You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

,

HERE A “CERTIFICATE OF DELINQUENCY” WAS NEVER FILED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF PROBATION BY THE DEFENDANT AND THE PERIOD OF PROBATION EXPIRED WHILE DEFENDANT WAS STILL UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT; WHEN DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE TERMS OF PROBATION AGAIN, PROBATION WAS REVOKED AND DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO INCARCERATION; BECAUSE THE REVOCATION AND SENTENCE TOOK PLACE AFTER THE PERIOD OF PROBATION EXPIRED, THE SENTENCING COURT HAD BEEN STRIPPED OF JURISDICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that, because no “declaration of delinquency” had ever been filed, defendant’s [Mr. Curry’s] period of probation was never tolled. Therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and sentence him to incarceration after his probationary period […]

,

THE STREET STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS INVALID UNDER BOTH THE US SUPREME COURT’S “HILL VS CALIFORNIA” “MISTAKEN ARREST” CRITERIA AND THE NYS “DEBOUR” STREET STOP CRITERIA; THE WEAPON DISCARDED BY DEFENDANT AS HE FLED SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a three-judge dissent, determined the parole investigators did not have “reasonable suspicion” that the defendant was in fact the parole absconder for whom they had a warrant when they pulled along side the defendant on the street in an […]

,

THE FOURTEEN-MONTH PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the 14-month pre-indictment delay did not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant was incarcerated when he threw urine on a corrections officer. The court analyzed the facts under the “Taranovich” criteria (37 NY2d 442): […]

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY HAVE HAD LEGITIMATE STRATEGIC REASONS FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO A REPUGNANT VERDICT, INCLUDING THE AVOIDANCE OF THE RISK OF RE-EXPOSING DEFENDANT TO AN ATTEMPTED SECOND-DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined defendant did not demonstrate his attorney’s failure to object to a repugnant verdict constituted ineffective assistance: Defendant has not demonstrated a lack of strategic or other legitimate explanation for his attorney’s failure to object to the jury verdict as repugnant (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). Counsel […]

,

THE EVIDENCE OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE WAS SUFFICIENT AND EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S BIPOLAR DISORDER WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED BECAUSE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE DEFENSE WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE PEOPLE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, affirmed defendant’s conviction of reckless endangerment first degree for a series of deliberate collisions with vehicles which culminated in his deliberately crashing into an occupied house. The evidence of depraved indifference to human life was deemed sufficient and evidence of defendant’s bipolar disorder was […]

, ,

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST AN EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE CARRIER FOR UNTIMELY COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, determined that the Workers” Compensation Board (Board) did not have the authority to approve attorney’s fees for charges against an employer or insurance carrier under Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) section 25 for untimely compensation payments. The Board may only approve […]

, ,

HERE THE RESITITUTION FOR THE VICTIM’S OUT-OF-POCKET MEDICAL EXPENSES WAS VACATED BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE A RECORD SUPPORTING THE AMOUNT AWARDED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating the restitution for the victim’s out-of-pocket medical expenses, determined the judge failed to make a record of those expenses as required by Penal Law section 60.27: Although the restitution amount did not exceed the agreed-upon limit, the record is devoid of any hearing, colloquy or judicial determination confirming the actual out-of-pocket […]

,

THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR COULD NOT IMPOSE A NEW “RULE” WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN SUBJECT TO THE FORMAL RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS IN THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) determination, held that the Commissioner’s ruling was based upon a “rule” which had never been subject to the rule-making procedures required by the State Administrative Procedure Act. The Commissioner turned down the petitioner’s application for an O & P license (a license to own, possess and/or […]

, , ,

A NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW WHICH PROHIBITS THE SALE OF FOIE GRAS, A “FATTY LIVER” CREATED BY FORCE FEEDING GEESE AND DUCKS, IS NOT PRE-EMPTED BY THE AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mackey, determined the NYC Local Law which prohibited the sale of foe gras was not pre-empted by the Agriculture and Markets Law. Foie gras (fatty liver) is produced by force feeding geese or ducks several times a day: Foie gras, which translates to […]

,

THE NYS GAMING COMMISSION RELIED ON HEARSAY TO FIND THAT PETITIONER, A RACE-HORSE TRAINER, VIOLATED A LIMIT IMPOSED ON THE AMOUNT OF A DRUG WHICH MAY BE ADMINISTERED TO A RACE HORSE; THE HEARSAY LETTERS FROM TWO LABORATORIES WHICH TESTED THE HORSE’S BLOOD CONSTITUTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE VIOLATION BECAUSE THE LETTERS DID NOT DESCRIBE THE TESTING METHODS AND THE RELIABILTIY OF THOSE TESTING METHODS; MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the NYS Gaming Commission’s ruling and remanding the matter for a new hearing, determined the Commission relied on hearsay to find that petitioner (a race-horse trainer) violated a rule limiting the amount of a drug (bute) which can be administered to a race horse. The petitioner brought an Article 78 proceeding […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy