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NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FATHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HARM TO THE CHILD, NEGLECT FINDING VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that a causal connection between father’s mental illness and actual or potential harm to the child (Kyle) had not been demonstrated. The neglect finding was vacated:

While parental neglect may be based on mental illness, proof of a parent’s mental illness alone will not support a finding of neglect … . Rather, the petitioner must adduce evidence sufficient to “establish a causal connection between the parent’s condition, and the actual or potential harm to the [child]”… .

In this case, we agree with the father and the attorney for the children that ACS [Administration for Children’s Services] failed to establish that there was a causal connection between the father’s mental illness and any actual or potential harm to Kyle … . The evidence did not establish that the father’s mental illness, for which he was receiving treatment, precluded him from being able to care for Kyle, or placed Kyle’s physical, mental, or emotional condition in imminent danger of becoming impaired … . Matter of Geoffrey D. (Everton D.), 2018 NY Slip Op 01185, Second Dept 2-21-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, MENTAL ILLNESS, NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FATHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HARM TO THE CHILD, NEGLECT FINDING VACATED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FATHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HARM TO THE CHILD, NEGLECT FINDING VACATED (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL ILLNESS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FATHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HARM TO THE CHILD, NEGLECT FINDING VACATED (SECOND DEPT))

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INABILITY TO AGREE ON CHILD’S RELIGIOUS TRAINING CONSTITUTED A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING THE AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the parents’ inability to agree on the child’s religious training, together with the father’s threat to take to child to Morocco if she were not raised as a “true Muslim,” warranted awarding sole custody to mother:

” In order to modify an existing custody arrangement, there must be a showing of a subsequent change of circumstances so that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child'”… . Here, the parties’ inability to agree on the child’s religious training, which was an issue that had not been addressed in the parties’ July 2009 stipulation of settlement, constituted a change in circumstances. The change in the child’s relationship with the father based on the child’s fear of his displeasure if she were not a “true Muslim,” and her belief that he threatened to abscond with her to Morocco, also contributed to the change in circumstances warranting modification … . …

The evidence established that the only issue on which the parents disagreed was the religion in which the child should be raised and to what degree she should be expected to observe the tenets of each parent’s religion. The award to the mother of sole decision-making authority with respect to religion is in the child’s best interests, and the award of parenting time to each parent on his or her respective religious holidays will continue to allow the child to be exposed to both parents’ religions … . Matter of Baalla v Baalla, 2018 NY Slip Op 01050, Second Dept 2-14-18

FAMILY LAW (CUSTODY, INABILITY TO AGREE ON CHILD’S RELIGIOUS TRAINING CONSTITUTED A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING THE AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, INABILITY TO AGREE ON CHILD’S RELIGIOUS TRAINING CONSTITUTED A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING THE AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER (SECOND DEPT))/RELIGION (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, INABILITY TO AGREE ON CHILD’S RELIGIOUS TRAINING CONSTITUTED A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING THE AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER (SECOND DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should have made the findings to enable the child to petition for special immigrant juvenile state (SIJS):

… [W]here, as here, the Family Court’s credibility determination is not supported by the record, this Court is free to make its own credibility assessments and overturn the determination of the hearing court… . Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with his mother is not a viable option based upon parental neglect. The record reflects that the mother failed to meet the educational needs of the child … . The child testified that, although he was prevented from attending school by gang members who beat him while walking to school, the mother did not arrange for transportation, which was within her financial means, but instead, told him to stay home. Additionally, the child was expelled from one school due to excessive tardiness, and he failed the seventh grade … . Further, the mother did not provide adequate supervision, often leaving the then eight-year-old child home alone at night in the neighborhood where he had encountered the gang violence … . Matter of Dennis X. G. D. V., 2018 NY Slip Op 01073, Second Dept 2-14-18

FAMILY LAW (SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (FAMILY LAW, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS), FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, SET ASIDE AN IN-COURT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN A DIVORCE ACTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF, STIPULATION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the in-court stipulation of settlement in a divorce action should not have been set aside. Neither party requested that the stipulation be set aside:

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, setting aside the stipulation. We agree. Neither the decedent nor the defendant requested that the court set aside the stipulation … . Moreover, stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside. “Only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation” … . Here, the court did not conclude that any of these grounds were present. Estate of Michael Reid v Reid, 2018 NY Slip Op 01044, Second Dept 2-14-18

FAMILY LAW (STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, SET ASIDE AN IN-COURT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN A DIVORCE ACTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF, STIPULATION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (FAMILY LAW, SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, SET ASIDE AN IN-COURT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN A DIVORCE ACTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF, STIPULATION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUA SPONTE, FAMILY LAW, STIPULATIONS, SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, SET ASIDE AN IN-COURT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN A DIVORCE ACTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF, STIPULATION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT))/SUA SPONTE (STIPULATIONS, FAMILIY LAW, SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, SET ASIDE AN IN-COURT STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN A DIVORCE ACTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF, STIPULATION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT))

