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A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined defendants were properly convicted of kidnapping and, under the facts, unlawful imprisonment was not a lesser included offense. The defendants taped the victim’s wrists behind his back, taped his arms to his body, and then transported the victim by car from New York to Philadelphia, where the victim was released at night in a deserted area:

We reject defendants’ argument that a car on a public thoroughfare may not, as a matter of law, be considered “a place where [the victim] is not likely to be found” [within the meaning of the kidnapping statute]  (Penal Law § 135.00  [2]). …

Defendants suggest that a car may only be treated as a place where the victim is “not likely to be found” if (1) the defendant used or threatened to use a weapon to put or keep the victim in the vehicle, (2) the defendant used the vehicle to take the victim to a secluded place, or (3) the victim was not visible to the public within the car. However, neither Penal Law § 135.00(2) nor any case law imposes such requirements of proof. …

Unlawful imprisonment does not qualify here as a lesser included offense of the kidnapping charge, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that defendants unlawfully imprisoned [the victim] but did not kidnap him. People v Grohoske, 2017 NY Slip Op 00617, 1st Dept 1-31-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)/KIDNAPPING (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)/UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)

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JURY-NOTE ERROR REQUIRED REVERSAL; ALL INDICTMENT COUNTS WERE TAINTED BY THE JURY-NOTE ERROR; UNSWORN VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT OF WITNESS PROPERLY ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT CAUSED THE WITNESS’S UNAVAILABILITY.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined (1) there was no evidence the trial judge gave counsel notice and a chance to respond to a jury note, (2) the jury-note error affected all the counts of which defendant was convicted, and (3) the videotaped statement of an unsworn witness was properly admitted based upon proof the witness was unavailable due to defendant’s intentional misconduct:

Here, the jury submitted a note stating, “Please clarify 1st degree assault; 2nd degree assault; 2nd degree manslaughter [and] 2nd degree murder.” The Supreme Court did not read the contents of the note into the record at any point, and there is no record indication that the court communicated to the parties that a jury note had been received. Instead, after a recess for deliberations, the court merely stated “let us revisit these counts,” and then it gave the charges for those offenses. The court’s failure to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a substantive jury note was a mode of proceedings error … , which requires reversal of the judgment and a new trial … . …

When the error at issue relates to a mistake in the court’s charge to the jury, the primary focus is on any effect the error “might have had on the jury’s ability to deliberate fairly on the non-tainted counts, although attention must of course be paid as well to the evidentiary relationship between the tainted counts and the non-tainted counts” … . Reversal is required if “there is a reasonable possibility’ that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its guilty verdict on the remaining counts in a meaningful way'” … . In this case, given the evidentiary relationship between the tainted counts and the weapon possession count, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury’s decision to convict on the other counts did not influence its guilty verdict on the weapon possession count … . …

In a criminal case, the out-of-court statements of a witness may be admitted as direct evidence at trial where, inter alia, the witness is unavailable to testify and proof establishes that the witness’s unavailability was procured by intentional misconduct on the part of the defendant … . People v Thomas, 2017 NY Slip Op 00497, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY-NOTE ERROR REQUIRED REVERSAL, ALL COUNTS TAINTED BY THE JURY-NOTE ERROR, UNSWORN VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT OF WITNESS PROPERLY ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT CAUSED THE WITNESS’S UNAVAILABILITY)/JURY NOTES (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY-NOTE ERROR REQUIRED REVERSAL, ALL COUNTS TAINTED BY THE JURY-NOTE ERROR, UNSWORN VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT OF WITNESS PROPERLY ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT CAUSED THE WITNESS’S UNAVAILABILITY)/EVIDENCE (CRMINAL LAW, UNSWORN VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT OF WITNESS PROPERLY ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT CAUSED THE WITNESS’S UNAVAILABILITY)

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment (intimidating a victim or witness). The court explained the applicable standard of proof:

“Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted—and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence—would warrant conviction'” … . ” Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof” … . ” In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt'” … . “The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes,’ and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference’. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference'” … . People v Franov, 2017 NY Slip Op 00482, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/GRAND JURY (EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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ERRONEOUS SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a dissent, determined the Sandoval ruling erroneously allowed cross examination about a prior crime. The defendant chose not to testify and the proof was deemed far from overwhelming. During the prior crime (robbery) defendant held a knife to the victim’s throat. In the rape trial at issue, it was alleged the defendant held a knife to the victim’s throat:

