Civil Procedure – Page 291 – New York Appellate Digest

FAMILY COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE STATUTORY FACTORS, FORUM NON CONVENIENS FINDING REVERSED.

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s petition should not have been dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Father, who is incarcerated, was entitled to six visits per year with the child. Mother, unbeknownst to father, relocated to Georgia and cut off all communication between the child and father:

[A “forum non conveniens”] determination “depends on the specific issue(s) to be decided in the pending litigation,” and must involve consideration of all relevant factors, including those set forth in the statute … .

Although Family Court articulated its consideration of each of the statutory factors, we disagree with the weight it accorded certain factors and find that it failed to view those factors in light of the sole issue to be decided in this proceeding, namely, whether the mother violated [the court order]. First, in considering whether the child or a sibling was the victim of violence, mistreatment or abuse that was likely to continue in the future … , Family Court found that the child was negatively affected by the father’s criminal actions, despite the fact that all of the parties agreed that this factor was not relevant, neither the child nor a sibling was involved in the 2008 [criminal case] case [against father] and Family Court had awarded the father six visits per year in 2011. Next, the father promptly commenced this proceeding four months after the mother relocated with the child … — which occurred without his knowledge or Family Court’s permission — and we find that the additional 12 months that it took to dispose of this proceeding does not militate in favor of finding that New York is an inconvenient forum. Further, the father and the paternal grandmother, whose testimony would be central to the issue of whether a violation occurred, are located in New York, and any testimony by the mother could be presented “by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means” … . Matter of Snow v Elmer, 2016 NY Slip Op 07075, 3rd Dept 10-27-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE STATUTORY FACTORS, FORUM NON CONVENIENS FINDING REVERSED)/FORUM NON CONVENIENS (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE STATUTORY FACTORS, FORUM NON CONVENIENS FINDING REVERSED)

October 27, 2016

Appeals, Civil Procedure

APPELLATE DIVISION APPLIED THE WRONG TEST TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW; APPLYING THE CORRECT TEST, THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT “UTTERLY IRRATIONAL” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, determined the Appellate Division used the wrong test when it reversed a civil assault verdict and ordered a new trial. The central issue was whether defendant was the initial aggressor. In the first trial, the jury found that the defendant had acted in self-defense. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict as a matter of law and, alternatively, to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division, applying a weight of the evidence test, reversed and held ” ‘no fair interpretation of the evidence’ supported ‘the verdict finding that defendant acted in self-defense’ inasmuch as it was predicated upon ‘a conclusion that defendant was not the initial aggressor in the encounter’ .” Based on the Appellate Division’s ruling, at the second trial, the defendant was deemed the initial aggressor as a matter of law and the jury found for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that the test the Appellate Division should have applied on its review of the first trial was the “utterly irrational (matter of law)” test, not the “weight of the evidence” test. Applying the correct test, the Court of Appeals found that the jury’s conclusion the defendant acted in self-defense was not “utterly irrational.” Therefore the Appellate Division should not have set aside defendant’s verdict and then precluded him from presenting the “initial aggressor/self-defense” question to the jury in the second trial:

The question before us is whether the Appellate Division’s legal conclusion in its 2012 order was reached under the proper test. When the Appellate Division reviews a jury determination, it may either examine the facts to determine whether the weight of the evidence comports with the verdict, or the court may determine that the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of law, rendering the verdict utterly irrational … . Defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred by setting aside the jury verdict in his favor and improperly determining as a matter of law that a justification defense was unavailable to him, without finding the verdict to be utterly irrational. We agree. * * *

In its 2012 order, although the Appellate Division examined the facts and determined that “the jury’s conclusion that defendant was not the first to threaten the immediate use of physical force [wa]s unreachable on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (98 AD3d 830) — ostensibly a weight of the evidence review — the effect of that order was to hold as a matter of law that defendant was the initial aggressor to whom the defense of justification was not available — a determination that could only be reached by concluding that the verdict was “utterly irrational.” Yet, the Appellate Division did not use the utterly irrational test. The Appellate Division’s error in not applying the proper test resulted in defendant being improperly precluded from raising a justification defense on the retrial. Defendant should have been afforded a new trial on all the issues in the case, including consideration of his justification defense by the jury. Despite this error, reversal is only required if we find that the jury verdict was not utterly irrational.

