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FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THE ENTIRE DEBT TIME-BARRED; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DEBT WAS DE-ACCELERATED; IF SO, ONLY THOSE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS DUE WITHIN SIX YEARS OF THE START OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ARE RECOVERABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action on the entire debt was time-barred, but there was a question of fact whether the debt was de-accelerated such that the installment payments due during the six years prior to the commencement of the action were recoverable by the plaintiff bank (Chase):

… [T]he defendants demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on July 7, 2009, when Chase accelerated the mortgage debt and commenced the prior foreclosure action … . Since the plaintiff did not commence the instant foreclosure action until more than six years later, on January 28, 2016, the defendants sustained their initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the action was untimely … .

… [T]he plaintiff tendered evidence that, in May 2015, it sent letters to each of the defendants that purported to de-accelerate the entire debt … . However, such evidence is sufficient only to raise a question of fact as to whether those causes of action that sought unpaid installments which accrued within the six-year period of limitations preceding the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213[4] …) are barred by the statute of limitations due to this alleged de-acceleration by the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff failed to tender any evidence to rebut the defendants’ showing that the statute of limitations bars the causes of action relating to unpaid mortgage installments which accrued on or before January 27, 2010, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss those causes of action. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Miele, 2020 NY Slip Op 04422, Second Dept 8-5-20

 

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