While we recognize that, under Sandoval and its progeny, the mere similarity of crimes or conduct to the charge for which a defendant stands trial does not automatically preclude inquiry, here, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, a proper balancing of the probative value of the defendant’s prior conduct of placing a knife to the robbery complainant’s neck, in connection with the issue of credibility, against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, should have resulted in a ruling precluding the People’s proposed line of questioning … . Moreover, the error was not harmless … . The proof of the defendant’s guilt was far from overwhelming, and the defendant was the only available source of material testimony in support of his defense (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 378). Inasmuch as the pretrial ruling affected the defendant’s decision whether to testify and denied the jury potentially significant material evidence, the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling cannot be considered harmless … . People v Calderon, 2017 NY Slip Op 00479, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

CRIMINAL LAW (ERRONEOUS SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED REVERSAL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ERRONEOUS SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED REVERSAL)/SANDOVAL (CRIMINAL LAW, ERRONEOUS SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED REVERSAL)

FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined defendant’s conviction for unlawful use of secret scientific information should not have been set aside:

Defendant was formerly employed by Goldman Sachs as a computer programmer. Prior to leaving Goldman to work for a potential competitor, defendant made a digital copy of Goldman’s proprietary computer source code by uploading and saving it to a hard drive of a server located outside the Goldman network. After surreptitiously uploading the source code, defendant transferred copies of it to several of his personal computing devices, and subsequently shared it with his new employer. As a result, defendant was charged with unlawful use of secret scientific material (Penal Law § 165.07). After a jury convicted defendant of this crime, the trial court set aside the verdict.

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether defendant’s actions constitute legally sufficient evidence to establish that he made a “tangible reproduction or representation” of the source code, and did so with the “intent to appropriate . . . [its] use,” within the meaning of the unlawful use statute. We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was legally sufficient as to both of these elements. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate the jury’s verdict and remand the matter for sentencing. People v Aleynikov, 2017 NY Slip Op 00449m 1st Dept 1-24-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL (FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/CODE (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE, FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/COMPUTERS (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE, FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)

SEARCH NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, INJURY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ASSAULT 2ND.

The Second Department, reversing and reducing defendant’s convictions, determined a gun found after the emergency which justified police entry into defendant’s home had abated should have been suppressed. The police forced the door open after receiving a report of an assault with weapons and after learning the defendant had run inside the home. After the defendant was handcuffed and the children secured in a bedroom, the police searched the basement a second time and found the gun. The Second Department also hed the injury suffered by the assault victim was not serious enough to meet the requirements for assault second:

… [W]e agree with the defendant that the hearing court should have suppressed the gun. Although “warrantless entries into a home are presumptively unreasonable'” … , a warrantless search and seizure in a protected area may be lawful under some circumstances pursuant to the emergency doctrine … . The emergency exception “sanctions warrantless searches and seizures in circumstances presenting an immediate danger to life or property” … . “This exception must be narrowly construed because it is susceptible of abuse and may be used to validate an otherwise unlawful arrest or seizure” … . The People have the burden of justifying the warrantless search … . Moreover, the scope and duration of the search must be limited by, and reasonably related to, the exigencies of the situation … .

Here, the initial entry by the police into the defendant’s home and the initial search for occupants and weapons was justified under the emergency doctrine … . However, once the police had the defendant in handcuffs and had secured all of the occupants of the home in the rear bedroom, the emergency had abated … . People v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 00329, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, INJURY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ASSAULT 2ND)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (SEARCH NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)/ASSAULT (INJURY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ASSAULT 2ND)/PHYSICAL INJURY (CRIMINAL LAW, INJURY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ASSAULT 2ND)

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WAIVER OF A-1 FELONY INDICTMENT INVALID, DESPITE GUILTY PLEA, WAIVER OF APPEAL AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR.

The Second Department determined the waiver of indictment, which included an A-1 felony, was invalid. The guilty plea, the waiver of the right to appeal and/or the failure to preserve the error did not preclude appeal of the issue:

CPL 195.10 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] defendant may waive indictment and consent to be prosecuted by superior court information when . . . the defendant is not charged with a class A felony punishable by death or life imprisonment.” Thus, the Court of Appeals has held: “[W]hen an accused is held for Grand Jury action upon a felony complaint that charges a class A felony . . . a waiver of indictment with respect to that felony complaint is unauthorized” … . Here, the felony complaint charged the defendant with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. That crime is a class A-I felony (see Penal Law § 220.21), which is punishable by an indeterminate sentence with a mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment (see Penal Law § 70.00[2][a]). Accordingly, the defendant could not waive indictment and agree to be prosecuted by superior court information … . People v Janelle,2017 NY Slip Op 00188, 2nd Dept 1-11-17