Because determining whether a jury verdict was utterly irrational involves a pure question of law, this Court may look at the trial evidence and make that determination … . We must consider the jury charge as to initial aggressor and self-defense that was given during the first trial because the instruction, submitted without objection, is the law of the case … . Based on that instruction, … we hold that the jury’s determination that defendant acted in self-defense was not utterly irrational. * * *

Accordingly, the order appealed from and the … Appellate Division order insofar as brought up for review should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for a new trial in accordance with the opinion herein. Killon v Parrotta, 2016 NY Slip Op 07048, CtApp 10-27-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (APPEALS, APPELLATE DIVISION APPLIED TO WRONG TEST TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW; APPLYING THE CORRECT TEST, THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT “UTTERLY IRRATIONAL” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE)/APPEALS (CIVIL, MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW, APPELLATE DIVISION APPLIED TO WRONG TEST TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW; APPLYING THE CORRECT TEST, THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT “UTTERLY IRRATIONAL” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (APPEALS, APPELLATE DIVISION APPLIED TO WRONG TEST TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW; APPLYING THE CORRECT TEST, THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT “UTTERLY IRRATIONAL” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE)

October 27, 2016

Civil Procedure

ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court did not have the power to “reinstate” a “verdict” that had not been recorded in open court. When the jury first announced they had a verdict, the court officer, without reporting the verdict to the judge, handed the verdict sheet back to the jurors, pointing to directions on the sheet. After the judge accepted a subsequent verdict, the court officer informed the judge of the prior “verdict” and his interaction with the jurors:

“[A] trial court has discretion to set aside a verdict which is clearly the product of substantial confusion among the jurors” … . Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in setting aside the jury’s verdict on the basis that it was the product of substantial confusion. However, the court erred in attempting to “reinstate” the jury’s original verdict as reported by the court officer. ” A verdict is not recognized as valid and final until it is pronounced and recorded in open court'” … . Under these circumstances, upon setting aside the verdict, the court should have granted the branch of the defendant’s motion which was for a new trial … . Kitenberg v Gulmatico, 2016 NY Slip Op 07004, 2nd Dept 10-26-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE)/VERDICTS (CIVIL, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE)/JUROR CONFUSION (VERDICTS, CIVIL, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE)

October 26, 2016

Civil Procedure, Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY.

NEGLIGENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EVIDENCE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court of Appeals determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s expert’s testimony. The “expert-evidence” notice indicated the expert would testify about the cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death but did not indicate the substance of the testimony. At trial the expert did not agree with the cause described in the autopsy report (pneumonia) and testified death was attributable to cardiac arrhythmia. The motion to strike argued the “expert notice” was deficient because it did not provide any detail about the expert’s opinion. Because the lack of detail was obvious pre-trial, the mid-trial objection was properly overruled:

Plaintiff made her motion mid-trial immediately prior to the expert’s testimony. Plaintiff argues that at the time of the expert exchange, she had no reason to object to the disclosure statement because the statement gave no indication that defendant would challenge plaintiff’s theory of decedent’s cause of death. Assuming defendant’s disclosure was deficient, such deficiency was readily apparent; the disclosure identified “causation” as a subject matter but did not provide any indication of a theory or basis for the expert’s opinion. This is not analogous to a situation in which a party’s disclosure was misleading or the trial testimony was inconsistent with the disclosure. Rather, the issue here was insufficiency.

The trial court’s ruling did not endorse the sufficiency of the statement but instead addressed the motion’s timeliness. The lower courts were entitled to determine, based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case, that the time to challenge the statement’s content had passed because the basis of the objection was readily apparent from the face of the disclosure statement and could have been raised — and potentially cured — before trial. Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2016 NY Slip Op 06854, CtApp 10-20-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT EVIDENCE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)

October 20, 2016

Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Evidence

ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539.

CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court of Appeals determined evidence which was originally generated in electronic form was admissible under CPLR 4518 (a) and CPLR 4539 (b) applies only to documents originally in hard copy and subsequently scanned into digital form. The document in question was a record of testing of the simulator solution used during an alcohol breath test:

County Court correctly held that the applicable statute is CPLR 4518 (a), which was amended in 2002 (see L 2002, ch 136, § 1) to provide that an “electronic record . . . shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record” (CPLR 4518 [a]). The statute further provides that the court “may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record,” but “[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record. . . may be proved to affect its weight,” and “shall not affect its admissibility” (id. [emphasis added]).

