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PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BY MOTHER OF A 14-YEAR-OLD KILLED WHEN WORKING ILLEGALLY ON DEFENDANT FARM PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE RECOVERY UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW WAS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BECAUSE THE INTENTIONAL-TORT EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY; THE ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE; IN ADDITION THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS ACTED WILLFULLY OR INTENTIONALLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the personal injury action brought by decedent’s mother was properly dismissed because the recovery pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law was the exclusive remedy. Plaintiff’s decedent, 14-years-old, was killed operating a skid steer while illegally employed by defendant’s (Park’s) farm. Although plaintiffs recovered Workers’ Compensation benefits, plaintiffs argued an exception to the exclusive-remedy restriction for intentional torts applied. The Third Department held the exclusive-remedy restriction applied and there was no evidence of willful or intentional conduct on the part of the defendants:

Inasmuch as the [Workers’ Compensation] Board had already “determined that [decedent’s] injuries were suffered accidentally and in the course of employment” for the Farm, the claim that the Farm or its employees are liable “for an intentional tort based on the same event is barred by the exclusive remedy and finality provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, and by principles of res judicata” … . Even if the Board’s decision did not have preclusive effect, however, Supreme Court properly rejected the contention that Park engaged in “deliberate acts . . . to injure [decedent] or to have him injured” so as to bring this case within an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law … . The record reflects that decedent used the skid steer without anyone’s knowledge and that, following the investigation into decedent’s death, Park pleaded guilty to willful failure to pay unemployment insurance contributions (see Labor Law § 633), endangering the welfare of a child (see Penal Law § 260.10) and prohibited employment of a minor (see Labor Law § 133). It could be inferred from those facts that Park was negligent in failing to supervise decedent, or even reckless in exposing decedent to dangerous work that his age left him unsuited for, but not that Park acted out of a “willful intent to harm” decedent, as required … . Smith v Park, 2020 NY Slip Op 03583, Third Dept 6-25-20

 

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ALTHOUGH DISFAVORED, DISCLOSURE OF REDACTED TAX RETURNS WAS WARRANTED IN THIS CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that the disclosure of tax returns is disfavored, but agreed with Supreme Court that disclosure of the redacted returns in this Labor-Law/employment-law dispute was warranted:

Plaintiffs claim that between 2010 and 2016 defendant employed them as a caretaker for her ailing aunt and that defendant violated, inter alia, several sections of the Department of Labor Regulations (12 NYCRR) requiring overtime pay, a minimum wage, and additional pay for split shifts. Defendant denies that she was plaintiffs’ employer for purposes of the regulations and provisions of the Labor Law, but admits that she paid plaintiffs by check from 2014 to 2016, albeit on her aunt’s behalf. Plaintiffs claim they were paid in cash by defendant between 2010 and 2013. Defendant, who denies that she was the source of the cash payments, seeks plaintiffs’ federal and state tax returns for 2010 to 2013, claiming she needs the returns to verify the cash amounts, as well as plaintiffs’ assertion that they were employees, and not independent contractors.

… [D]efendant demonstrated both that the specific information ordered disclosed was necessary to defend the action, and unavailable from other sources … . Since plaintiffs were paid in cash between 2010 and 2013 and there is no other evidence in the record establishing who paid their wages and how much they were paid during those years, defendant showed a specific need for the production of the three years of tax returns, which might show the amounts claimed by plaintiffs as income from the caretaker work, as well as whether they claimed the income as wages or as money earned through self-employment. Defendant demonstrated that investigating plaintiffs’ bank accounts would be inconclusive, since pay deposited in the accounts could have been commingled with other amounts, and because one of the plaintiffs claimed that she used several banking institutions and did not make deposits on a predictable basis. We note that the court already inspected the tax returns in camera and deemed them relevant. Currid v Valea, 2020 NY Slip Op 03590, First Dept 6-25-20

 

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PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESPONDENT IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING; FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this family offense proceeding because the petitioner and the respondent were not members of the same family or household and had not been in an intimate relationship:

The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this family offense proceeding brought by the foster mother of respondent’s biological children. Petitioner failed to establish that she and respondent, who are not members of the same family or household, are or have been in an intimate relationship (see Family Court Act § 812[1][e] …). Petitioner testified that she did not even know respondent’s first name. It appears from the record that petitioner’s contact with respondent has been limited to scheduling visitation with the children at the agency and, perhaps, interacting with respondent when she went to petitioner’s home to pick up the children for visits. Matter of Veronica C. v Ariann D., 2020 NY Slip Op 03612, First Dept 6-25-20

 

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PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION IN THIS UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PROCEEDING WAS SERVED AFTER THE 20-DAY STATUTORY PERIOD FOR SERVICE AND WAS NOT SERVED IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE (CPLR 7503(c)); THEREFORE THE APPLICATION TO STAY ARBITRATION WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer’s (State Farm’s) notice and petition to stay arbitration was not served within the required 20 days and was not properly served. The petition therefore should have been dismissed:

… [T]he insured, Joyce Reid, sent State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm) a demand for supplemental underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) arbitration, which was received by State Farm on February 14, 2019. On March 22, 2019, State Farm filed a notice of petition and petition seeking to temporarily stay the arbitration pending the completion of pre-arbitration discovery. That notice and petition were served upon counsel for Reid by first-class mail on March 22, 2019. …

CPLR 7503(c) requires that an application to stay arbitration be made within 20 days after service of a demand to arbitrate. “This limitation is strictly enforced and a court has no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely application” … . CPLR 7503(c) also directs that notice of an application to stay arbitration “shall be served in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.”

