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THE DENIAL OF THE JURY’S REQUEST TO SEE MRI IMAGES ON THE GROUND VIEWING THEM WAS “BEYOND THE KEN” OF THE JURY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the denial of plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict, determined the judge should not have withheld from the jury MRI images on the ground they were “beyond the ken” of the jury:

… [T]he Supreme Court failed to respond meaningfully to the jury’s request to view all of the infant plaintiff’s MRI images during deliberations … . Although the MRI images were admitted into evidence at trial, the court denied the jury’s request to view the MRI images during deliberations on the ground that viewing them was “beyond the ken of a juror.” … [T]he error deprived the plaintiffs of “substantial justice” with respect to the jury’s finding that Halitsky’s departure was not a substantial factor in causing the infant plaintiff’s injury … . Accordingly, the court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as was in favor of Halitsky …. J.T.M. v Parrinello, 2026 NY Slip Op 03787, Second Dept 6-17-26

Practice Point: Here the judge should not have refused the jury’s request to view MRI images which were in evidence on the ground they were “beyond the ken” of the jury.

 

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