AMBIGUITY IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WAS RESOLVED BY LANGUAGE IN THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO), THE LANGUAGE IN THE QDRO SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that an ambiguity in the stipulation of settlement involving the supplemental employee retirement plan (SERP) should have been resolved by the language of the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO):

Courts must interpret matrimonial stipulations of settlement using the standards of contract interpretation … . A QDRO can only convey rights agreed upon by the parties in their underlying stipulation of settlement… . Courts “cannot reform an agreement to conform to what it thinks is proper, if the parties have not assented to such a reformation” … . Here, however, the parties assented to a reformation of their stipulation of settlement in a manner that resolves the ambiguity of its SERP [supplemental employee retirement plan] language by mutually consenting to the language of the QDRO that was entered by the Supreme Court … . The QDRO states that the parties “consent[ed] to the submission of th[e] order,” and it was signed by the attorneys representing both parties. The QDRO directed the use of a standard Majauskas formula for dividing, inter alia, the SERP. While the terms of a QDRO must ordinarily yield to the terms of an underlying matrimonial stipulation of settlement or judgment … , here, the circumstances warrant otherwise as the QDRO resolved an ambiguity in the language of the underlying stipulation, and further, was submitted for entry upon the consent of both parties. * * *

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have interpreted the stipulation of settlement in light of the 2002 QDRO, which granted to the plaintiff a one-half share, as per the formula set forth therein, in the subject 401(k) account and SERP as of the date of the retirement of the defendant … . Palaia v Palaia, 2018 NY Slip Op 01076, Second Dept 2-14-18

FAMILY LAW (AMBIGUITY IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WAS RESOLVED BY LANGUAGE IN THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO), THE LANGUAGE IN THE QUDRO SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT (FAMILY LAW, AMBIGUITY IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WAS RESOLVED BY LANGUAGE IN THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO), THE LANGUAGE IN THE QUDRO SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT))/SUPPLEMENTAL EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLAN (SERP) (FAMILY LAW, AMBIGUITY IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WAS RESOLVED BY LANGUAGE IN THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO), THE LANGUAGE IN THE QUDRO SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT))/QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO) (FAMILY LAW, AMBIGUITY IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WAS RESOLVED BY LANGUAGE IN THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (QDRO), THE LANGUAGE IN THE QUDRO SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT))

NEGLECT STEMMING FROM MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS NOT PROVEN, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that neglect based upon mother’s mental illness had not been demonstrated:

… [T]he petitioner failed to establish that the mother received inadequate psychiatric treatment for her mental illness, or that her alleged untreated mental illness placed the child at imminent risk of harm. The evidence demonstrated that the mother, who was homeless at the time that she became pregnant and had relapsed into using heroin just a few months earlier, managed to obtain housing at a shelter for high-risk pregnant women, sought out appropriate prenatal care which included visits with a social worker, maintained compliance with a methadone treatment program which included weekly counseling sessions, and regularly took the psychotropic medications that were being prescribed to her by a licensed psychiatrist. The evidence also indicated that the mother interacted appropriately with the child in the hospital following the child’s birth … . The petitioner failed to present competent medical evidence that the treatment the mother was receiving failed to address her mental health needs or was otherwise improper in light of her mental health history … . Matter of Bella S. (Sarah S.), 2018 NY Slip Op 01069, Second Dept 2-14-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, MENTAL ILLNESS, NEGLECT STEMMING FROM MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS NOT PROVEN, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, NEGLECT STEMMING FROM MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS NOT PROVEN, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL ILLNESS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, NEGLECT STEMMING FROM MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS NOT PROVEN, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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NEGLECT FINDING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence did not support the neglect finding:

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… [W]e agree with the mother that the court erred in determining that she neglected the child inasmuch as the AFC  [attorney for the child] failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the “child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired” as a consequence of the mother’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care … . It is well established that “any impairment to the child[ ] must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the mother to exercise a minimum degree of care toward’ [the child] . . . , rather than what may be deemed undesirable parental behavior’ ” … . “Indeed, the statutory test is minimum degree of care — not maximum, not best, not ideal” … . Here, the court concluded that, “on one hand, [the mother] may simply be a mother determined to protect her child. On the other hand, she may be a woman determined to cause emotional harm to the father of their child. In either case, the consequence of this course of action may be emotional harm to [the child]” (emphasis added). While the record establishes that the mother’s conduct has been troubling at times, “there is no indication in the record that the child was . . . impaired or in imminent danger of impairment of her physical, mental, or emotional condition as a result of any acts committed by [the mother]” … . Matter of Ellie Jo L.H., 2018 NY Slip Op 00934, Fourth Dept 2-9-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT FINDING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLECT (NEGLECT FINDING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT FINDING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have refused to allow a settlement of this child support proceeding by stipulation. The court had directed that father be jailed for six months for failure to pay child support. Mother agreed that the jail sentence should be suspended in return for immediate payment of $3000 and future payments father could make because of a construction job he had just started:

