based on the [father’s] failure to call [his girlfriend] as a witness, and failed to advise [him] that it intended to do so” … . Thus, the father “lacked the opportunity to explain [his] failure to call [his girlfriend] as a witness, or to discuss whether [his girlfriend] was even available to testify or under [his] control” … . We conclude, however, that the error did not affect the result  … . Matter of Liam M.J. (Cyril M.J.), 2019 NY Slip Op 02207, Fourth Dept 3-22-19

 

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FAMILY COURT DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE, CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASE, MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, sending the matter back to Family Court, determined Family Court did not make the requisite findings of fact in this family offense, custody and visitation case:

… [W]e agree with the father that Family Court failed to adequately set forth its essential findings of fact (see CPLR 4213 [b]; Family Ct Act § 165 [a] …). …[T]he court failed to specify the family offense upon which the order of protection was predicated … . … [T]he court failed to “set forth its analysis of those factors that traditionally affect the best interests of a child, namely, the relative fitness of each party, each parent’s ability to provide for the emotional and intellectual development of the child, the ability to provide financially for the child, the quality of the home environment, the length of time and stability of prior custodial arrangements, [and] the need of a child to reside with siblings[, if any] . . . As a result, we are unable to review [the court’s] ultimate factual finding regarding each of those factors and the weight it placed upon each factor relative to the best interests of the child[ ]” … . Under the circumstances of these cases, we decline to exercise our discretion to make the requisite findings … . Matter of Benson v Smith, 2019 NY Slip Op 02221, Fourth Dept 3-22-19

 

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SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A CONDITIONAL ORDER OF PRECLUSION SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE BEYOND THE PENALTY DESCRIBED IN THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that the sanction imposed for plaintiff’s failure to turn over audio files and transcripts she was apparently relying upon to prove employment discrimination should not have gone beyond the terms of the conditional order of preclusion:

“A conditional order of preclusion requires a party to provide certain discovery by a date certain, or face the sanctions specified in the order” … . ” With this conditioning, the court relieves itself of the unrewarding inquiry into whether a party’s resistance was willful'” … . “When a plaintiff fails to timely comply with a conditional order of preclusion, the conditional order becomes absolute” … .

… [W]here, as here, a conditional order of preclusion specifies a penalty for the failure to comply, absent a change in circumstances, it is inappropriate for the court to impose a harsher penalty … . The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in barring the plaintiff from offering any evidence for any claim premised on the introduction of or which relies on the audio files the plaintiff failed to produce. Instead, the appropriate sanction was the one set forth in the conditional order of preclusion, which precluded the plaintiff from using the audio files and corresponding transcripts at trial unless she produced these items by a date certain, which she failed to do. Felice v Metropolitan Diagnostic Imaging Group, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 02067, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE CITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, NO SUCH MOTION WAS BEFORE THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that Supreme Court should not have searched the record and awarded summary judgment to the city in this sidewalk slip and fall case. No such motion was before the court:

… [T]he Supreme Court should not have, in effect, searched the record and awarded summary judgment to the City, which did not move for such relief. “A court may search the record and grant summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party only with respect to a cause of action or issue that is the subject of the motions before the court” … . Since no party made any motion with respect to the plaintiff’s direct cause of action against the City contained in the amended complaint, the court should not have granted relief with respect to that cause of action … . Cerbone v Lauriano, 2019 NY Slip Op 02056, Second Dept 3-20-29

 

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FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO SUA SPONTE VACATE A CONSENT ORDER IN THIS SUPPORT PROCEEDING, VACATION OF THE CONSENT ORDER AND THE RESULTING COMMITMENT ORDER REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court did have the authority to issue a sua sponte order vacating a consent order:

Upon the father’s admission to a willful violation of the support order and upon the father’s representation that he was employed, an order of disposition was entered upon the parties’ consent, finding the father to be in willful violation of the support order and committing him to a term of incarceration of five months, but suspending his commitment on the condition that he complied with the support order (hereinafter the consent order). Shortly after the consent order was entered, the Family Court received a telephone call, ostensibly from the father’s purported employer, informing the court that the father was not, in fact, employed. The court, over the father’s objection, sua sponte issued an order vacating the consent order (hereinafter the sua sponte order). The court then proceeded to a willfulness hearing, at the conclusion of which it issued the second order of disposition, finding the father to be in willful violation of the support order and directing that he be committed to the Orange County Jail for a period of six months unless he paid the purge amount of $19,839 (hereinafter the commitment order). …

As the father correctly contends, the Family Court lacked authority to issue the sua sponte order vacating the consent order (see CPLR 5019[a]) …). Moreover, the court issued the sua sponte order on the basis of unsworn statements made during a telephone call between the court and the father’s purported employer … . Accordingly, the sua sponte order must be reversed, and the commitment order, which was based in part on the sua sponte order, must be reversed as well. Matter of Schiavone v Mannese, 2019 NY Slip Op 01419, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHEN PLAINTIFF BANK ATTEMPT TO TO BRING PREVIOUSLY FILED PAPERS INTO COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the foreclosure action when plaintiff bank attempted to bring previously filed documents into compliance with subsequent administrative orders:

