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NYPD’S WRITTEN INVENTORY SEARCH PROTOCOL IS CONSTITUTIONAL; HERE THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE TURNED UP A FIREARM (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over an extensive dissent, determined the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) written inventory search protocol was constitutional. Defendant was arrested after a traffic stop for possession of a gravity knife. A subsequent inventory search of defendant’s vehicle turned up a firearm from the trunk:

Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the NYPD’s inventory search protocol was unconstitutional because it gives officers too much discretion in conducting inventory searches and that the searching officers failed to create a meaningful inventory of defendant’s items. At the suppression hearing, the People introduced the NYPD’s written inventory search protocol as set forth in section 218-13 of the NYPD Patrol Guide. The protocol instructs officers to first “[s]earch the interior of the vehicle thoroughly,” “includ[ing] any area that may contain valuables.” The protocol lists 10 areas within the car that must be searched, such as the glove compartment and trunk, but does not limit the searching officers to those spaces. Second, section 218-13 directs officers to force open the “trunk, glove compartment, etc. only if it can be done with minimal damage” except in particular situations including where officers “[r]easonably suspect that the item contains weapons, explosives, hazardous materials or contraband.” Lastly, the protocol requires officers to remove the valuables from the vehicle and invoice, or “voucher,” the property on a specifically referenced invoice form. Section 218-13 instructs officers to list property of little value inside the vehicle, “within reason,” in their activity log and cross reference the property “to the invoice number covering any valuables removed.” Both officers testified that the purpose of an inventory search is, in part, to secure a defendant’s items. The arresting officer further testified that it is an officer’s duty to safeguard a defendant’s recovered items prior to vouchering the items. People v Douglas, 2023 NY Slip Op 05350, CtApp 10-24-23

Practice Point: Here the NYPD’s written inventory search protocol for vehicles was found constitutional. Defendant was arrested after a traffic stop for possession of a gravity knife. A subsequent inventory search of defendant’s vehicle turned up a firearm. There was an extensive dissenting opinion.

 

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