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REQUIREMENT THAT NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT BE INFORMED OF POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO DEFENDANT WHO ABSCONDED BEFORE APPEAL PERFECTED.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the non-citizen defendant, whose direct appeal was pending when he absconded, was entitled to the protection afforded by People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, which requires the court to inform the defendant deportation may follow a plea to a felony:

The issue here is whether a defendant whose case still is on direct appeal should be denied the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ ruling in People v Peque … , which is rooted in federal constitutional law, because defendant absconded from parole before his attorney perfected this appeal. We conclude Peque should apply to defendant’s case.

In Peque, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court is obligated to apprise any defendants that if the defendant is not an American citizen, he or she may be deported as a consequence of a guilty plea to a felony … . That decision acknowledged that under federal immigration law, deportation, in many cases, is an inevitable consequence of a noncitizen’s guilty plea and that as part of the defendant’s decision to make a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty, the defendant must be alerted to the deportation consequences by the court. In the instant case, the court did not advise defendant about the immigration consequences flowing from his plea … . People v Tejeda, 2016 NY Slip Op 05541, 1st Dept 7-14-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (REQUIREMENT THAT NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT BE INFORMED OF POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO DEFENDANT WHO ABSCONDED BEFORE APPEAL PERFECTED)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, REQUIREMENT THAT NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT BE INFORMED OF POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO DEFENDANT WHO ABSCONDED BEFORE APPEAL PERFECTED)/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, REQUIREMENT THAT NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT BE INFORMED OF POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO DEFENDANT WHO ABSCONDED BEFORE APPEAL PERFECTED)/IMMIGRATION LAW  (CRIMINAL LAW, REQUIREMENT THAT NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT BE INFORMED OF POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO DEFENDANT WHO ABSCONDED BEFORE APPEAL PERFECTED)

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FAILURE TO CONTEST PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR STRIKING JURORS RENDERED THE ISSUE UNPRESERVED FOR APPEAL.

The Third Department, over a two justice dissent, determined defense counsel’s failure to contest the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking jurors rendered the issue unpreserved for appeal:

Following the People’s step-two proffer, County Court denied the Batson challenge, without any attempt to respond or protestation registered by defendant. Now, on appeal, defendant contends for the first time that County Court erred in failing to conduct a step-three inquiry. However, “[b]y accepting the People’s explanation without any additional objection at a time [when] it could have been addressed, defendant failed to preserve” this contention for our review … , and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction … . In reaching this conclusion, we reaffirm the importance of both the trial court’s attention to each articulated, sequential step of the Batson inquiry, and counsel’s “attention to placing their objections on the record so they may be addressed by the court” … . Indeed, “whatever procedural problems may exist in a Batson inquiry, the overriding concern is that a properly preserved question regarding the ultimate issue of discrimination is meaningfully addressed” … . People v Acevedo, 2016 NY Slip Op 05517, 3rd Dept 7-14-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO CONTEST PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR STRIKING JUROR RENDERED THE ISSUE UNPRESERVED FOR APPEAL)/JURORS (BATSON CHALLENGE, FAILURE TO CONTEST PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR STRIKING JUROR RENDERED THE ISSUE UNPRESERVED FOR APPEAL)/APPEALS (BATSON CHALLENGE, FAILURE TO CONTEST PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR STRIKING JUROR RENDERED THE ISSUE UNPRESERVED FOR APPEAL)/BATSON CHALLENGE (FAILURE TO CONTEST PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR STRIKING JUROR RENDERED THE ISSUE UNPRESERVED FOR APPEAL)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW.

The Second Department determined plaintiff special guardian had raised a question of fact about whether the fiduciary tolling rule applied to this breach of fiduciary duty action brought on behalf of her mentally ill brother, thereby rendering the action timely. The court explained the rule and why the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal:

… [T]he plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the fiduciary tolling rule or the “repudiation rule,” under which the “applicable statutory period . . . does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” … . Although the plaintiff raises the issue for the first time on appeal, the issue of whether the fiduciary tolling rules applies to the facts as alleged may be reached, since it involves a question of law which appears on the face of the record and which could not have been avoided if raised at the proper juncture … . Franklin v Hafftka, 2016 NY Slip Op 04692, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW)/FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW)FIDUCIARY DUTY, BREACH OF (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW)/APPEALS (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW)

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SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND MUST BE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT, NOT IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING.

