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APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a partial dissent, determined appeals as of right, irrespective of the issues raised, should not be dismissed because the appellant has been deported. Permissive appeals, such as an appeal of the denial of a motion to vacate a conviction, are, however, subject to discretionary dismissal because the appellant has been deported:

… [W]e conclude that this Court’s holding in Ventura [17 NY3d 675] prohibits an intermediate appellate court from exercising its discretion to dismiss a pending direct appeal on the ground that the defendant has been involuntarily deported, regardless of the appellate contentions raised by the defendant. …

We reach a different conclusion with respect to [a] pending permissive appeal. Our holding in Ventura was based upon a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a direct appeal granted by CPL 450.10. That statute has no application, however, in the context of permissive appeals. Rather, CPL 450.15 governs an appeal from an order denying a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate a judgment, and provides that a certificate granting leave to appeal must be obtained pursuant to CPL 460.15 (see CPL 450.15 [1]). In Ventura, this Court spoke of a criminal defendant’s “absolute right,” “statutory right,” “fundamental right,” and “basic entitlement” to appellate consideration of a direct appeal … . A defendant has no such fundamental right or basic entitlement to appeal where the defendant must seek permission to appeal to the intermediate appellate court pursuant to CPL 450.15. …

Where an intermediate appellate court has permissive jurisdiction over a pending appeal, the intermediate appellate court retains its discretion to dismiss the pending permissive appeal due to the defendant’s involuntary deportation. People v Harrison, 2016 NY Slip Op 03547, CtApp 5-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)

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