Constitutional Law – Page 21 – New York Appellate Digest

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Family Law

THE MAJORITY HELD THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED MOTHER’S APPEAL OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING MOTHER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING HER CUSTODY/HABEAS CORPUS PETITION STEMMING FROM THE OUT-OF-STATE FATHER’S FAILURE TO RETURN THE CHILDREN; THE MAJORITY SENT THE CASE BACK TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE STANDING ISSUE; THREE DISSENTERS ARGUED FAMILY COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION BECAUSE NO CUSTODY ORDER WAS IN PLACE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a three-judge comprehensive dissent, determined the Appellate Division erred when it refused to consider mother’s appeal of the denial of her habeas corpus petition seeking the return of her children. The children visited father out-of-state and one of them was not allowed to return. The Appellate Division erred when it found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction for the appeal. The matter was sent back for consideration of mother’s standing to bring the habeas corpus petition. The dissenters argued the habeas corpus petition was erroneously dismissed by Family Court on the ground that mother did not have standing because there was no custody order in place for the children. But the majority wanted the development of a record on the standing issue:

… Family Court denied the mother’s applications both for sole custody and habeas corpus relief. As the parties who have appeared before us agree, the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the mother’s ensuing appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By dismissing the appeal upon a motion, and upon an undeveloped record, without full briefing and without providing all parties the opportunity to appear, the Appellate Division has rendered impossible meaningful appellate review of the weighty issues raised in this case. To the extent that the Appellate Division’s order on the motion to dismiss could be read, as the dissenters read it, to be a determination that the mother lacked standing to seek habeas corpus relief without an order of custody in place, the issue of standing did not impact the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Division … . Regardless of whether that Court had the “power to reach the merits,” an issue on which we express no opinion, the Court did not lack the “competence to entertain” the appeal … . Therefore, we remit to the Appellate Division for an expeditious determination on the merits of the standing question presented herein and, if warranted, disposition of any other issues that the parties may raise. Matter of Celinette H.H. v Michelle R., 2023 NY Slip Op 05303, CtApp 10-19-23

Practice Point: The majority held the Appellate Division should not have refused to consider mother’s appeal on the ground she did not have standing to bring her custody/habeas corpus petition. The Appellate Division did not lack subject matter jurisdiction. The matter was sent back for a ruling on the standing question.

October 19, 2023

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE OF SOME OF THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY COUNTY COURT FOR THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT; THE MATTER WAS REMANDED FOR A NEW HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined defendant was not given notice of some of the grounds County Court relied upon for an upward departure re: defendant’s SORA risk-level assessment. That constituted a violation of defendant’s right to due process:

While … defendant [was] on notice that his persistent sexually-motivated criminal conduct would be relied upon by the People as a factor for upward departure, there is no similar indication that his concurrent conviction for failure to register along with the facts underlying his juvenile delinquency adjudication would be considered … . … “[D]efendant was entitled to a sufficient opportunity to consider and muster evidence in opposition to the request for an upward departure” on the specific bases upon which the People, and consequently County Court, would rely in considering that relief … . … [T]the matter must be remanded for a new hearing, upon proper notice to defendant of the justifications relied upon by the People specific to their request for such relief. People v Maurer, 2023 NY Slip Op 05290, Third Dept 10-19-23

Practice Point: Due process requires that a defendant be notified of all of the evidence which will be relied upon by the People and the court for a SORA risk assessment.

October 19, 2023

Constitutional Law, Contract Law, Debtor-Creditor, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

CASE REMITTED FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUARANTY LAW WHICH WAS FOUND TO HAVE BARRED PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR CERTAIN AMOUNTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department sent this case back for a determination whether guarantees at issue are constitutional:

In view of the recent decision in Melendez v City of New York (2023 WL 2746183, 2023 US Dist LEXIS 57050 [SD NY, Mar. 31, 2023, No. 20-CV-5301 (RA)] finding the guaranty law unconstitutional, we remand the constitutional question raised by the parties here so the parties can further develop the record in the trial court for the purpose of applying the Contracts Clause test for constitutionality … . Plaintiff is directed to serve notice on nonparty City of New York under CPLR 1012(b)(2) and file proof of service in order for the City to “intervene in support of its constitutionality” … .