The First Department determined that sex-offender certification is part of the judgment of conviction. Challenge to sex-offender certification, therefore, must be raised on appeal from the judgment and cannot be raised for the first time in a SORA risk-level determination:

Although this appeal from a risk level determination is not subject to dismissal, it does not bring up for review defendant’s claim that his underlying New York felony conviction was not for an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. Sex offender certification is part of the judgment of conviction, and the proper occasion for defendant to have challenged that certification was on an appeal from the judgment …, but defendant did not appeal. People v Miguel, 2016 NY Slip Op 04666, 1st Dept 6-14-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND MUST BE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT, NOT IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING)/APPEALS (SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND MUST BE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT, NOT IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACE (SORA) (SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND MUST BE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT, NOT IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING)/SORA (SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND MUST BE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT, NOT IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING)

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SHACKLES, QUESTIONS ABOUT A PENDING INDICTMENT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE GRAND JURY OF A WITNESS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE NOT MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the shackling of defendant during the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor's questions during the grand jury proceedings about a pending indictment, and the prosecutor's failure to inform the grand jury of a witness requested by the defendant, were not mode of proceedings errors. Therefore, preservation of the errors by objection was required:

Defendant argues that the preservation rule should be disregarded with respect to the shackling challenge because the prosecution inaccurately stated on the record that the Court had previously denied such a challenge when he sought to move to dismiss the indictment on that basis. No circumstances excuse the preservation requirement: defense counsel was present during the Grand Jury proceeding while defendant was shackled. In any event, the failure to make an adequate showing on the record of the need for restraints does not constitute an unwaivable mode of proceedings error … . …

Defendant made no attempt to preserve his challenge to the prosecution's questions before the Grand Jury of his awareness of the potential for increased penalties in an unrelated pending indictment as a result of his conviction in this matter. Such a challenge requires preservation … .

Finally, defendant's challenge to the indictment based on the prosecution's failure to inform the Grand Jury about the requested witness is unpreserved. Here the record demonstrates that before defense counsel was relieved, he likely knew of the fact that the requested witness had not actually testified and was discussing the matter with the prosecution. Defendant relieved counsel before he could fully address the issue with the court, and defendant and his legal advisor, who were aware of and had every incentive to follow up and seek to preserve an objection on this basis, did not do so. Moreover, any error does not rise to the level of a mode of proceedings error. People v Griggs, 2016 NY Slip Op 04655, CtApp 6-14-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SHACKLES, QUESTIONS ABOUT A PENDING INDICTMENT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE GRAND JURY OF A WITNESS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE NOT MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SHACKLES, QUESTIONS ABOUT A PENDING INDICTMENT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE GRAND JURY OF A WITNESS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE NOT MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS (SHACKLES, QUESTIONS ABOUT A PENDING INDICTMENT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE GRAND JURY OF A WITNESS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE NOT MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL)

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PROSECUTOR’S INCORRECT STATEMENT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY OBJECTION.

The Fourth Department determined the prosecutor's misstatement concerning the length of post-release supervision did not require reversal because defendant had ample opportunity to raise an objection to preserve the error but did not do so:

Although the prosecutor initially misstated the period of postrelease supervision prior to the plea allocution and the court failed to mention postrelease supervision during the allocution, defendant was aware that the sentence included a postrelease supervision component at the time of the allocution, the court immediately thereafter confirmed the correct agreed-upon sentence, and neither defendant nor defense counsel objected to the period of postrelease supervision or otherwise indicated that there was any misunderstanding with regard to its length. People v Chant, 2016 NY Slip Op 04544, 4th Dept 6-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW PROSECUTOR'S INCORRECT STATEMENT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY OBJECTION)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR'S INCORRECT STATEMENT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY OBJECTION)/POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION PROSECUTOR'S INCORRECT STATEMENT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY OBJECTION)