… State Farm did not file its notice of petition and petition until March 22, 2019, which was beyond the 20-day statute of limitations. Consequently, the proceeding is time-barred … .

Moreover, State Farm’s notice of petition and petition to stay arbitration were served by regular first-class mail, rather than by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Since there was a lack of compliance with CPLR 7503(c), the present proceeding was jurisdictionally defective … . Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v Reid, 2020 NY Slip Op 03517, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DANGEROUS CONDITION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, APPELLANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DENIED A MOTION ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY A PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action properly survived summary judgment. The Second Department noted the court should not have, sua sponte, denied appellants’ motion on the ground the deposition transcripts were inadmissible because that issue was not raised. Plaintiff was working in the bottom of a hole which was muddy from heavy rain and littered with boulders and rocks. Plaintiff was injured when he allegedly slipped and fell because of the mud. The Second Department held that the causes of action were based upon a dangerous condition, not the method and manner of work, and the appellants did not demonstrate they lacked actual or constructive notice of the condition:

Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed on owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work … . There are “two broad categories of actions that implicate the provisions of Labor Law § 200” … . The first category involves worker injuries arising out of alleged dangerous or defective conditions on the premises where the work is performed … . In those circumstances, “[f]or liability to be imposed on the property owner, there must be evidence showing that the property owner either created a dangerous or defective condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it without remedying it within a reasonable time” … . The second category of actions under Labor Law § 200 involves injuries arising from the method and manner of the work … . A property owner will be held liable under this category only if it possessed the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work … .

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the plaintiff’s accident arose from a dangerous premises condition, not from the method and manner of the work. Where a plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured at a work site as a result of a dangerous premises condition, a property owner’s liability under Labor Law § 200 and for common-law negligence rests upon whether the property owner created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable amount of time within which to correct the condition … . Modugno v Bovis Lend Lease Interiors, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03508, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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THE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT WAS GOVERNED BY THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, NOT THE SIX-YEAR CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 213; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the statute of limitations with respect to the enforcement of a postnuptial agreement is that provided for in Domestic Relations Law 250, not the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions generally:

… [T]he six-year statute of limitations that pertains to breach of contract causes of action (see CPLR 213[2]) is not applicable. Rather, the applicable statute of limitations is provided for in Domestic Relations Law § 250. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 250, the statute of limitations for claims arising from prenuptial and postnuptial agreements is three years and that period is tolled, as relevant here, until process has been served in a matrimonial action. The language of the statute makes it broadly applicable to claims arising from prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, such that it applies equally where a party seeks to invalidate the agreement and where a party seeks to enforce it … .

Here, the defendant did not assert his claim to enforce the postnuptial agreement until more than 4½ years after he was served with process in the matrimonial action. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is untimely, and should have been rejected. Washiradusit v Athonvarangkul, 2020 NY Slip Op 03562, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PRIVITY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging architectural malpractice should not have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211. Plaintiff leased the first floor of a building to operate a pizza restaurant. Plaintiff hired a contractor which in turn hired an architect for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) design. The gas line hookup was completed in 2014. Subsequently, in 2016, National Grid shut off the gas, alleging plaintiff was stealing gas. In 2017 the defendant architect allegedly attempted to remedy the problem with the gas line. The complaint adequately pled the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine and a privity-like relationship between the plaintiff and the architect:

“The law recognizes that the supposed completion of the contemplated work does not preclude application of the continuous representation toll if inadequacies or other problems with the contemplated work timely manifest themselves after that date and the parties continue the professional relationship to remedy those problems” … . In support of its motion, the architect submitted documentary evidence which included a final invoice issued by it dated August 14, 2014, and a letter of completion issued by the New York City Department of Buildings to the architect stating that its work was completed on December 20, 2014. In opposition, the plaintiffs’ submissions, which included evidence of continuing communications between [plaintiff] and the architect, and evidence of the architect’s efforts to remedy the alleged error uncovered by National Grid regarding the gas line connection for the premises, raised a question of fact as to the application of the continuous representation doctrine and supported the denial of those branches of the architect’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (5) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it … . Contrary to the architect’s contention, the fact that two years had elapsed between the completion of its services and its subsequent efforts to remedy the problem does not render the continuous representation doctrine inapplicable as a matter of law … .