Given the vitality of the constitutional question, we also reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for those amounts the court determined were barred by the guaranty law for a determination following the court’s resolution of the constitutional issue. 45-47-49 Eighth Ave. LLC v Conti, 2023 NY Slip Op 05180, First Dept 10-12-23

Practice Point: Supreme Court had held plaintiff’s claim to certain amounts was barred by the guaranty law. A federal court has held the guaranty law unconstitutional. This matter was sent back for a determination of the constitutional question.

October 12, 2023

Constitutional Law, Religion

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO RELIGIOUS ENTITIES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THEREFORE COURTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ADJUDICATING THE MATTER BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dispute between plaintiff church and defendant, which has some form of supervisory authority over plaintiff church, could not be adjudicated in a court pursuant to the First Amendment:

“The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs . . . Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution” … .

We conclude that none of the relief requested by plaintiff in its complaint may be decided by a court based on neutral principles of law … . Instead, resolution of those issues would “necessarily involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice” … . United Church of Friendship v New York Dist. of Assemblies of God, 2023 NY Slip Op 05090, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: Where the resolution of a dispute between religious entities requires a court to inquire into religious doctrine or practice, the First Amendment prohibits court involvement.

October 6, 2023

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Election Law

THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION SUBMIT A SECOND VOTING-DISTRICT REDISTRICTING PLAN AFTER THE REJECTION OF THE FIRST (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) was required by statute to submit a second voting-district redistricting plan after the rejection of the first. The opinion provides a detailed analysis of the constitutional, legislative and administrative measures taken to reform the manner in which voting-district maps are drawn:

The IRC had an indisputable duty under the NY Constitution to submit a second set of maps upon the rejection of its first set (see NY Const, art III, § 4 [b]). The language of NY Constitution, article III, § 4 makes clear that this duty is mandatory, not discretionary. It is undisputed that the IRC failed to perform this duty. Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commission, 2023 NY Slip Op 03828, Third Dept 7-13-23

Practice Point: The constitutional, statutory and regulatory requirements for the approval of a voting-district redistricting plan are explained in depth.

July 13, 2023

Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO AN ACCOMPLICE’S TESTIMONY ABOUT THE GUILTY PLEA ENTERED BY A NON-TESTIFYING PARTICIPANT IN THE SHOOTING (DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT A WITNESS AGAINST HIM); DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT REQUEST THE ACCOMPLICE JURY INSTRUCTION (WHICH REQUIRES CORROBORATION OF THE ACCOMPLICE’S TESTIMONY) OR THE MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. An accomplice, Brenda, testified that another accomplice, Roberto, had pled guilty for his role in the shooting and Roberto’s cooperation agreement was placed in evidence with Brenda on the stand. Brenda also testified that defendant made incriminating statements after the shooting. Although the prosecution had informed defense counsel Roberto would be called as a witness, Roberto was not called. Defendant was therefore deprived of right to confront Roberto. In addition, the accomplice jury instruction was not requested or given and the missing witness jury instruction was not requested or given:

… [D]efense counsel failed to object to evidence elicited by the People pertaining to the guilty plea of Roberto, a nontestifying alleged accomplice, including the introduction into evidence of the cooperation agreement in which Roberto agreed to give “meaningful and truthful information” concerning the shooting. The admission of this evidence violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him … . * * *

… [D]efense counsel failed to request either an accomplice-in-law or accomplice-in-fact jury instruction with respect to Brenda’s testimony. Since accomplice testimony is “marked by obvious self-interest,” a defendant “‘may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of such offense'” … . * * *

… [D]efense counsel failed to timely request a missing witness charge … . People v Alvarenga, 2023 NY Slip Op 03704, Second Dept 7-5-23

Practice Point: Defense counsel was deemed ineffective (1) for failing to assert defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him when an accomplice testified about a non-testifying participant in the shooting, (2) for failing to request the accomplice jury instruction, and (3) in failing to request the missing witness jury instruction.