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal”… . Here, the plaintiff’s counsel attempted to comply, in good faith, with Administrative Orders 548/10 and 431/11 of the Chief Administrative Judge, which did not exist at the time of the commencement of the action, or at the time of the plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference. Under such circumstances, dismissal was not warranted. Nothing in the Administrative Orders requires the dismissal of an action merely because the plaintiff’s counsel discovers that there was some irregularity or defect in a prior submission, nor is the plaintiff effectively required to commence an entirely new action … . JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszlo, 2019 NY Slip Op 01205, Second Dept 2-20-19

 

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TRIAL JUDGE GAVE THE WRONG JURY INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE LIABILITY OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY FOR DAMAGE WHEN THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE COULD EITHER BE A CAUSE COVERED BY THE POLICY OR A CAUSE NOT COVERED BY THE POLICY, THE OVER $1.8 MILLION VERDICT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the over $1.8 million verdict in this property damage case, determined that the trial judge did not give the proper jury instruction. There was evidence that the water damage during Hurricane Sandy could have been caused by  water which backed up in the sewers, which was covered by the police, or surface water, which was not covered by the policy:

“A trial court is required to state the law relevant to the particular facts in issue, and a set of instructions that confuses or incompletely conveys the germane legal principles to be applied in a case requires a new trial” … . Under an all-risk property damage policy, where multiple perils work together to cause the same loss, and one or more of those perils is covered under the policy, New York follows the majority rule such that the loss will be covered if the “proximate, efficient and dominant cause” of the loss is covered by the policy … . By contrast, a minority of jurisdictions adhere to the broader “concurrent cause” rule, under which a loss will be covered “if any one of multiple non-remote causes of the same loss is a non-excluded peril” … .

Here, the Supreme Court’s instruction to the jury misstated the law in that it permitted the jury to find coverage for the plaintiffs’ loss if one or more covered perils acted together with a noncovered peril to cause the same loss, without regard to whether the efficient or dominant cause of the loss was a covered peril under the policy. Since the error may have prejudiced the defendant, a new trial is warranted … . Greenberg v Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch., 2019 NY Slip Op 01202, Second Dept 2-20-19

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED RELIEF WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED IN THE MOTION PAPERS, QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SOME ISSUES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment on some issues in this slip and fall case. The decision addresses too many issues to fairly summarize here. The court noted that Supreme Court should not have granted relief (dismissal of cross-claims) not requested in the motion papers. Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in a delivery area behind defendant Cafe in a plaza owned by defendant Pixley. There was some evidence the Cafe exercised control over at least part of the delivery area (snow removal):

… [W]e conclude that the court erred in granting that part of the Café’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it insofar as the complaint alleges that the Café had constructive notice of the icy condition; the court also erred in denying that part of Pixley’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it insofar as the complaint alleges that Pixley had actual notice of the icy condition. Johnson v Pixley Dev. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 01040, Fourth Dept 2-8-19

 

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A NEGATIVE INFERENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DRAWN BASED UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO TESTIFY, SHE HAD NO FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING FATHER’S PETITION TO MODIFY VISITATION, FATHER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE MODIFICATION WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN, JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FACTUAL FINDINGS, FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined father did not demonstrate a change in circumstances that warranted visitation in his home, supervised by his new wife. The modified visitation was not demonstrated to be in the best interests of the children. The existing visitation arrangement, supervised by grandmother, was long-standing and was working well. In addition, the Fourth Department held that the fact that mother did not testify should not have been the basis of a negative inference. Mother had no knowledge of the circumstances underlying father’s petition:

Family Court erred in drawing a negative inference against [mother] based on her failure to testify at the hearing. The mother had no relevant testimony to offer inasmuch as she had no personal knowledge of the allegations in the modification petition … . Thus, we conclude that a negative inference against the mother was unwarranted because she did not “withhold[] evidence in [her] possession or control that would be likely to support [her] version of the case” … . …

Although the court correctly identified in its decision the applicable standard for modification of an existing custody and visitation order and referenced several circumstances that generally may support a court’s finding of a sufficient change in circumstances, the court failed to make express findings relative to the change in circumstances alleged by the father in his petition. Notwithstanding that failure, “we have the authority to review the record to ascertain whether the requisite change in circumstances existed’ ” … . …

Although the father’s marriage, new home, and diagnosis with sleep apnea are changes that have occurred since the time of the stipulation, those changes to the father’s personal circumstances do not ” reflect[] a real need for change to ensure the best interest[s] of the child[ren]’ ” … . …

… [T]there is no sound and substantial basis in the record to support the court’s determination that the children’s best interests warranted replacing the visitation supervisor, their grandmother, with the father’s new wife and permitting the father to select any location for his visits with the children … . Matter of William F.G. v Lisa M.B., 2019 NY Slip Op 00774, Fourth Dept 2-1-19

 

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