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EXECUTOR-STATUS (PRIOR TO DEATH) AND FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP DO NOT CREATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOKED TO SAVE A TIME-BARRED CLAIM.

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not have been invoked to save a time-barred claim to real property. The real property was the subject of a 1977 will which placed the property in trust for decedent's children and named defendant executor. In 1988 the property was conveyed to the defendant, but the will was never amended. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that defendant's executor-status and familial ties created a fiduciary relationship, requiring defendant to notify plaintiffs of the 1988 transfer. The Third Department held the appointment as executor did not create a fiduciary relationship (prior to death), and the familial relationship, as well, did not create a fiduciary relationship. Therefore, the Third Department ruled, the defendant was not barred, by equitable estoppel, from asserting the statute of limitations defense:

Supreme Court recognized that “concealment without actual misrepresentation may form the basis for invocation of the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] if 'there was a fiduciary relationship which gave [the] defendant an obligation to inform [the] plaintiff of facts underlying the claim'” … . Here, the court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that defendant owed them a fiduciary duty to disclose the conveyance when it occurred in 1988 because of her nomination as executor-trustee in the 1977 will, as well as their familial relationship.

We note, however, that the existence of a familial relationship does not equate to a fiduciary relationship for equitable estoppel purposes … . Nor does the mere fact that a will has nominated an executor, in and of itself, create a fiduciary relationship between the nominee and the will's beneficiaries. Indeed, because of the ambulatory nature of a will, a nominated executor is prohibited from acting in a fiduciary capacity until the testator dies … . Similarly, “a testamentary trust cannot become effective prior to the testator's death” … . Picard v Fish, 2016 NY Slip Op 04086, 3rd Dept 5-26-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXECUTOR-STATUS (PRIOR TO DEATH) AND FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP DO NOT CREATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOKED TO BAR A TIME-BARRED CLAIM)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (EXECUTOR-STATUS (PRIOR TO DEATH) AND FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP DO NOT CREATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOKED TO BAR A TIME-BARRED CLAIM)/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (EXECUTOR-STATUS (PRIOR TO DEATH) AND FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP DO NOT CREATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOKED TO BAR A TIME-BARRED CLAIM)

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