The 2002 amendment to CPLR 4518 (a) was adopted by the legislature upon the recommendation of the Chief Administrative Judge’s Advisory Committee on Civil Practice specifically because the Committee and the legislature concluded that CPLR 4539 (b) had no application to documents originally created in electronic form. People v Kangas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06857, CtApp 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)DWI (BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/BREATH TEST (DWI, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)

October 20, 2016

Civil Procedure

PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court abused its discretion when it ruled two lawsuits joined for trial could be held in the county where the second of the two actions, as opposed to the first, was commenced:

“[W]here actions commenced in different counties have been consolidated [or joined for trial] pursuant to CPLR 602, the venue should be placed in the county where the first action was commenced, unless special circumstances are present, which decision is also addressed to the sound discretion of the court” … . Here, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in placing the venue of the joint trial in Queens County, since EMB [the defendants in the second suit] failed to establish the existence of special circumstances that would warrant a departure from the general rule … . Tieshmaker v EMB Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06819, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)/VENUE (PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED)

October 19, 2016

Civil Procedure, Corporation Law

DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO (COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion too complex for summary here (by Justice Tom), affirmed the dismissal of complaints stemming from the Madoff Ponzi scheme pursuant to the doctrine of in pari delicto (courts will not resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers).

In this case, plaintiff’s claims are precluded under the doctrine of in pari delicto. As the funds’ bankruptcy trustee, plaintiff stands in the funds’ shoes, and is subject to a defense based on the in pari delicto doctrine to the same extent as the funds … . Thus, the doctrine “prevents the trustee from recovering in tort if the corporation, acting through authorized employees in their official capacities, participated in the tort” … .

While a claim of in pari delicto sometimes requires factual development and is therefore not amenable to dismissal at the pleading stage … , the doctrine can apply on a motion to dismiss in an appropriate case … , such as where its application is “plain on the face of the pleadings” … . New Greenwich Litig. Trustee, LLC v Citco Fund Servs. (Europe) B.V., 2016 NY Slip Op 06796, 1st Dept 10-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/CORPORATION LAW (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/IN PAR DELICTO (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/MADOFF PONZI SCHEME (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)

October 18, 2016

Civil Procedure, Municipal Law, Negligence

DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should have been applied to deny the NYC Transit Authority’s (NYCTA’s) motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve a notice of claim. The notice of claim had been timely served on the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and a 50-h hearing had been held:

Although the MTA and NYCTA share an affiliation, they are separate entities … . Thus, service of a notice of claim upon the MTA does not satisfy the condition precedent of serving a notice of claim upon the NYCTA … . However, a municipal corporation may be equitably estopped from asserting lack of notice of claim when it has wrongfully or negligently engaged in conduct that misled or discouraged a party from serving a timely notice of claim or making a timely application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, and when that conduct was justifiably relied upon by that party … . “By applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to notice of claim situations, the courts may insure that statutes like section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, do not become a trap to catch the unwary or the ignorant'” … . Konner v New York City Tr. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 06683, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPLA LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)

October 12, 2016

Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Corporation Law

NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined a broad choice of law provision in a contract required the application of New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202). Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the law of the Province of Ontario Canada. The statute of limitations for breach of contract under Ontario law is two years. New York’s statute of limitations is six years. Because, under the facts, New York’s borrowing statute applies and therefore the Ontario statute of limitations controls, the action is untimely:

The borrowing statute is itself a part of New York’s procedural law and is a statute of limitations in its own right, existing as a separate procedural rule within the rules of our domestic civil practice, addressing limitations of time … . Thus, applying the borrowing statute is perfectly consistent with a broad choice-of-law contract clause that requires New York procedural rules to apply to the parties’ disputes. 2138747 Ontario, Inc. v Samsung C&T Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06671, 1st Dept 10-11-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CONTRACT LAW (CHOICE OF LAW, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CORPORATION LAW (CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACTUAL PROVISION, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/BORROWING STATUTE (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CHOICE OF LAW (CONTRACT, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)

October 11, 2016

Attorneys, Civil Procedure

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT.

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court should have sanctioned plaintiff for disregarding a court order and submitted a materially false affidavit:

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (a), a court may award to any party fees and costs resulting from frivolous conduct, i.e., conduct that is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; . . . [or that is] undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or . . . asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]). Factors to consider in determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous include “the circumstances under which the conduct took place,” and whether “the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party” (id.).

Here, plaintiff’s conduct was clearly frivolous inasmuch as she submitted an affidavit that disregarded a court order and, in response to a second order, she submitted a second affidavit that contained a material falsehood. When that conduct is viewed along with plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands and other orders, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to sanction plaintiff. Place v Chaffee-Sardinia Volunteer Fire Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 06588, 4th Dept 10-7-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)/FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)/SANCTIONS (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)

October 7, 2016