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We agree with the father that the court erred in refusing to allow the parties to enter into the settlement agreement … . “Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside” … . “As a general matter, open court stipulations are especially favored by the courts inasmuch as they promote efficient dispute resolution, timely management of court calendars, and the integrity of the litigation process’ ” …  Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court erred in refusing to allow the parties to settle the matter, and we therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for further proceedings. If the parties no longer wish to settle, we direct the court to hold a new confirmation hearing. Matter of Soldato v Feketa, 2018 NY Slip Op 00989, Fourth Dept 2-9-18

FAMILY LAW (CHILD SUPPORT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT))/CHILD SUPPORT (STIPULATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY COURT, STIPULATION, CHILD SUPPORT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT))/STIPULATION (FAMILY COURT, CHILD SUPPORT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT))/SETTLEMENT (FAMILY COURT, CHILD SUPPORT, STIPULATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING, MOTHER AGREED FATHER’S JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN RETURN FOR FATHER’S AGREEMENT TO PAY (FOURTH DEPT))

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FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Austin, determined Surrogate’s Court properly denied the wife’s (Irene’s) motion to dismiss the husband’s estate’s petition to invalidate Irene’s notice of spousal election. Irene and her husband who had both been married before, signed a prenuptial agreement that they would not make a claim to each other’s estates. There was no question both parties signed the agreement, but essential language was missing from the acknowledgments, taken by their respective attorneys as notaries. Both attorneys submitted affidavits stating that the signers were known to them at the time of signing, the information missing from the acknowledgments.  The question came down to whether, by submitting the prenuptial agreement with the invalid acknowledgments, Irene demonstrated conclusively that the petition could not succeed. The Second Department determined the flaw in the acknowledgments can be cured, and the motion to dismiss was therefore properly denied:

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In Galetta v Galetta (21 NY3d 186), the Court of Appeals left unanswered the question of whether a defective acknowledgment of a prenuptial agreement could be remedied by extrinsic proof provided by the notary public who took a party’s signature. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such proof can remedy a defective acknowledgment. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Surrogate’s Court, which denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss a petition to invalidate her notice of spousal election. Matter of Koegel, 2018 NY Slip Op 00833, Second Dept 2-7-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/NOTARIES (FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (NOTARIES, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, LAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS, FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))

CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, reversing Family Court, determined: (1) the presumption of legitimacy applies to a child born to a same-gender married couple after artificial insemination; (2) the presumption was not rebutted; (3) ordering a paternity test was not in the best interests of the child; and (4) the doctrine of equitable estoppel required the dismissal of the paternity petition. The mother inseminated herself with sperm with the consent of the donor. The parties had agreed the sperm donor waived any claims of paternity and any right to custody or visitation. The facts that the written agreement was destroyed and did not comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law 73 (formalities required for artificial insemination) did not preclude proof of legitimacy by other means. The opinion is comprehensive and too detailed to fairly summarize here:

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While a workable rubric has not yet been developed to afford children the same protection regardless of the gender composition of their parents’ marriage, and the Legislature has not addressed this dilemma, we believe that it must be true that a child born to a same-gender married couple is presumed to be their child and, further, that the presumption of parentage is not defeated solely with proof of the biological fact that, at present, a child cannot be the product of same-gender parents … . If we were to conclude otherwise, children born to same-gender couples would be denied the benefit of this presumption without a compelling justification. * * *

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… [I]nvocation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is warranted here “to protect the status interests of [the] child,” who was born to married parents and thereafter lived with them in a family unit … . While the child, now over three years old, was an infant when the paternity proceeding was commenced, we nonetheless find that petitioner’s representations in donating sperm combined with his delay in asserting parental rights compel against ordering a test. While young, the child’s “image of her family” — consisting of two mothers — would be devastated by an outsider, who merely donated sperm, belatedly asserting parental rights … . Matter of Christopher YY. v Jessica ZZ., 2018 NY Slip Op 00495, Third Dept 1-25-18

FAMILY LAW (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/LEGITIMACY, PRESUMPTION OF (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/PATERNITY (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/SAME-GENDER MARRIAGE (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/PARENTAL RIGHTS (ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))

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