July 5, 2023

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE STATUTE PROHIBITING SEX OFFENDERS FROM BEING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF SCHOOL GROUNDS AS APPLIED TO SEX OFFENDERS CONVICTED BEFORE THE STATUTE WENT INTO EFFECT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE; HERE PETITIONER WAS INCARCERATED PAST HIS PAROLE DATE BECAUSE HOUSING WHICH COMPLIED WITH THE SCHOOL GROUNDS LAW COULD NOT BE FOUND (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, three judges dissenting, determined the statute (Executive Law 259-c [14]) prohibiting sex offenders from being within 1000 feet of school grounds as applied to sex offenders who were convicted before the statute went into effect does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the US Constitution. Here the application of the statute resulted in petitioner remaining incarcerated past his parole release date because housing which met the school-grounds requirement could not be found:

The United States Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits states from “retroactively alter[ing] the definition of crimes or increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts” … . The ex post facto prohibition “applies only to penal statutes” and “where the challenged statute does not seek to impose a punishment, it does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause” … . * * *

We are unable to conclude from this record that prolonged incarceration is a common result of Executive Law § 259-c (14), rather than an idiosyncratic effect, and the Supreme Court has “expressly disapproved of evaluating the civil nature of [a statute] by reference to the effect that [statute] has on a single individual” … . Petitioner has failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating, by the clearest proof, that the effects of Executive Law § 259-c (14) are “so punitive . . . as to negate [the legislature’s] intention to deem it civil” … . People ex rel. Rivera v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 2023 NY Slip Op 03299, CtApp 6-15-23

Practice Point: Here petitioner remained incarcerated past his parole release date because housing which complied with the school-grounds statute (prohibiting sex offenders from being within 1000 feet of school grounds) could not be found. Even though petitioner was convicted before the school-grounds statute was enacted, the majority concluded the statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. There were three dissenting judges.

June 15, 2023

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law

ELECTRONIC LOGGING DEVICES (ELD’S) WHICH KEEP TRACK OF COMMERCIAL TRUCKERS’ LOCATION, HOURS OF OPERATION AND MILES DO NOT FACILITATE UNREASONABLE SEARCHES; THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY IS HEAVILY REGULATED AND THE ELD’S AIM TO PREVENT DRIVER FATIGUE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the electronic logging devices (ELD’s) which record the location, engine hours and mileage of commercial motor vehicles (CMV’s) do not facilitate unreasonable searches, The commercial trucking industry has been regulated for decades to prevent accidents due to drivers’ fatigue and the ELD’s contribute to that end:

Before us is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration requiring the installation of electronic logging devices in commercial motor vehicles. We hold that the warrantless inspections authorized by the regulations fall within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement and do not constitute unreasonable searches and seizures under article I, § 12 of the State Constitution. * * *

… [P]etitioners correctly concede that there is a long tradition of commercial trucking being subject to comprehensive regulations. Regulation of commercial trucking, including regulation of “the maximum hours of service for commercial drivers,” extends back more than eighty years both in New York and on the federal level … . Those regulations are in keeping with this State’s “vital and compelling interest in safety on the public highways” … .

CMV operators therefore have “a diminished expectation of privacy in the conduct of that business because of the degree of governmental regulation” … , and “may reasonably be deemed to have relinquished a privacy-based objection” to an “intrusion that will foreseeably occur incident” to applicable regulations … . More particularly, … commercial truck drivers have a diminished expectation of privacy in the location of their vehicles because of their participation in a pervasively regulated industry. Matter of Owner Operator Ind. Drivers Assn., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Transp., 2023 NY Slip Op 03184, CtApp 6-13-23

Practice Point: Electronic Logging Devices (ELD”s) which keep track of the location, hours of operation and mileage of commercial trucks aim to prevent driver fatigue and do not facilitate unreasonable searches.

June 13, 2023

Constitutional Law, Municipal Law, Real Property Tax Law

THE CITY OF OGDENSBURG PROPERLY PASSED A LOCAL LAW REPEALING A PRIOR LOCAL LAW WHICH OPTED OUT OF THE RPTL ARTICLE 11 PROVISIONS FOR DELINQUENT REAL ESTATE TAX COLLECTION; THE COUNTY’S ARGUMENT THAT THE LOCAL LAW UNLAWFULLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF TAX COLLECTION TO THE COUNTY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS REJECTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the Local Law which repealed a prior Local Law in which the City of Ogdensburg opted out of the application of RPTL Article 11 (regarding the collection of delinquent real estate taxes) was not unconstitutional. The county argued repeal of the local law unlawfully shifted the burden of delinquent tax collection to the county and the school district. That argument was rejected:

Inasmuch as the County has no powers with respect to taxation that are not “unambiguously delegated” to it by the legislature or the Constitution … and the legislature has chosen to limit a county’s ability to enter into RPTL 1150 (1) agreements by making such agreement permissive rather than mandatory, it cannot be said that the City impaired the County’s power by doing as the legislature permits it to do under RPTL article 11. Therefore, we conclude that Local Law No. 2 does not violate the statutory and constitutional protections at issue, but effectuates a power the legislature granted to cities wishing to revoke their initial opt-out from article 11. Matter of St. Lawrence County v City of Ogdensburg, 2023 NY Slip Op 02757, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: A city can opt out of the RPTL Article 11 provisions re: delinquent real estate tax collection, and it can later opt back in. Here the county’s argument that the city’s opting back in unlawfully shifted the tax collection burden to the county and school district was rejected.

May 23, 2023

Constitutional Law, Foreclosure, Municipal Law, Real Property Tax Law

ALTHOUGH THERE IS MERIT TO THE DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT THEY WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION IN THESE TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WHERE THEIR PROPERTIES WERE TRANSFERRED TO NEIGHBORHOOD RESTORE UNDER NYC’S THIRD PARTY TRANSFER PROGRAM, THE DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO ANSWER IN THE TAX FORECLOSURE ACTIONS AND THEIR FAILURE TO REDEEM WITHIN FOUR MONTHS PRECLUDED ANY RECOVERY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Wooten, determined the tax foreclosures on defendants’ properties were valid and the transfer of the properties under New York City’s Third Party Transfer Program (TPT program) was proper. The court noted that, under the current procedure, property worth $2 million could be lost for nonpayment of a small water bill and the owner would receive no compensation. Here the city demonstrated it fulfilled the tax-foreclosure notification requirements and defendants did not answer and did not attempt to redeem the property within the four-month redemption period:

… [T]he defendants’ motions were time-barred due to their failure to move to vacate the judgment of foreclosure or to take any action to redeem the subject properties within the four-month redemption period … . In light of the presumption of regularity created by the entry of the judgment of foreclosure against the subject properties (see Administrative Code § 11-411), which became conclusive four months after the entry of the judgment …, there is no basis to consider the defendants’ contentions that the subject properties were not distressed … . Further, this Court has held that where, as here, the defendant property owners failed to interpose a timely answer or to redeem the property during the four-month period following the entry of the judgment of foreclosure, they are not entitled to “compensation” for any “surplus money as a result of the foreclosure and transfer of the property” under the TPT program … . Thus, while we emphasize that there is potential merit to the defendants’ contentions that they were deprived of their properties without just compensation, and that the transfer of a property which was not distressed under the TPT program was improper, we are constrained to conclude that those issues are not reviewable by this Court under the circumstances presented. Matter of Tax Foreclosure Action No. 53, 2023 NY Slip Op 02711, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: The court acknowledged that the city’s transfer of defendants’ properties to Neighborhood Restore under NYC’s Third Party Transfer program may have deprived defendants of just compensation for the taking of their properties, the fact that defendants did not answer in the tax foreclosure proceedings and did not attempt to redeem the properties within the four-month redemption period precluded any recovery.

May 17, 2023

DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE OF SOME OF THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY COUNTY COURT FOR THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT; THE MATTER WAS REMANDED FOR A NEW HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

CASE REMITTED FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUARANTY LAW WHICH WAS FOUND TO HAVE BARRED PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR CERTAIN AMOUNTS (FIRST DEPT).

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO RELIGIOUS ENTITIES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THEREFORE COURTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ADJUDICATING THE MATTER BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION SUBMIT A SECOND VOTING-DISTRICT REDISTRICTING PLAN AFTER THE REJECTION OF THE FIRST (THIRD DEPT).

ELECTRONIC LOGGING DEVICES (ELD’S) WHICH KEEP TRACK OF COMMERCIAL TRUCKERS’ LOCATION, HOURS OF OPERATION AND MILES DO NOT FACILITATE UNREASONABLE SEARCHES; THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY IS HEAVILY REGULATED AND THE ELD’S AIM TO PREVENT DRIVER FATIGUE (CT APP).

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