CRIMINAL LAW (WAIVER OF A-1 FELONY INDICTMENT INVALID, DESPITE GUILTY PLEA, WAIVER OF APPEAL AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)/INDICTMENT, WAIVER OF (WAIVER OF A-1 FELONY INDICTMENT INVALID, DESPITE GUILTY PLEA, WAIVER OF APPEAL AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER OF A-1 FELONY INDICTMENT INVALID, DESPITE GUILTY PLEA, WAIVER OF APPEAL AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)

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NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the blood-alcohol test and his statement should not have been granted. Although the police learned the name and phone number of defendant’s counsel before the test was administered, there was no evidence of the source of that information and no evidence counsel “entered” the case such that defendant should have been allowed to talk to his attorney before taking the test. The Second Department offered a concise explanation of the applicable law:

In People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224), the Court of Appeals held in this context that the police “may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and his lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication, if such access does not interfere unduly with the matter at hand” (id. at 227…). The police have no duty to warn a defendant of this limited right before asking the defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test … . Violation of the limited right to consult with counsel will result in suppression of the test results … . * * *

“[A]n attorney enters’ a criminal matter and triggers the indelible right to counsel when the attorney or a professional associate of the attorney notifies the police that the suspect is represented by counsel” (People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 324). Notification given to the police by a third party, such as a member of the defendant’s family, is not sufficient to establish counsel’s entry into the case (see id. at 322 …). Although the holding in Grice related to the triggering of the indelible constitutional right to counsel, we see no reason to apply a less stringent rule for triggering the more limited right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to refuse a blood alcohol test. Indeed, the reasons for applying this clear rule as to entry of counsel for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel …, apply with equal force to the more limited Gursey right. People v Lucifero, 2017 NY Slip Op 00190, 2nd Dept 1-11-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/ATTORNEYS (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST (DWI, (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)

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DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO JURY TRIAL ON MISDEMEANORS, DESPITE POSSIBLE DEPORTATION UPON CONVICTION.

The First Department determined defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on misdemeanor charges, even though conviction might result in deportation:

… “[A] defendant’s right to a jury trial attaches only to serious offenses, not to petty crimes, the determining factor being length of exposure to incarceration” … . “An offense carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less is presumed petty, unless the legislature has authorized additiona… l statutory penalties so severe as to indicate that the legislature considered the offense serious” … . Despite the gravity of the impact of deportation on a convicted defendant (see Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356 [2010]), deportation consequences are still collateral ,,, , and do not render an otherwise petty offense “serious” for jury trial purposes.

Furthermore, under defendant’s approach, in order to decide whether to grant a jury trial to a noncitizen charged with B misdemeanors, the court would need to analyze the immigration consequences of a particular conviction on the particular defendant, and we find this to be highly impracticable. We note that the immigration impact of this defendant’s conviction is unclear. He is already deportable as an undocumented alien, and only claims that the conviction would block any hypothetical effort to legalize his status. People v Suazo,  1st Dept 1-3-172017 NY Slip Op 00030

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO JURY TRIAL ON MISDEMEANORS, DESPITE POSSIBLE DEPORTATION UPON CONVICTION)/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO JURY TRIAL ON MISDEMEANORS, DESPITE POSSIBLE DEPORTATION UPON CONVICTION)/JURY TRIALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO JURY TRIAL ON MISDEMEANORS, DESPITE POSSIBLE DEPORTATION UPON CONVICTION)

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TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA.

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s car should have been granted. The deputy stopped defendant’s car based solely on a temporary inspection sticker without any suspicion of criminal behavior. The court noted that the denial of the suppression motion was appealable because defendant did not waive his right to appeal, and the harmless error standard applied because defendant pled guilty after the motion was denied:

The deputy candidly admitted that he had no idea whether the sticker was valid when he made the stop, nor did he indicate that the temporary sticker gave him any other reason for suspicion. He instead stated that his “general practice” was to stop any vehicle he encountered with a temporary inspection sticker in order to “ensure [that the sticker had] not expired.” It is entirely proper to operate a motor vehicle with a temporary inspection sticker under certain circumstances and, as a result, the display of one does not constitute grounds for a traffic stop absent a “specific articulable basis” to believe that illegality is afoot … . The practice of stopping any vehicle with a temporary inspection sticker, without more, represents impermissible “idle curiosity” as to the sticker’s validity rather than the “reasonable suspicion” of illegality needed to effect a traffic stop … . People v Driscoll, 2016 NY Slip Op 08902, 3rd Dept 12-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)/STREET STOPS (TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, TEMPORARY INSPECTION STICKER NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY TRAFFIC STOP, DRUGS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD APPLIES TO APPEALS AFTER A GUILTY PLEA)

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