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ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST.

The Court of Appeals determined Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for statutory interest after judgment was entered. The post-judgment award of statutory interest ($4.9 million) was properly vacated by the appellate division:

While [petitioner] was appealing Supreme Court's judgment dismissing its action, some of the [respondents] filed a motion seeking an award of statutory interest under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5001. Supreme Court granted the motion, and in August 2013, directed entry of a judgment of approximately $4.9 million, representing interest at the statutory rate. Upon appeal, the Appellate Division reversed; the court denied the [respondents'] motion and vacated the statutory interest judgment … .

We agree with the Appellate Division that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to award statutory interest on the January 2012 judgment that dismissed the petition. … [T]he January 2012 paper, denominated an “order,” was a final judgment dismissing the proceeding … .

Once Supreme Court dismissed [the] petition and judgment was entered, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the [respondents'] post-judgment motion for statutory interest … . CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. v Cuomo, 2016 NY Slip Op 04251, CtApp 6-2-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST)/JURISDICTION, SUBJECT MATTER(ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST)

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