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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND WRONGFUL DEATH...
Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Negligence, Trusts and Estates

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS WERE NOT TIME-BARRED, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice and wrongful death causes of action on behalf of decedent should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

The plaintiff’s decedent died due to complications related to cancer on August 29, 2015. On May 26, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for wrongful death and medical malpractice against, among others, the defendants Forest Hills Hospital (hereinafter FHH) and Sergio Martinez, a physician (hereinafter together the defendants). As is relevant to these appeals, the complaint alleged negligent acts and omissions by the defendants related to the decedent’s hospitalization at FHH from July 30, 2013, to August 1, 2013. After joinder of issue, Martinez and FHH separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss, as time-barred, so much of the complaint as was based upon alleged acts of malpractice committed before November 26, 2013, insofar as asserted against each of them. … Supreme Court granted the defendants’ separate motions. …

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the statute of limitations barred causes of action to recover damages for medical malpractice that accrued prior to November 26, 2013 (i.e., 2½ years before the date the action was commenced), rather than February 28, 2013 (i.e., 2½ years before the date of the decedent’s death) (see EPTL 5-4.1 …). Since, at the time of his death, the decedent had a valid cause of action to recover damages for medical malpractice based upon acts or omissions occurring on or after February 28, 2013, and since the wrongful death cause of action was commenced within two years of the date of his death, the wrongful death cause of action was timely commenced … . Accordingly, any causes of action to recover damages for medical malpractice that accrued on or after February 28, 2013 (i.e., within 2½ years of the decedent’s death), including the decedent’s July 2013 hospitalization, were timely. Further, the plaintiff then had one year from the decedent’s death to assert a cause of action alleging conscious pain and suffering (see CPLR 210[a]; …). Perez v Baez, 2020 NY Slip Op 04329, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

July 29, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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