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EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED; NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) although the finding that petitioner had violated work-related requirements under the family assistance program was reversed and the reduction in petitioner's benefits had been restored, the appeal was not moot; (2) the wording of the notices of required meetings for work-assessment under the family assistance program did not violate the Social Services Law; and (3) the propriety of the “autopost” system by which petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled meeting resulted in an automatically posted infraction must be determined in the context of a summary judgment or a trial (not this declaratory judgment action). The dissenters argued the appeal was moot and should not have been heard:

… [W]e find that the notices at issue do not violate the applicable regulatory scheme. In reviewing these notices, we are mindful that “[t]he standard for judicial review of an administrative regulation is whether the regulation has a rational basis and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” … , or contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated … . The party challenging a regulation has the heavy burden of establishing that “it is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary” … . * * *

The regulation and notices closely track the statute, which focuses on how a recipient can demonstrate good cause for having failed to comply with work requirements. In fact, every requirement set forth in SSL § 341 is incorporated into the notices. The crux of Supreme Court's holding is that the regulation and notices do not satisfy a requirement that recipients be expressly told that they can avoid sanction by asserting compliance. The statute on its face, however, simply contains no such requirement. This is particularly true for the notice of decision, because SSL § 341(1)(b) does not require that the notice give examples of good cause. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot find that 18 NYCRR 385.11 and the notices were unreasonable or arbitrary. Matter of Puerto v Doar, 2016 NY Slip Op 04463, 1st Dept 6-9-16

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)/FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (NYC) (NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)/APPEALS (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED; NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)

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COURT’S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined (1) the trial court properly notified all parties of the contents of a jury note, and (2), the response to the jury note, in which only the direct testimony of a witness was read back, was not a mode of proceedings error. Therefore the failure to read the cross-examination was an error which must be preserved for appellate review (no preservation here):

Counsel had meaningful notice of the precise content of the jury's note and was in the courtroom as the readback was conducted. Counsel was therefore aware that the court had failed to read the witness's cross-examination testimony. Counsel's knowledge of the precise content of the note and of the court's actual response, or lack thereof, removes the claimed error from the very narrow class of mode of proceedings errors for which preservation is not required … . “[C]ounsel's silence at a time when any error by the court could have been obviated by timely objection renders the claim unpreserved and unreviewable here” … . People v Morris, 2016 NY Slip Op 04327, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/APPEALS (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR  (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/PRESERVATION OF ERROR (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)

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PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED.

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined defendant failed to preserve an objection to his sentence because he did not move to withdraw his plea or otherwise object prior to the imposition of sentence. As part of a plea deal, defendant was required to complete six months in jail, followed by a period of time during which he was not arrested. Defendant completed the jail time but was subsequently arrested. Because of the arrest, the plea deal was not available and defendant was sentenced accordingly. The Court of Appeals held that the narrow exception to the preservation requirement for an illegal sentence did not apply to these facts. The jail-time was deemed to be a “pre-sentence” condition and could not, therefore, be deemed an illegal sentence. The court further explained the criterial for an Outley hearing to determine the validity of an arrest which violates a condition for a plea deal:

Here, defendant's sentence was premised on a violation of an admittedly lawful presentence condition – he could not be arrested – and the issue of the propriety of the plea could certainly have been raised prior to sentencing. Thus, defendant's challenge to the presentencing incarceration, which was not part of the sentence, is subject to the preservation rule … . * * *

[At the Outley hearing] the judge heard testimony from the complainant and the arresting officer. Defendant also testified that the complainant had been the aggressor and had attacked him. The judge found that there was a legitimate basis for defendant's arrest, implicitly rejecting defendant's version of events, and that finding was adopted by the sentencing court. Thus, because defendant was given an opportunity to testify to his exculpatory explanation, and his testimony was evidently discredited by the court, the nature of the inquiry was sufficient under our Outley standard. People v Reynolds, 2016 NY Slip Op 04323, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)/APPEALS (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT)/SENTENCING (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)/OUTLEY HEARING (CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)

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FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE’S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissenting opinion, determined the trial judge's acceptance of the verdict without answering three jury notes was not a mode of proceedings error. Because there was no objection to the failure to answer the jury notes, the error was not preserved. The notes had been marked as court exhibits, had been read verbatim to counsel and counsel were aware of the court's proposed responses. The note indicating a verdict had been reached was sent out before th