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BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP).

Defendant was convicted in town court of criminal contempt stemming from anti-drone protests at Hancock Field, an Air National Guard base. The town court proceedings were recorded electronically and no stenographer was present. The defendant filed a notice of appeal, but did not file an affidavit of errors. County Court heard the appeal and reduced defendant’s sentence from one year to six months. The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined County Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because an affidavit of errors was not filed. However, because defendant had moved for an extension of time to file the affidavit of errors should the transcript of the electronic recording be deemed insufficient (never ruled on by County Court), the matter was sent back to County Court:

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Criminal Procedure Law § 460.10 requires an appellant to file an affidavit of errors with the criminal court in order to take an appeal from a judgment of a local criminal court if the underlying proceedings were not recorded by a court stenographer. We have already held that the filing of the affidavit of errors in this circumstance is a jurisdictional prerequisite … . …[W]e conclude that the failure to file the required affidavit of errors renders the intermediate appellate court without jurisdiction to hear the case. People v Flores, 2017 NY Slip Op 08037, CtApp 11-16-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP))/AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP))/TOWN COURT (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP))/COUNTY COURT (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, TOWN COURT, BECAUSE NO AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS WAS FILED AFTER A CONVICTION IN TOWN COURT, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL (CT APP))

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WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).

The majority, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined whether the search of a vehicle after a street stop was valid presented a mixed question of law and fact that was not reviewable by the Court of Appeals:

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From the dissent:

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… [W]here the issue presented is whether the People have demonstrated “the minimum showing necessary” to establish the legality of police conduct, “a question of law is presented for [our] review” … .

Accepting the facts as found by the Appellate Division and the suppression court, which are not disputed here, the People failed to adduce the minimum showing required to justify a protective search of defendant’s vehicle — namely, a substantial likelihood of the presence of a weapon and an actual and specific threat to officer safety. I, therefore, disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the question of whether the protective search was lawful is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable only for record support, and I would hold that the search of defendant’s vehicle was unlawful. People v Hardee, 2017 NY Slip Op 08038, CtApp 11-16-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH, WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT OF APPEALS,  WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))/MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, COURT OF APPEALS, WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))/STREET STOPS (SEARCH, WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, COURT OF APPEALS, WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))/PROTECTIVE SEARCH (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOPS, APPEALS, COURT OF APPEALS, WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP))

DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT WHEN, IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO VACATE BECAUSE THE PERIOD OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS NOT MENTIONED AT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING, THE COURT IMPOSES A SENTENCE WITHOUT A PERIOD OF PRS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the appellate division, determined a defendant has a right to be present when, after moving to vacate the sentence because the period of post-release supervision (PRS) was not mentioned, the sentencing court imposes the original sentence without a period of PRS:

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There is only one enumerated exception to the statute where the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor or petty offense, on motion of the defendant the court may sentence the defendant in absentia (CPL 380.40 [2]). We have also previously held that a defendant convicted of a felony may waive the right to be present at sentencing, provided that the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent … . However, absent such a waiver — or a forfeiture of the right to be present … — … “[t]here is no statutory basis for [a] [futility] exception” … .

Here, the Appellate Division concluded that there was no reason to remand the case because [defendant] was not adversely affected by his re-imposed sentence, citing People v Covington(88 AD3d 486, 486 [1st Dept 2011]), and People v Mills (117 AD3d at 1556). The majority in Mills cited CPL 470.15 [1] for the proposition that the Appellate Division cannot consider a sentence that did not “adversely affect[] the appellant.” CPL 470.15 (1) says, “Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant.” Here, as there was no voluntary waiver, [defendant’s] absence from the sentencing proceeding was in itself, under our precedents, an error as it constitutes a violation of his right under CPL 380.40. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. People v Estremera, 2017 NY Slip Op 08036, CtApp 11-16-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING, DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT WHERE, IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO VACATE BECAUSE THE PERIOD OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS NOT MENTIONED AT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING, THE COURT IMPOSES A SENTENCE WITHOUT A PERIOD OF PRS (CT APP))/SENTENCING (DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT WHERE, IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO VACATE BECAUSE THE PERIOD OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS NOT MENTIONED AT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING, THE COURT IMPOSES A SENTENCE WITHOUT A PERIOD OF PRS (CT APP))/POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (SENTENCING, DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT WHERE, IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO VACATE BECAUSE THE PERIOD OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS NOT MENTIONED AT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING, THE COURT IMPOSES A SENTENCE WITHOUT A PERIOD OF PRS (CT APP))

DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to vacate his judgment of conviction (by guilty plea) should not have been denied without a hearing. Defendant presented evidence he would not have pled guilty had he known his state and federal sentences would not run concurrently:

 

A hearing will be appropriate where a defendant comes forward with “allegations that raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to challenge the presumed validity of a judgment of conviction” … . Here, as the People concede, the evidence submitted by the defendant was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he believed, prior to pleading guilty, based on the advice of his attorney, that his state sentence would run concurrent with his federal sentence and whether he would have rejected the plea agreement in the absence of concurrent sentences … . People v Oquendo, 2017 NY Slip Op 08018, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/CONVICTION, MOTION TO VACATE  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))

THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined firing 13 shots from a rooftop into a group of people, killing one and wounding two, resulting in a murder and two assault convictions, were not separate events which would support consecutive sentences:

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Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant’s acts underlying the crimes were separate and distinct. Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment was improper … . People v Lopez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08016, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))

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GRAND JURY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR FILING CHARGES, INSTRUMENTS WERE PREPARED FOR A PRIVATE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE COUNTY, COUNTY COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the “offering a false instrument for filing” charges should not have been dismissed based upon the evidence presented to the grand jury. Defendant was a county employee who worked with a private company (Casella)  which managed a land fill under a contract with the county. The documents in question were submitted by the defendant to Casella. County Court found that the documents were submitted to a private party, not the government. The Fourth Department disagreed, finding a sufficient relationship between Casella and the county to support the charges:

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“The essential elements of the crime of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree . . . are (1) knowledge that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, (2) intent to defraud the State or any political subdivision thereof, and (3) offering or presenting such instrument to a public office or public servant with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed” … . The term “public servant” is defined as “(a) any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any governmental instrumentality within the state, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee” … .

Here, we agree with the People that the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Casella, in accepting the reports from defendant for purposes of complying with the County’s permit issued by the State, was “not acting as a private concern” but rather was exercising a governmental function as an agent of the County … , and thus was acting as a public servant within the meaning of the statute. In addition, we conclude that the evidence before the grand jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the People… , was sufficient to allow the grand jury to infer that defendant intended to defraud the County by submitting reports with fabricated information while still receiving a salary as a County employee … . People v Rafferty, 2017 NY Slip Op 07797, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GRAND JURY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR FILING CHARGES, INSTRUMENTS WERE PREPARED FOR A PRIVATE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE COUNTY, COUNTY COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR FILING CHARGES, INSTRUMENTS WERE PREPARED FOR A PRIVATE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE COUNTY, COUNTY COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR FILING (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR FILING CHARGES, INSTRUMENTS WERE PREPARED FOR A PRIVATE COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE COUNTY, COUNTY COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department ordered a new trial on the assault and unlawful imprisonment charges and reached a prosecutorial misconduct issue in the interest of justice (error not preserved). The prosecutorial misconduct, referring to evidence (a bloody t-shirt) which had been destroyed, was not deemed reversible. The Fourth Department found that a jury instruction on assault allowed the jury to consider a theory about how the victim was injured which was not charged in the indictment. Such an error affects the fundamental right to be tried only on what has been charged and need not be preserved. The Fourth Department also found that the evidence supported both the charged and a lesser included unlawful imprisonment offenses. The judge’s refusal to charge the jury on the lesser included was reversible error:

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… [The] conviction of assault in the second degree must be reversed because Supreme Court’s instruction created the possibility that the jury convicted him upon a theory different from the one charged in the indictment. … As a preliminary matter, we reject the People’s contention that defendant was required to preserve his contention for our review. It is well settled that ” defendant has a “fundamental and nonwaivable” right to be tried only on the crimes charged’ ” … . With respect to the merits of defendant’s contention, “[w]here the court’s jury instruction on a particular count erroneously contains an additional theory that differs from the theory alleged in the indictment, as limited by the bill of particulars, and the evidence adduced at trial could have established either theory, reversal of the conviction on that count is required because there is a possibility that the jury could have convicted the defendant upon the uncharged theory” … . We may not apply harmless error analysis to such an error because it would be impossible to determine whether the jury based its guilty verdict on the uncharged theory … . People v Barber, 2017 NY Slip Op 07807, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL LAW, JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES  (JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER UNCHARGED OFFENSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DESTROYED (FOURTH DEPT))

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PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined that defendant, during the plea colloquy, raised a mental health issue that was not adequately addressed by the judge. Because the issue was raised in the colloquy, it was appealable despite the lack of preservation:

