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THE INFORMATION IN THE CHILD-VICTIMS-ACT CLAIM WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE STATE TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BETWEEN 1986 AND 1990; CLAIM DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan,, determined the Child Victims Act claim did not provide sufficient information to allow the State to investigate the allegations of sexual abuse between 1986 and 1990:

… [W]e conclude that Wright’s [claimant’s] claim lacks the specificity section [Court of Claims Act] 11 (b) requires. Because the allegations are too spare to enable the State promptly to investigate and ascertain the existence and extent of its liability, the claim suffers a jurisdictional defect and therefore must be dismissed.

The claim lacks critical information about the abusers. It alleges that the perpetrators included teachers, coaches, counselors, and perhaps other employees of the State, but it does not explain whether those employees were Wright’s teachers, coaches, and counselors, or why, as a child, he was in their company multiple times between 1986 and 1990. The claim also alleges that members of the public were responsible for some of the abuse he suffered, but it does not explain why Wright came into contact with those persons as a child, the context in which adult supervision of any particular activity allegedly should have been provided, or the extent to which the State bore responsibility for Wright’s contact with the abusers. Nor does the claim adequately allege what repeatedly brought Wright to The Egg [a State performing arts center] over a four-year period in the late 1980s, or why, once on the premises, he frequently engaged with both members of the public and State employees.

In the absence of such information, the State cannot promptly investigate the claim and determine its liability under Wright’s theories of negligence. … The State is left to “guess” whether at any point during the four-year period alleged in the claim it owed some duty to Wright and, if so, whether it breached that obligation … . But it “is not the State’s burden . . . to assemble information” not included in a claim so that it may promptly investigate and assess its liability … . Section 11 (b) places that burden on the claimant. Wright v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01564, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: If the claim in a Child Victims Act suit against the State does not provide enough information to allow the State to investigate, it will be deemed to lack the specificity required by Court of Claims Act section 11 (b) and will be dismissed.​

 

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