We also reject the architect’s contention, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that dismissal of the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it was warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), on the ground that it was not in privity with the plaintiffs. The evidence submitted by the architect, which included a copy of the contract entered into between it and the contractor, failed to utterly refute the factual allegations supporting the plaintiffs’ contention that a relationship existed between them and the architect that was the “functional equivalent of privity” … . Creative Rest., Inc. v Dyckman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03499, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF TAX RETURNS AFTER THE PARTIES’ FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; THE FAILURE TO RESPOND TO A PALPABLY IMPROPER DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION, I.E. A DEMAND FOR TAX RETURNS, DOES NOT WAIVE THE ABILITY TO OBJECT TO THE DEMAND ON APPEAL; DEFENDANT MAY RENEW THE MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF THE TAX RETURNS IF THE REQUIRED SHOWINGS ARE MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that the failure to respond to defendant-Mazal’s demands for production waived any objections to the demands. Mazal’s motion to compel discovery therefore was properly granted. However objections to demands which are palpably improper are not waived by a failure to respond and Mazal’s demand for tax returns may be in the palpably-improper category. Mazal’s motion to compel the production of tax returns should therefore have been denied. But the First Department denied that portion of the motion to compel without prejudice and granted leave to renew if Mazal can make the required showing of need:

The motion court providently deemed the appealing parties’ objections waived under CPLR 3122 as a result of their failure to respond timely to Mazal’s demands for production … . We modify, however, with respect to Mazal’s demands for the appealing parties’ tax returns, as objections to “palpably improper” demands are not waived … .

A demand for the production of tax returns is disfavored and requires “a strong showing of necessity,” and the inability to obtain the information from other sources … . Here, the failure “to identify the particular information the tax returns . . . will contain and its relevance to the claims made” … should have been sufficient to deny Mazal’s motion to compel. Indeed, the tax returns were not necessary to determine whether plaintiffs acquired an interest in the properties in 1994 or retained it thereafter — the reason the motion court gave for granting the motion. However, Mazal argues that the tax returns could be relevant to its affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, waiver, ratification, and consent, and the motion court did not pass on this issue. As a result, although Mazal did not sufficiently show the inability to obtain the information sought from other sources or, indeed, what specific information the appealing parties’ tax returns will show, we grant leave to renew upon a proper showing … . Demurjian v Demurjian, 2020 NY Slip Op 03479, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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SELF-EXECUTING CONDITIONAL DISCOVERY ORDER BECAME ABSOLUTE UPON NON-COMPLIANCE; A MOTION TO VACATE, NOT AN APPEAL, IS THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO CONTEST THE ORDER ON THE GROUND OF EXCUSABLE DEFAULT; DEFENDANTS TOOK NO ACTION TO AVOID THE DEFAULT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that defendants’ failure to comply with a self-executing, conditional order striking the answer became absolute. The proper way to contest such an order is to move to vacate, not appeal:

When defendants failed to comply with the self-executing, conditional order striking their answer if they did not produce a witness for deposition by a date certain, the order became absolute ( … CPLR 3126[3]). Defendants’ proper recourse was to move to vacate the conditional order on the ground of excusable default (… CPLR 5015[a]). They did not seek that relief. In any event, the excuses for failing to comply with the court’s order that defendants asserted in opposition to plaintiff’s motion were not reasonable, and defendants failed to seek an adjournment from the court or take any other action to avoid their knowing default. Humble Monkey, LLC v Rice Sec., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03470, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE APPROVAL OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DOLLAR STORE; THE PLANNING BOARD DID NOT NEED TO SEND THE MATTER TO THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS TO INTERPRET A ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH WAS ONLY A GUIDELINE CONCERNING THE ALLOWED LENGTH OF A BUILDING FACADE; THE PLANNING BOARD TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, noting that the abutting neighbors (Cady and Crawley) had standing to contest the town planning board’s approval of the construction of a Dollar Store, determined Supreme Court should not have found that the matter must be sent to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a variance proceeding. Because the zoning ordinance in question, concerning the length of a building facade, was only a guideline, it was not necessary to involve the ZBA to interpret it:

Cady and Cawley’s residence is directly adjacent to the proposed construction site, and the proposed retail store would be directly across the woods from their property. The store’s main parking lot, which is located behind the store, is in the line of sight of Cady and Cawley’s property. As a result, the store is likely to obstruct or interfere with the scenic views within the scenic viewshed overlay district from Cady and Cawley’s property. Cady and Cawley have standing because they have demonstrated that they would suffer an “injury in fact – i.e., actual harm by the action challenged that differs from that suffered by the public at large — and that such injury falls within the zone of interests, or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” … . * * *

… [T]he Town zoning code states that “the length of any faÇade should generally not exceed 50 feet maximum [horizontal dimension]”. Insofar as the subject provision lacks any compulsory language, … this provision is deliberately phrased …  as a guideline, rather than as a prohibition; in other words, there was no requirement for a referral to the ZBA to determine the plain language of the statute. …

… [O]ur review of the record reveals that the Planning Board underwent a nearly four-year process that involved in-depth environmental impact reports, multiple draft EISes [environmental impact statements] and public hearings, which formed the basis of the FEIS [final environments impact statement] and SEQRA [State Environmental Quality Review Act] findings statement. Accordingly, we find that the Planning Board complied with its procedural and substantive requirements under SEQRA … . Matter of Arthur M. v Town of Germantown Planning Bd., 2020 NY Slip Op 03440, Third Dept 6-18-20

 

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