You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

,

RECORDS SUBMITTED BY THE BANK DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the records submitted by the bank (Deutsche Bank) did not meet the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule: Here, in support of its motion, Deutsche Bank submitted the mortgage, the note, and the affidavit of Nicholas Collins, a vice president of Ocwen Loan Servicing, […]

, , ,

JUDGE’S SUA SPONTE DISMSSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF NOTICE AND A CHANCE TO BE HEARD, A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint as abandoned without giving plaintiff a chance to be heard in this foreclosure action: … [B]y notice of motion dated August 15, 2014, the plaintiff … moved, inter alia, to extend its time to serve a copy of […]

,

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the sand and debris in a walkway in this slip and fall case. Therefore their motions for summary judgment were properly denied:  “Mere reference to general cleaning practices, with no evidence regarding any specific cleaning or inspection of the area in question, […]

, ,

PLAINTIFF PRESENTED ONLY SPECULATION ABOUT THE CAUSE OF HER SLIP AND FALL, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted because plaintiff could not identify the cause of her fall: … [T]he landlord met her prima facie burden on her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint by submitting the plaintiff’s […]

,

DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE WAS INSPECTED OR TREATED ON THE DAY OF THE FALL, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not demonstrate it did not have constructive notice of the icy condition in this slip and fall case. The defendant presented evidence of the manager’s and superintendent’s general practices but did not present evidence was inspected or treated on the day of the fall: “To meet its […]

, , ,

DEFENDANT’S HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS NEVER PLACED IN CONTROVERSY AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE WAS NOT WAIVED BY A LETTER TO PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY INDICATING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM DEMENTIA, ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that defendant driver’s (Rozansky’s) medical condition at the time of this 2004 traffic accident was not “in controversy” and therefore the driver’s medical records were not discoverable. Rozansky, who subsequently died, had, in 2006, submitted a letter from his social worker to plaintiff’s attorney claiming he suffered from […]

, ,

DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA AND DID NOT HAVE A PRACTICAL ABILITY TO OBJECT, THEREFORE AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT FOR APPEAL APPLIES, MATTER REMITTED TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant was not informed of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea and therefore did not have the opportunity to move to withdraw his plea. Therefore a narrow exception to the preservation requirement applies and the matter was remitted to allow defendant to make the motion: … [A] narrow exception to […]

,

ANONYMOUS TIP ALLEGING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR BY MEN WEARING HOODIES GOING IN AND OUT OF A U-HAUL TRUCK DID NOT JUSTIFY PULLING OVER A U-HAUL TRUCK DRIVEN BY A MAN WEARING A HOODIE, WEAPON FOUND IN THE TRUCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that the anonymous tip that persons were acting suspicious going in and out of a U-Haul truck and that one of the persons was wearing a brown hoodie did not justify pulling over a U-Haul truck driven by a man wearing a brown hoodie. The weapon found in […]

,

ANGRY REMARK MADE TO PROBATION OFFICER DID NOT CONSTITUTE OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION, PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s angry remark made to the probation officer (threatening to “blow her up”) was not a crime and therefore did not justify the revocation of probation and incarceration (defendant has served his sentence): A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree when “he intentionally […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy