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DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY HAVE HAD LEGITIMATE STRATEGIC REASONS FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO A REPUGNANT VERDICT, INCLUDING THE AVOIDANCE OF THE RISK OF RE-EXPOSING DEFENDANT TO AN ATTEMPTED SECOND-DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined defendant did not demonstrate his attorney’s failure to object to a repugnant verdict constituted ineffective assistance:

Defendant has not demonstrated a lack of strategic or other legitimate explanation for his attorney’s failure to object to the jury verdict as repugnant (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). Counsel could have declined to object to avoid the possibility that, to remedy the verdict’s repugnancy, the court might resubmit all charges to the jury, reexposing defendant to an attempted second-degree murder conviction (see CPL 310.50 [2]; People v Salemmo, 38 NY2d 357, 360-362 [1976]) That this additional conviction would not have increased defendant’s maximum sentencing exposure does not change this analysis. Sentencing exposure is not dispositive of the sentence a court ultimately imposes. Moreover, an additional felony conviction may have adverse collateral consequences and added societal stigma (see Ball v United States, 470 US 856, 865 [1985]; People v Greene, 41 NY3d 950, 951 [2024]), particularly a conviction for attempting to murder a police officer. People v Gaffney, 2026 NY Slip Op 01445, CtApp 3-17-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when defense counsel’s failure to object to a repugnant verdict may be supported by legitimate strategic concerns—the avoidance of re-exposing defendant to charges of which he was acquitted, for example.

 

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