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FORENSIC EVIDENCE OF COMPLAINANT’S SEXUAL ACTIVITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER THE RAPE SHIELD LAW; DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO PUT ON A DEFENSE WAS VIOLATED; TWO-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lynch, reversing the Appellate Division, determined forensic evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity should not have been excluded pursuant to the Rape Shield Law. Under the circumstances, by excluding forensic evidence of sexual activity which did not implicate the defendant deprived defendant of the right to present a defense. The complainant alleged defendant inserted his finger in her vagina and fondled her breasts. A forensic analysis of a vaginal swab and complainant’s underwear revealed the presence of complainant’s saliva and fluids from two unidentified males:

… [T]he legislature enumerated five exceptions to CPL 60.42’s [the Rape Shield Law’s] evidentiary proscriptions. The first four exceptions “allow evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in narrowly defined factual circumstances,” whereas the fifth “is a broader ‘interest of justice’ provision vesting discretion in the trial court” (Williams, 81 NY2d at 311). “The exceptions . . . recognize that any law circumscribing the ability of the accused to defend against criminal charges remains subject to limitation by constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses” … .

Defendant argues that the forensic evidence was admissible under several of the exceptions set forth in CPL 60.42. We need not address every basis raised because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying admission of the evidence under CPL 60.42 (5). Under this subdivision, evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct may be admitted in evidence during a sex crime prosecution when it “is determined by the [trial] court after an offer of proof by the accused . . . to be relevant and admissible in the interests of justice” (CPL 60.42 [5]). “Offer of proof is not a term of art but its generally accepted meaning . . . is to summarize the substance or content of the evidence” … . In his motion in limine, defense counsel delineated the findings contained in the forensic reports and explained how they constituted “evidence of something other than . . . defendant having engaged in inappropriate and unlawful sexual activity with [the complainant].” This was a sufficient offer of proof under Williams (81 NY2d at 314). People v Cerda, 2023 NY Slip Op 05305, CtApp 10-19-23

Practice Point: Here the interest-of-justice exception to the Rape Shield Law applied. The majority found that the exclusion of forensic evidence of complainant’s sexual activity (which did not implicate the defendant) violated defendant’s right to put on a defense.

 

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