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… [D]efendant acknowledged during the plea colloquy that he had mental health problems, including posttraumatic stress disorder that caused him to experience hallucinations, that he heard a voice telling him to commit the crime at issue and that he was taking multiple medications, including Zoloft, to address his mental health problems. Although County Court observed that defendant appeared coherent and responsive during the plea proceedings, it did not ascertain if he was aware that a possible defense, emanating from his mental state at the time that he committed the crime, was available and that he was waiving it by pleading guilty. Inasmuch as an essential element of attempted burglary in the third degree is the intent to commit a crime inside a building that one has unlawfully entered … , and defendant’s mental state potentially negated such intent, County Court should have conducted a further inquiry before accepting defendant’s guilty plea… . Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, we find that the guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent and must be vacated. People v Rogers, 2017 NY Slip Op 07889, Third Dept 11-9-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GUILTY PLEA, PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA (PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/COLLOQUY (CRIMINAL LAW,  PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/MENTAL HEALTH (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, PLEA COLLOQUY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH, NARROW EXCEPTION TO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT ALLOWED ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))

STREET STOP JUSTIFIED, FACTS AND LAW EXPLAINED IN DETAIL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in finding the street stop of defendant was justified, provided a useful, detailed discussion of the facts and the law (too detailed to summarize here):

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… [W]e agree with the People that the officer had at least the requisite founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and thus that his initial approach of defendant was proper under level two.

When defendant then immediately fled, the officer pursued him, which was a level three intrusion requiring reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was committing a crime. “In determining whether a pursuit was justified by reasonable suspicion, the emphasis should not be narrowly focused on . . . any . . . single factor, but [rather should be based] on an evaluation of the totality of circumstances, which takes into account the realities of everyday life unfolding before a trained officer” … . We also note that, although “flight alone is insufficient to justify pursuit, defendant’s flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit’ ” … . Here, we agree with the People that the specific information known to the officer, coupled with the officer’s observations of defendant’s actions, furtive behavior, and immediate flight, gave the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was engaged in criminal activity, thereby justifying the officer’s pursuit, detainment, and search of defendant.  People v Jones, 2017 NY Slip Op 07808, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (STREET STOP JUSTIFIED, FACTS AND LAW EXPLAINED IN DETAIL (FOURTH DEPT))/STREET STOPS (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOP JUSTIFIED, FACTS AND LAW EXPLAINED IN DETAIL (FOURTH DEPT))

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SECTION EIGHT HOUSING SUBSIDIES ARE NOT ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THEREFORE A WELFARE FRAUD PROSECUTION CANNOT BE BASED UPON SECTION EIGHT BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s welfare fraud conviction, determined the statute required that the fraud involve a program administered by the department of social services. Here the fraud involved the federal section eight housing subsidy program, which was not administered by the department of social services:

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… [D]efendant’s interpretation of the statutory definition of public assistance benefits is supported by the legislative history of the statute, which shows that it was enacted primarily to combat Medicaid fraud … , and Medicaid benefits are administered by the department of social services or social services district. In addition, we note that the People’s interpretation of the statute would extend its reach beyond its intended meaning to include any “money, property or services provided directly or indirectly through programs of the federal government,” without qualification … For example, under the People’s interpretation, veteran’s benefits would be “money, property or services” falling within the definition of “[p]ublic assistance benefits” … , but it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended the improper receipt of such benefits to be considered welfare fraud.

We conclude that both [the People’s and defendant’s] interpretations of the statute are plausible. In such situations, the rule of lenity applies and we must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is more favorable to defendant … . The People were therefore required to establish that the Section 8 funds were “administered by the department of social services” … , which they failed to do. People v Davis, 2017 NY Slip Op 07800, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SECTION EIGHT HOUSING SUBSIDIES ARE NOT ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THEREFORE A WELFARE FRAUD PROSECUTION CANNOT BE BASED UPON SECTION EIGHT BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT))/WELFARE FRAUD (CRIMINAL LAW, SECTION EIGHT HOUSING SUBSIDIES ARE NOT ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THEREFORE A WELFARE FRAUD PROSECUTION CANNOT BE BASED UPON SECTION EIGHT BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT)))/SECTION EIGHT (CRIMINAL LAW, WELFARE FRAUD, SECTION EIGHT HOUSING SUBSIDIES ARE NOT ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THEREFORE A WELFARE FRAUD PROSECUTION CANNOT BE BASED UPON SECTION EIGHT BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT))

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