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NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the blood-alcohol test and his statement should not have been granted. Although the police learned the name and phone number of defendant’s counsel before the test was administered, there was no evidence of the source of that information and no evidence counsel “entered” the case such that defendant should have been allowed to talk to his attorney before taking the test. The Second Department offered a concise explanation of the applicable law:

In People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224), the Court of Appeals held in this context that the police “may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and his lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication, if such access does not interfere unduly with the matter at hand” (id. at 227…). The police have no duty to warn a defendant of this limited right before asking the defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test … . Violation of the limited right to consult with counsel will result in suppression of the test results … . * * *

“[A]n attorney enters’ a criminal matter and triggers the indelible right to counsel when the attorney or a professional associate of the attorney notifies the police that the suspect is represented by counsel” (People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 324). Notification given to the police by a third party, such as a member of the defendant’s family, is not sufficient to establish counsel’s entry into the case (see id. at 322 …). Although the holding in Grice related to the triggering of the indelible constitutional right to counsel, we see no reason to apply a less stringent rule for triggering the more limited right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to refuse a blood alcohol test. Indeed, the reasons for applying this clear rule as to entry of counsel for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel …, apply with equal force to the more limited Gursey right. People v Lucifero, 2017 NY Slip Op 00190, 2nd Dept 1-11-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/ATTORNEYS (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST (DWI, (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, DWI, NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS LIMITED RIGHT TO SPEAK TO COUNSEL BEFORE TAKING BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST, SUPPRESSION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, APPLICABLE LAW EXPLAINED)

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